What the #MeToo Campaign Teaches About Stop and Frisk

Josephine Ross
WHAT THE #METOO CAMPAIGN TEACHES ABOUT STOP AND FRISK

JOSEPHINE ROSS*

“I felt helpless. . . . Like my [modeling] agency said, he has a lot of power.”

“I’ve never experienced a pat-down in my life, where officers do not go into your pockets, do not go into your pants, do not open your jacket, do not fondle your genitals[.]”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 543
II. ERIC GARNER .................................................................................................................. 546
III. THE FRISK ...................................................................................................................... 549
   A. Frisks as Sexual Touchings .......................................................................................... 549
   B. Sexual Misconduct by Police is Hardly Rare.............................................................. 551
IV. WHAT’S WRONG WITH TERRY’S ASSUMPTION THAT SHORT DETENTIONS PREVENT CRIME ......................................................................................................................... 555
   A. The Control Theory of How Frisks Fight Crime ......................................................... 556
   B. The Waive Your Rights Theory: How Officers Get from Reasonable Suspicion to Probable Cause .................................................................................................................. 558
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 560

I. INTRODUCTION

There is much that #MeToo and feminism can illuminate about the policing practice known as stop and frisk. The #MeToo campaign turned a spotlight on power, consent, and sexual abuse. The hashtag describes a movement in which

* Josephine Ross, Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I thank Jennifer Laurin and Eric Miller for inviting me to join the “Terry at Fifty” Criminal Justice panel at the AALS Annual Meeting in January 2018 and the symposium editors at the Idaho Law Review for asking me to participate in this investigation of Terry’s legacy. Several conversations with Phyllis Goldfarb and Valena Beety helped to strengthen this piece before publication. This Article was made possible by a 2017 summer research stipend provided by the Howard University School of Law. Hats off to Victoria Capatosto, a reference librarian at my law school who finds whatever eludes me and to research assistants Kaiwon Tresvant and Ethan Tillman, who whipped my footnotes into shape.

1. Male model, Josh Ardolf, discussing a situation with photographer Bruce Weber when Mr. Ardolf was twenty years old. Jacob Bernstein et al., Male Models Say Mario Testino and Bruce Weber Sexually Exploited Them, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/13/style/mario-testino-bruce-weber-harassment.html (“The experience, once seen as the price models had to pay for their careers, is now being called something else: abuse of power and sexual harassment.”).

women, and some men, share the fact that they have been the victim of unwanted sexual aggression, from harassment to rape. Thanks to the 2017 campaign, the public increasingly appreciates that power and authority impose new meanings on what might appear superficially as consensual encounters. When a person submits to someone who wields power over them, this may be deeply disturbing and coercive even for encounters that lack visible violence. These insights are equally applicable to policing.

The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Terry v. Ohio fifty years ago this year, allowing stop and frisk to flourish throughout the United States. While the current president extolls aggressive stop and frisk tactics that a federal district court ruled unconstitutional, the current scholarly debate centers on whether the regime set forth in Terry v. Ohio should be completely overturned or whether it is better to simply reign in the worst abuses.

Insights from the #MeToo campaign bolster the argument that Terry v. Ohio is inherently flawed. One of the strengths of #MeToo is how the campaign “put the focus back on the victims.” Another strength is the campaign’s recognition of

3. For example, several men accused Kevin Spacey of groping them without their consent and the Netflix staff reported that he made lewd comments towards the staff, primarily targeted at young men. See, e.g., Mike Miller, Kevin Spacey Accused of Sexual Misconduct by Eight House of Cards Employees: Report, PEOPLE (Nov. 2, 2017), http://people.com/movies/kevin-spacey-accused-of-sexual-misconduct-by-eight-house-of-cards-employees-report/; see also supra note 1.


5. Michael Barbaro et al., Donald Trump Embraces Wider Use of Stop-and-Frisk by Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/donald-trump-don-king-black-voters.html. (In a presidential debate, Mr. Trump said: “One of the things I’d do . . . is I would do stop-and-frisk. I think you have to. We did it in New York; it worked incredibly well and you have to be proactive.”); see also Brian M. Rosenthal, Police Criticize Trump for Urging Officers Not to Be “Too Nice” With Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/nyregion/trump-police-too-nice.html. (“Like when you guys put somebody in the car, and you’re protecting their head, you know, the way you put your hand over their head, [Trump] said, putting his hand above his head for emphasis. ‘I said, “You can take the hand away, O.K.?”’”).

6. For examples of scholars recommending that police continue Terry stops after reigning in the worst abuses, see generally Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, Stop and Frisk: The Use and Abuse of a Controversial Policing Tactic (2016); see generally David A. Harris, Good Cops: The Case for Preventive Policing 154–71 (2005).

In contrast, these scholars seek to end stop and frisk altogether: Frank Rudy Cooper, The Spirit of 1968: Toward Abolishing Terry Doctrine, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 539 (2007); L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 74 (2017) (asserting that the only way to reduce racial bias in stop and frisk interactions would be to eliminate the use of the tactic all together); Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 164 (2016) (“[T]he simple fact of repeated police interactions overexposes African Americans to the possibility of police violence.”).

power dynamics and the difficulty women face in resisting someone who wields power over them. A third strength of the movement is that it exposes sexual abuse as a common occurrence. As more and more women speak up, an activist explained, “we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.”

This Essay applies these three strengths towards examining the *Terry* doctrine.

*Terry* is usually taught, analyzed, and judged from the vantage point of the police officer. Just as the #MeToo movement starts from the perspective of victims of unwanted touchings, so this Essay starts from the perspective of the person subjected to an officer’s stop and frisk.

*Terry* looks very different when I go to middle schools and churches to teach black teenagers and adults how to safely exercise their rights. When law professors teach the case, we explain that the Constitution limits what police can do. We tell our students that police need probable cause to search for drugs; reasonable suspicion is not enough. But that’s not really true. The person who is stopped must assert his constitutional right to refuse the search. The Constitutional limits on *Terry* have to be asserted. Police only need consent from civilians, and I use the concept of consent broadly in this piece to include consent to stop, consent to answer questions, and consent to search. When community members talk about a stop from their perspective, they have many practical questions. “What happens if I say ‘no’ to the officer?” “What will the officer do to me if I walk or run away?” This is what civilians ask and what *Terry*’s victims need to know.

Just as #MeToo recognizes that “no” is not always a realistic response to an aggressor, the Court should recognize that it is unrealistic to expect civilians to say “no” to officers. From a civilian’s perspective, the constitutional limits on *Terry* are scary. Like the victims of Harvey Weinstein, these teenagers have to weigh their options at a bad time, at a time when they feel vulnerable, a time not of their own

the Me Too campaign really does, and what Tarana Burke has really enabled us to do, is put the focus back on the victims,” Alyssa Milano said.

8. “If all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem,” tweeted Alyssa Milano. Lisa Respers France, #MeToo: Social Media Flooded with Personal Stories of Assault, CNN (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/15/entertainment/me-too-twitter-alyssa-milano/index.html. The hashtag was widely used on Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat and other platforms; on Facebook, it was shared in more than twelve million posts and reactions in the first twenty-four hours. More than 12M "Me Too" Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS News (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/me-too-more-than-12-million-facebook-posts-comments-reactions-24-hours/.

9. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[A]lmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.”); see also David A. Sklansky, *Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment*, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 275 (1997) (“the officer’s concern must be objectively reasonable” to allow searches of a driver or the car itself). For a critique of how law school texts rely too heavily on court opinions, thereby slanting readers’ assessments of the benefits and costs of the Fourth Amendment, see Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, *Grounding Criminal Procedure*, 20 J. Gender Race & Just. S3, 96–87, 94 (2017) (“The story that emerges from the winnowed subset of published opinions is one in which police are professional, uncannily intuitive about criminal wrongdoing, and colorblind.”).

10. Along with Howard law students, I teach “Know Your Rights” to community groups, a course on exercising one’s constitutional rights vis-à-vis the police. We have done this in Chicago, New Orleans, Maryland, and Washington D.C.
choosing. To critique *Terry v. Ohio* properly, we must grapple with the fact that requiring civilians to assert their rights represents a weak bulwark against unlimited police power. In reality, *Terry’s* constitutional limits are virtually impossible to assert on the street.

While #MeToo revealed a hidden tsunami of sexual abuse in film studios and offices, this essay points out that police sexual misconduct is extensive and underreported. Like other types of sexual harassment, police sexual misconduct ranges from unconstitutional overreach to criminal assault. Even constitutional frisks can feel like rape to those on the receiving end.

Teaching “Know Your Rights” in the community led me to recognize the flawed reasoning at the heart of *Terry v. Ohio*, flaws that have not been investigated in the pages of law reviews. This Essay asserts that the case law that allows police to obtain consent from individuals is not a stand-alone doctrine independent from *Terry v. Ohio*, any more than consent for sex is separate from the definition of rape. Rather, even a constitutional application of *Terry v. Ohio* relies upon vulnerable individuals consenting to searches or otherwise waiving their rights. Looked at in this light, stop and frisk can no longer be defended as a method that does more good than harm.

II. ERIC GARNER

While Eric Garner is best remembered for his final words, “I can’t breathe,” he could be the poster child for why *Terry v. Ohio* was a mistake from its inception. On July 17, 2015, officers tackled the forty-three-year-old black New Yorker, holding him down first in a chokehold and then compressing his chest as Mr. Garner’s friend recorded the deadly encounter in a video that went viral. The tragedy of what happened to Mr. Garner drew so much attention and outrage that demonstrations were held across the country in which people carried signs that read, “I can’t breathe.” Scholars properly point to his needless death to criticize the chokehold and excessive force. In addition, scholars correctly use his death to indict broken

---

windows policing, a theory closely aligned with stop and frisk. But Eric Garner’s death is a tale of so much else that’s wrong with stop and frisk.

After Mr. Garner was killed, the NYC police department claimed that he was resisting arrest. This claim is troubling because the video does not show him committing any crime and my research uncovered no evidence that the police had probable cause to arrest him. The lawyer who represented the family in their claim against the police department, Jonathan C. Moore, verified that the police lacked an arrest warrant. “It was a bad Terry stop,” Attorney Moore explained. Not only did the police lack probable cause for arrest but they did not even possess reasonable suspicion for a Class A or Class B misdemeanor.

Under Terry, Mr. Garner was free to tell the police to leave him alone and he was free to leave. As the Terry Court stated: “Absent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way.” As Attorney Moore put it, “he was walking away, just as he is supposed to be able to do. He had an absolute right to do all of that.”

Assuming the officers wished to arrest Mr. Garner for untaxed cigarettes, they must see him sell them or they must witness loose cigarettes in his possession.

16.  See Fact Sheet in Richmond County (Staten Island) Grand Jury in Eric Garner Homicide, COLUM. L. SCH. (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.law.columbia.edu/news/2014/12/eric-garner-case-fact-sheet (“The grand jury was tasked with deciding whether there was sufficient evidence to believe that Officer Pantaleo violated any of the homicide provisions of the New York Penal Law and (2) whether Officer Pantaleo’s actions were justified as the legal use of force by a law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest” under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30.1 (McKinney 2018)).
18.  Telephone Interview with Jonathan C. Moore, Attorney for the Garner Family (Dec. 24, 2017). This was a private phone call between myself and the Garner family’s attorney, Jonathan C. Moore. Mr. Moore represented the family in their dispute with New York City and negotiated the $5.9 million settlement. [hereinafter Telephone Interview]; see J. David Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is Settled by New York City for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/eric-garner-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html.
19.  Telephone Interview, supra note 18.
20.  Police had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Garner had loitered and been among a group selling untaxed cigarettes, but this was stale information and the person was only described to the police as “Eric.” See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html (Landlord complained of group loitering in March of 2014, “[t]hough police officials understood the Eric of his complaint to be Mr. Garner, [the landlord] said he was referring to someone else”). Moreover, selling or possessing untaxed cigarettes are not misdemeanors found in the penal code. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-bb (McKinney 2003). Rather, they are regulatory infractions. Id. The New York Code permits police to perform stops based upon a reasonable suspicion of a felony or misdemeanor but not for mere violations. People v. Brukner, 43 N.Y.S.3d 851, 853 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2016) (“Had the legislature intended to include violation level offenses, it most certainly would have done so.”).
22.  Id.
This was a classic stop and frisk conundrum. If Mr. Garner had cooperated, the police would have called this a consensual encounter, a mere contact, camouflaging their unlawful detention as the civilian’s choice.

Because police knew from past arrests that Mr. Garner sometimes earned money selling loose cigarettes, the police wanted to search Mr. Garner’s pockets. To search Mr. Garner’s pockets under Terry v. Ohio, police needed probable cause to believe that their suspect possessed contraband, or they needed his consent to search. But Mr. Garner did not consent to a search. He told police, “I’m minding my business, officer . . . Please just leave me alone.” The chokehold that ended Mr. Garner’s life must be recognized as his punishment for refusing to give the police what they wanted. The investigatory stop morphed into an arrest when Mr. Garner complained: “Every time you see me, you want to mess with me. I’m tired of it. It stops today.”

The police violated the constitution by tackling Eric Garner. The settlement was for $5.9 million. Goodman, supra note 18. Nevertheless, the tackle still fell under the Terry regime that directs officers to seek evidence of a crime based on suspicion. The officers were not indicted or otherwise punished for their handling of Mr. Garner because the department considered the tackle to be in furtherance of police business.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The police violated the constitution by tackling Eric Garner. The settlement was for $5.9 million. Goodman, supra note 18. Nevertheless, the tackle still fell under the Terry regime that directs officers to seek evidence of a crime based on suspicion. The officers were not indicted or otherwise punished for their handling of Mr. Garner because the department considered the tackle to be in furtherance of police business.
32. Id. Under the “injuries” category, Garner claims “the injuries I received was to my manhood in which (the officer) violated” through the search of his rectum and genitals “for his own personal pleasure. (The officer) violated my civil rights.” Id.
breathe.” As the police surrounded him, moments before they would tackle and strangle him, he pleaded with them not to touch him. In the context of his earlier experience at the hands of the police, Mr. Garner’s final plea for dignity and liberty gathers new meaning.

Every time you see me, you want to mess with me. I’m tired of it. It stops today. Why would you…? Everyone standing here will tell you I didn’t do nothing. I did not sell nothing. Because every time you see me, you want to harass me. You want to stop me (garbled) Selling cigarettes. I’m minding my business, officer, I’m minding my business. Please just leave me alone. I told you the last time, please just leave me alone. please, please, don’t touch me. Do not touch me.

Even airport frisks can be especially upsetting for people with a history of sexual assault. In Mr. Garner’s case, the history was close to home because the prior sexual abuse was at the hands of an officer. In fact, the prior strip search began in somewhat the same way as his final encounter with the police began. Who can blame Mr. Garner for not consenting to a frisk or full-blown search? Who can blame Mr. Garner for wishing not to be touched?

III. THE FRISK

A. Frisks as Sexual Touchings

Even when done by the book, a frisk can feel like a sexual violation. As Paul Butler explains in his new book *Chokehold*, “Frisks are frequently experienced as []
sexual touchings. ” Seth Stoughton, now a professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law, spent five years as a police officer in Tallahassee, Florida. The former police officer points out that the person receiving the frisk and the officer doing the frisk will have very different feelings. When he worked as a police officer, Professor Stoughton frisked methodically, in this way:

I would start at either the front or rear center of the suspect’s midsection and run my fingers along and beneath their belt, then frisk their waistband, front and back pockets, groin, and buttocks. The groin and buttocks bear special mention, as it had been drilled into me in training that criminals knew and took advantage of the fact that officers were naturally uncomfortable searching these areas. The potential for avoiding discovery made those areas particularly attractive as hiding spots, which in turn made it particularly important for me to search there. To do so, I would make the same motions as I’ve just described, reaching around over the front of the thighs and doing the same from the back, running my hand along clothing between suspects’ legs starting on one side and making my way across. Inevitably, this involved contact (through gloves and clothing) with suspects’ buttocks and genitalia, but that contact was essential for an effective frisk.

A recent video posted on YouTube conforms to Professor Stoughton’s description of the invasive touching of the groin area. Initially, the anonymous civilian on the YouTube film complies fully with the officer, raising his arms above his head and spreading his legs apart. But as the officer feels around his groin, the young man jumps. “I am a man, brother,” he tells the officer. He jumps again, even after the officer handcuffs him before resuming the search. “Stop fingering me!” he exclaims. The frisk looks precisely as Professor Stoughton describes, routine for the officers who are simply intent on getting the job done. But quite naturally, the frisk is received as a sexual indignity by the civilian who asks the officer why he is “fingering my ass.” In the video, at least four other police officers stand nearby while

40. Id. at 22.
41. Id. at 29 (emphasis added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968) (“[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner’s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.”).
42. CC mob, Police Officer Appears to Sexually Assault a Suspect... During a Stop and Frisk, YouTube (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAYieOKP9yc. It appears to be a Terry stop because the civilian confidently states: “You are not going to find anything on me.” Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. CC mob, supra note 42.
one frisks the individual. In Professor Butler’s view, the other officers are participants in the enterprise. “Often other cops participate, either as voyeurs, or by doing another guy at the same time.”

Watching the frisk on YouTube, I am struck by the absurdity of the exercise. Even if the man were not placed in handcuffs, it is hard to believe he would somehow be able to reach into the region of his groin to pull out some small weapon without alerting the officer who is holding his arms. After all, there are four of them and all they aim to do, supposedly under Terry, is ask the man a few questions to dispel their suspicions before they let him walk away. Nevertheless, this is lawful under the Terry regime.

As Professor Butler points out, “you are supposed to go about your business as if nothing of consequence has happened” after the police have “felt all over your body.” In this way, the Terry regime fails to recognize the humanity of the men, women, and children subject to frisks. While Professor Butler describes the injury of an invasive frisk as “analogous to sexual assault[,]” he is careful not to claim the frisk as a form of sexual violence. “My claim[,]” he writes, “is not that seize and search is the same as sexual harassment. My point is that stop and frisk shares certain features with this form of subordination.” In other words, it feels like a sexual violation, but the officer may be simply following his supervisor’s orders, doing what he is trained to do. The officer performing the frisk may not intend to humiliate or harass. However, not all officers are like Professor Stoughton. It’s an open secret that frisks also create an opportunity for abuse.

**B. Sexual Misconduct by Police is Hardly Rare.**

Sexual abuse is the second most common civilian complaint lodged against police officers in the United States. The Cato Institute announced this surprising statistic in 2010 when they compiled and analyzed existing data from multiple sources. Others have followed the Institute’s lead, attempting to quantify the number of allegations that resulted in arrest or discipline. An Associated Press study concluded that in a six-year period, approximately 1,000 officers lost their badges for sexual misconduct. Reporters included serious criminal conduct, namely rape, sodomy, and other sexual assault, as well as less serious misconduct.

---

49. Id.
50. Butler, supra note 38, at 98.
51. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
52. Butler, supra note 38, at 17.
53. Id. at 97.
54. Id. at 103.
56. Id.
58. Sedensky, supra note 57.
such as “consensual” intercourse with citizens while on duty.\textsuperscript{59} The Buffalo News compiled its own database in 2015 and summarized its findings in this provocative sub-headline: “Every five days, a police officer in America is caught engaging in sexual abuse or misconduct. Others are never caught.”\textsuperscript{60}

Transgender individuals report frisks that include being told to unzip one’s pants to reveal genitals simply to satisfy the curiosity of a police officer.\textsuperscript{61} Others complain of physical abuse. A survey conducted in 2011 found that 22% of transgender people who interacted with police reported harassment, while 2% of respondents reported being sexually assaulted by officers.\textsuperscript{62} Survivors of violence who report the situation to police are particularly vulnerable.\textsuperscript{63} Nationally, nearly half of the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender (LGBT) survivors of violence report police misconduct when they sought help from police.\textsuperscript{64} By keeping their own statistics, the LGBT community has shed light on a problem that is exacerbated by stereotypes of transgender sex-workers and the discomfort of some police with gender-non-conforming individuals. While the connection between police harassment and sexual harassment may be more salient in LGBT complaints, the sexual misconduct extends beyond any particular group.

Even the International Association of Police Chiefs recognized sexual misconduct as a national problem. The Department of Justice underwrote an executive guide created by the Association that set out policy recommendations for eliminating sexual misconduct in police forces.\textsuperscript{65} Explaining the high incidence of sexual misconduct, the executive guide opined that the job itself inadvertently creates opportunities, namely, police have power and authority over others; officers work independently; and officers engage with vulnerable populations.\textsuperscript{66}

Most abuse stays hidden, in part because the conduct is shielded from discovery. Researchers complained back in 1995 that there are huge obstacles to finding data on police sexual misconduct, noting that “it is almost impossible to obtain information without a court order.”\textsuperscript{67} There is still no national database and no national reporting requirements for sexual misconduct by police, not even for reports

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Id. (the AP obtained records from 2009 through 2014 from forty-one states on police decertification, an administrative process in which an officer’s law enforcement license is revoked).
\item \textsuperscript{60} Spina, supra note 57.
\item \textsuperscript{61} See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 158–163 (2011) (note that 6% reported physical assault). Blacks and Latinos reported higher levels of sexual assault by police, 7% and 8% respectively. Id. at 160.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Id. at 158.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Id. at 4 (addressing sexual offenses by law enforcement); Carpenter, supra note 57 (“Though the guide was completed in 2011, it’s not clear if it actually led to changes within individual police forces.”); Sedesky, supra note 57.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of on-duty rape. Even more problematic, the extant data only illuminates situations where the police were charged with crimes or discharged from the force.

Sexual abuse is vastly underreported in general, and even less likely to be reported to authorities when the perpetrators are police. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence for the Cato Institute to conclude that "sexual assault rates are significantly higher for police when compared to the general population."68

Researchers need to do more to unearth the data involving male victims of sexually abusive policing. Philip Stinson, a Criminal Justice professor at Bowling Green State University, is one of the primary researchers quantifying and analyzing data on police misconduct.69 When Professor Stinson gathered data on the arrest of officers for sexual violence, he found 548 cases across the country in a three-year period.70 From 2005 to 2007, the police officers arrested for sexual misconduct were overwhelmingly male and most involved victims younger than eighteen years old.71 However, two-thirds of the child victims were abused by off-duty officers while three-quarters of the adults were abused while the officer was on-duty.72 Over 200 of these 548 cases involved charges of forcible rape or sodomy, followed by fondling or statutory rape.73 Crunching the numbers, Stinson notes that the "simple odds of an officer’s arrest for a sex-related crime versus some other type of police crime decrease by 97% if the victim is male."

Researchers agree that arrested officers represent the tip of the iceberg.76 While the gender of the victim is worthy of more study, we will likely learn that male victims are often the submerged part of the proverbial iceberg.

Men and boys have the same problems reporting sexual abuse that women do. For one, who do you call for help when the police are the bullies? Second, men and boys have the same problem of shame. Perhaps there is even more stigma for male victims in our society.77 Third, the badge, gun, and power to arrest creates the

68. The Cato report used FBI statistics for comparison. See CATO INST., supra note 55.
71. Id. at 674–76.
72. Id. at 675–76.
73. Id. at 675.
74. Id. at 678. Note that victims were male in only 8% of police prosecutions for sexual misconduct. "The inclusion of young male victims also provides data on cases of police sexual misconduct that have not been identified in prior empirical research." Id. at 686 n.2.
75. Id. at 675–78.
77. Rachel Wyatt, Note, Male Rape in U.S. PRISONS: Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 579, 587 (2006) (citing W. WOODEN & J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN PRISON (1982) ("Prisoners also may have refused to admit to having had sex with other men for fear of being labeled ‘weak’ or ‘gay’"); see also HALLIE MARTYNIUK, UNDERSTANDING RAPING IN PRISON, PA. COAL. AGAINST RAPE 3 (2014), https://www.pcar.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdfs/7_understanding Rape in prison_low_res.pdf ("The prison culture is based on assumptions about a person’s physical and mental weakness; victims are weak."); see also Valerie Jenness, & Sarah Fenstermaker, Forty Years after Brownmiller: Prisons for Men, Transgender Inmates, and the Rape of the Feminine, 30 Gender & Soc’y 14, 25 (2016) ("[A]s in the world
power differential between officers and women and between officers and men. Thus, there is every reason to suspect that police sexual abuse is grossly underreported among men. After all, Professor Stinson’s data only included police who were arrested or prosecuted and was therefore more likely to capture the “egregious” cases or cases that prosecutors would consider egregious.

The high rate of officers who are prone to commit sexual offenses either off-duty or on-duty creates a problem of legitimacy for the daily use of frisks. Statistically, there’s a high likelihood that some patrol officers are prone to intentional sexual misconduct. When male police chiefs in the St. Louis metropolitan area answered questions about the prevalence of sexual misconduct in their staff, on average, the chiefs suspected twenty percent of their staff. In their opinion, one out of five officers while on duty, committed at least low-level acts of sexual misconduct, such as pulling over cars to fish for dates, as well as more serious offenses. These are the same officers who initiate Terry stops and conduct frisks.

outside the prison, and depending upon the situation, sexual assault and sexual coercion can be made intelligible to all concerned by reaffirming the feminine as weak, vulnerable, and deserving of being demeaned and overpowered. Likewise, the masculine demands distance from and derogation of the feminine and draws its power from such behavior.”).

78. See generally Stinson, supra note 70. Oddly, Stinson theorizes that this proves that the inherent power differential between police officers and females extends to male children and male teens more than it does to adult men. Id. at 686 (“The fact that the identified male victims (M age = 15.67, SD = 4.143) were most commonly either children or teens suggests that some of the same factors that contribute to the perpetration of sex crimes against women—namely, differences in power between police and their victims—also operate in cases involving children or teens whether the victim is male or female.”). Stinson builds on an earlier feminist definition of police sexual violence and agrees that “sex crimes often result from encounters involving young females because of an inherent power differential and the interplay between issues of power and gender that work to produce opportunities for sex crimes.” Id. (Citing Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 67). This definition may have influenced his conclusions.

79. Stinson, supra note 70, at 683 (“Thus, our methodology is probably more likely to capture those cases that could not be ignored and compelled an arrest because they were indeed egregious. Still, the sheer number of violent sex crimes in our study should concern both scholars and police executives regardless of the methodology used to identify them empirically.”); see also Carpenter, supra note 57 (“Researchers have to rely on arrest reports and press accounts, which leave out unreported or unprosecuted cases.”).

80. For example, Officer Daniel Pantaleo, the officer who applied the chokehold to Eric Garner, was sued for degrading searches of other men. Kevin McCoy, Choke-Hold Cop Sued in Prior Misconduct Cases, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/04/choke-hold-cop-pantaleo-sued/19899461/ [law suit alleged “humiliating and unlawful strip searches in public view.”]; see also, Carimah Townes & Jack Jenkins, EXCLUSIVE DOCUMENTS: The Disturbing Secret History of the NYPD Officer Who Killed Eric Garner, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/daniel-pantaleo-records-75833e6168f3/ [Officer Pantaleo’s information was leaked from the Civilian Complaint Review Board. The information shows that “[b]efore he put Garner in the chokehold, the records show, he had seven disciplinary complaints and 14 individual allegations lodged against him. Four of those allegations were substantiated by an independent review board.”]; “Even a conservative reading of the documents indicates Pantaleo had among the worst CCRB disciplinary records on the force two years before his encounter with Garner.” Id.

81. Maher, supra note 11, at 16. (“Of those chiefs who identified percentages of officers they believed participated in some form of sexual misconduct, they reported that on average only 2.7% of all officers engage in serious forms of this behavior” such as “rape, sexual assault, and sex with a juvenile.”) [emphasis added]; When police stop cars “simply because the officer finds the driver attractive[,]” this is categorized as less serious form of police sexual misconduct. Id. at 3; see also Timothy M. Maher, Cops on The Make: Police Officers Using Their Job, Power, And Authority to Pursue Their Personal Sexual Interests, 7 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 32, 33–34 (2007) (“In unjustified traffic stops, where the officer pulls over someone
Criminologists recognize a continuum of police sexual violence ranging from humiliation to rape. What happened to Mr. Garner falls somewhere on that continuum. If we charted frisks on a continuum of legitimacy, on one end would be the frisk where an officer is simply confirming if a bulge in the waistband of a person’s pants might be a gun. On the other end of the continuum are frisks that turn into sexual assaults or rape. In the middle of the continuum one finds frisks performed with voyeuristic intent or a desire to humiliate, as well as frisks that are unconstitutional in scope or unreasonable at their inception.

Mr. Garner’s public strip search was unconstitutional even if the police were searching for drugs rather than satisfying a prurient interest. Assuming that it happened the way Mr. Garner remembered, the frisk was also sexually abusive, for it served to humiliate and dominate. These are motivations akin to the forms of abuse showcased in the #MeToo movement.

Let’s add a “#HimToo” for Eric Garner. We have come a long way from thinking about police sexual misconduct as a situation where females consent to an officer’s overtures. Indeed, we cannot discuss police violence against women without talking about sexual violence. It is because we are finally talking about abuse against women that we can finally talk about abuse against men in a more open and honest way.

**IV. WHAT’S WRONG WITH TERRY’S ASSUMPTION THAT SHORT DETENTIONS PREVENT CRIME**

According to the Supreme Court, stop and frisk is a legitimate crime-fighting strategy. This leads the Court in Terry to reason that overall, the benefits of allowing police to stop and frisk on less than probable cause outweigh the reduction in Fourth Amendment individual rights. The Court used crime-fighting as a justification for Terry stops even while it recognized that the method would sometimes be...

---

82. See Walker & Irlbeck, supra note 76, at 5.
83. See, e.g., John L. Burris, Life as a Civil Rights Lawyer in the San Francisco Bay Area, 47 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 133, 140 (2017) (discussing how a judge stopped the Oakland police from strip searching African American men in public).
84. See Andrea J. Ritchie, Invisible No More: Police Violence Against Black Women and Women of Color 104–126 (2017). (Andrea Ritchie devotes a chapter to the forms of police sexual violence that were historically directed to women of color and how many of these practices continue today.).
used to harass black civilians.\textsuperscript{86} So what is the crime-fighting strategy that justifies
the harms known fifty years ago and the harms known today?\textsuperscript{87}

There are two current theories for how stops and frisks prevent crimes. One
might be called the “control theory” of policing. And I shall call the second theory,
hidden within Terry, the “waive your rights theory.” Both are flawed. Both will ben-
et from feminist analysis. Both help explain how Mr. Garner ended up dying on a
day when he was not even carrying one loose cigarette.

A. The Control Theory of How Frisks Fight Crime

The control theory of policing became famous in New York, where it was scru-
tinized during the trial in \textit{Floyd v. City of New York},\textsuperscript{88} and in Baltimore where it was
critiqued by the Justice Department.\textsuperscript{89} However, the method is used in many other
jurisdictions in the United States.\textsuperscript{90} Basically, police use the stop and frisk as a means
of controlling a population. Repeated instances of stop and frisk will cause men,
women and youth to be afraid to break the law. Police are told to detain certain
demographics (usually black, brown and poor) and show them that the police own
the streets.\textsuperscript{91} New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg trumpeted this approach to stop
and frisk. When the statistics showed that police made one thousand stops before
they found one person with a gun—a terrible rate of return\textsuperscript{92}—Mayor Bloomberg

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 14–15 (“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of
which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion
of any evidence from any criminal trial.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Frank Rudy Cooper, \textit{Cultural Context
Amendment}, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 365 (1998). Crime prevention was the Terry Court’s sole justification for
stops and frisks on less than probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (A general interest in “effective crime
prevention and detection . . . underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circum-
stances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”).

\textsuperscript{87} For a description of the harms and the growing understanding of the harms caused by stop
and frisk, see Josephine Ross, \textit{Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health}, 25 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 689 (2016).

\textsuperscript{88} 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Kami Chavis Simmons, \textit{The Legacy of Stop and Frisk:
York’s stop-and-frisk police policy has evolved into a tactic whose purpose is to intimidate and harass vulnerable
classes of individuals—poor, racial, and ethnic minorities.”)

\textsuperscript{89} U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2016) [HEREINAFTER DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT].

\textsuperscript{90} See, e.g., David A. Harris, \textit{Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New

\textsuperscript{91} Jocelyn Simonson, \textit{Beyond Body Cameras: Defending A Robust Right to Record the Police}, 104

\textsuperscript{92} In 2009 a New York Police Department (NYPD) Lieutenant instructed his officers during the
“roll call” at the beginning of a shift at the 81st Precinct in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn:

“[W]e’ve got to keep the corner clear. . . . Because if you get too big of a crowd there, you
know, . . . they’re going to think that they own the block. We own the block. They don’t own
the block, all right? They might live there but we own the block. All right? We own the streets
clear. You tell them what to do.”

\textit{Id.} (quoting \textit{Floyd}, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 597).

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Floyd}, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (“The rate of arrests arising from stops is low (roughly 6%), and
the yield of seizures of guns or other contraband is even lower (roughly 0.1% and 1.8% respectively.”).
said this saves lives.93 People are scared to carry guns thanks to stop and frisk.94 The New York model is stop and frisk on steroids. When President Donald Trump praised New York’s stop and frisk and called for the method to be used throughout the country, he was talking about using stop and frisk to control poor black people.95

The sexaulized frisk or strip search must be understood as a logical extension of the control theory. As feminism teaches, sexual harassment and sexual abuse is often a way of demonstrating dominance. Harvey Weinstein told a distraught actress who asked him why he grabbed her breast without permission “as behavior he is ‘used to.’”96 Weinstein used the sexual massage as part of an overall strategy to control certain actresses.97

The authors of Terry v. Ohio would have been shocked to learn that the NYPD made over 685,000 stops one year only to find that over 600,000 of the people stopped or frisked were innocent of any crime.98 Likewise, Terry’s authors would have disapproved of the policing methods in Baltimore, where frisks are like a side of fries, served up with every Terry stop.99 In fact, Judge Shira Scheindlin supposedly ended the control method in New York City in 2013 with her famous Floyd decision.100 Floyd held that NYPD’s stop and frisk policy violated the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.101

The Floyd decision predated Eric Garner’s death by almost a year and reforms were in progress.102 Thus, Mr. Garner’s treatment illustrates that police control of


94. Id. (”By making it ‘too hot to carry,’ the N.Y.P.D. is preventing guns from being carried on our streets,” [Mayor Bloomberg] said. “That is our real goal . . . ”).

95. Barbaro et al., supra note 5. (”Mr. Trump remains an unabashed fan of the tactic and has glossed over the legal and racial objections to its use for years.”); Josh Zeitz, How Trump is Recycling Nixon’s ‘Law and Order’ Playbook, POLITICO MAG. (July 18, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/donald-trump-law-and-order-richard-nixon-crime-race-214066.


99. DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 89.


101. Id. at 667.

102. On August 12, 2013, the U.S. District Court appointed a monitor to oversee implementation of court-remedies ordered in Floyd. See J. David Goodman, Court-Appointed Police Monitor Has Fought for City and Against It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/nyregion/court-appointed-police-monitor-has-fought-for-city-and-against-it.html. Then, in November of 2013, Mayor Bill de Blasio won the election on a campaign to end New York’s stop and frisk program and he changed police commissioners in January of 2014. Jim Dwyer, Vowing to Stay the (Already Subdued) Stop-and-Frisk Dragon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/nyregion/de-blasio-and-bratton-promise-to-deliver-on-goals-but-give-no-credit.html (“[B]y the time Mr. de Blasio announced that he was running for mayor, the number of stops and frisks had already started a drastic decline . . . ”). The New York City Council also began moving forward with policing reform in the wake of the Floyd decision. See, e.g., COUNCIL
the individuals selected for questioning is inherent within Terry stops. This is partly due to the nature of policing. We teach officers to use command presence; we train police to use body language and words that signal that they have the power.\textsuperscript{103} Policing demands this. Thus, even if supervisors no longer demand frisk quotas or reward officers for drug arrests, officers would still exert power and control when they confront suspects.

B. The Waive Your Rights Theory: How Officers Get from Reasonable Suspicion to Probable Cause

Turning to Terry v. Ohio’s own thesis that stop and frisk solves crimes, the majority opinion is strangely inscrutable. While the majority reasons that reasonable suspicion can ripen into probable cause when an officer detains a person a short time while posing a few questions,\textsuperscript{104} the Terry Court never explains how this works. How can mere suspicion blossom into probable cause by detaining someone a short time?

In fact, Terry’s crime-fighting strategy is premised on vulnerable civilians waiving their constitutional rights. Of course, the Supreme Court has never admitted as much, but in practice, for an officer’s suspicion to evolve from reasonable suspicion to probable cause to arrest for the suspected crime, the civilian must give up either her right against self-incrimination or her consent to a search of her body or possessions.

Let’s play around with the facts of Terry v. Ohio to demonstrate how this theory unfolds. We know that police had reasonable suspicion to believe that John W. Terry was casing a store for robbery and that this allowed the officer to stop and frisk Mr. Terry.\textsuperscript{105} But what should the officer do if the frisk turned up no gun? What next? What’s the Court’s plan for police to develop probable cause for an arrest for conspiracy to rob?\textsuperscript{106} Perhaps the Court imagines that after a couple of questions, Mr. Terry might respond—‘yes, officer—I was planning a robbery, I was casing this store.’ Certainly, that would constitute probable cause to arrest for conspiracy to rob. Yet this crime-solving method is premised on Mr. Terry waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.


\textsuperscript{104} See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (“One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior . . . .”). The officer’s “justifiable suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting Terry, restraining his liberty of movement briefly, and addressing questions to him . . . .” Id. at 33.

\textsuperscript{105} Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.

\textsuperscript{106} Note that had Mr. Terry’s gun been lawful, as they are in Maine and Kansas, there would have been no arrest for gun possession—so the officer would have had to keep asking questions.
Next, we turn to the many drug arrests that begin with an officer’s mere suspicions. Take the stop in Utah v. Strieff, where the Supreme Court recently expanded the government’s power to violate the Fourth Amendment during a Terry stop without fear of redress. There, the police officer suspected that Edward Strieff possessed drugs. In order to find out whether his suspicions are accurate, the officer must examine Mr. Strieff’s pockets, but he lacked the probable cause required to do so.

In the actual Strieff situation, the officer even lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Strieff, but eventually the officer learned about an unpaid traffic ticket that enabled him to arrest his suspect. Mr. Strieff was then searched incident to arrest. That’s a cheat! That’s not the pure Terry theory of asking a couple of questions for reasonable suspicion that Mr. Strieff carried drugs on his person to ripen into probable cause to arrest for possession. The Terry doctrine is distorted when police use warrant checks to circumvent their lack of probable cause to search. Similarly, it is widely known that police often use the frisk to look for drugs—but this also distorts the Terry doctrine. Under the pure Terry doctrine, police can only search a person’s pockets for drugs if the person admits he possesses drugs or consents to a search. In other words, Terry’s justification for allowing detentions on less than probable cause relies on an officer’s ability to persuade vulnerable civilians to waive their right to say no.

---

109. Id. at 2063 (Officer Fackrell saw Strieff leave a “suspected drug house[,]” however, as Streiff’s lawyers argued, the officer “lacked a sufficient basis to conclude that Strieff was a short-term visitor who may have been consuming a drug transaction,” meaning that the officer suspected Strieff had purchased narcotics moments before.).
110. Id. at 2060.
111. Id. at 2063.
112. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The outstanding warrant is just another excuse to arrest. In fact, the outstanding warrant fits well under the control theory of policing. As the DOJ Ferguson Report showed, checking for warrants, particularly misdemeanor and traffic warrants, is useful for ensnaring a population into the criminal justice system. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015); see also Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (objecting to how the majority used the warrant to bootstrap an excuse to arrest: “The warrant check, in other words, was not an ‘intervening circumstance’ separating the stop from the search for drugs. It was part and parcel of the officer’s illegal ‘expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.’”) In other words, Terry requires reasonable suspicion to investigate a particular crime.
113. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65–66 (1968)”If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry . . . .”). The “sole justification” of the Terry frisk is the “protection of the police officer and others nearby.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378. Feeling a lump to see if it was drugs “therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize.” Id. See, e.g., Annie Fisher, The Myth of the Terry Frisk, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.: HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 1, 1–2 (2012)”It is one thing when a Terry frisk is done and a weapon is actually recovered, but in tens of thousands of misdemeanor cases in Philadelphia, the Terry frisk is merely a mechanism to get into the defendant’s pocket[,]”); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1994).
114. Confessions can create probable cause for a search while consent searches create an exception to the probable cause requirement. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 29 (2008).
Arguably, Mr. Garner’s death was a result of Terry’s crime-fighting method. Police needed his full cooperation to get to probable cause. They needed Mr. Garner to stop and submit to a search so that they might dispel their suspicions. When I talk to middle school students about their rights, I teach them to say “Officer, I do not consent to searches.” But they worry the officer will retaliate if they do not cooperate and do everything the officer wants. It is a reasonable fear. They all know what happened to Eric Garner, and to their friends. What person in Eric Garner’s neighborhood will ever feel safe saying no? It is no puzzle why over 90% of civilians consent to searches.\(^{115}\)

We know from the #MeToo movement that it is not easy to say no to a person with power. For the most part, our country recognizes that adults and children can freely say no when an officer asks for sex. But when it comes to searches, the courts call it consent. While many have called out the Supreme Court for its fiction that people somehow wish to give up their right to walk away or that they gladly suffer the type of frisk described in this article,\(^{116}\) Terry’s crime-fighting justification persists.

I hope the #MeToo movement helps counter the idea that there’s nothing wrong with a crime-fighting strategy that depends upon police halting civilians in order to convince them to give up their right to silence, their property rights (for searches of their bags), or inherent dignity (for searches of their person). The power dynamic in policing cannot change any more than we can stop the power dynamic between an intern and her employer. The only way to stop the abuse is to abolish the consent doctrine and that, in turn, means the end of Terry’s justification for stop and frisk on less than probable cause.

V. CONCLUSION

For two years, I traveled to DC Superior Court with Howard Law students on Saturday mornings to teach “Know Your Rights” to teenagers who had been arrested for trespassing, petty theft, and other minor misdemeanors. By attending “Youth Court,” the teens avoided juvenile court.

During one “know your rights” training, a slender fourteen-year-old dressed in the ubiquitous District of Columbia uniform of tee shirt, jeans and sneakers, kept his iPhone in his pocket and leaned forward in the jury box chair, listening intently. At one point, when the law students were switching scenes, he beckoned me over to ask me a question. What happens when they feel up your private areas, he wanted to know. I asked him if it happened to him. Yes, he explained, the last time he was searched, “it felt like rape.” He wanted to know whether there was something he could do about that.

This young man’s question continues to trouble me. Maybe the search was legal under Terry. After all, we know officers are allowed to feel around the groin. Or maybe it was closer to what happened to Eric Garner and a few others who have


\(^{116}\) For more on this, see Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2010).
spoken out. This is a huge but hidden part of Terry’s legacy. It requires more than mere tinkering with the doctrine.

The consent doctrine is a sham. It is simply not safe for vulnerable civilians to say no. We must toss out the consent doctrine. And once we get rid of the consent doctrine, Terry v. Ohio must fall with it. At its heart, Terry requires police to get individuals to waive their rights so that police can search pockets and gather confessions during short detentions.

As the #MeToo movement demonstrates, perceived consent is usually coercion when there’s an imbalance in power. Often, what appears to be consensual is surely not. Moreover, the brave #MeToo victims teach us that non-consensual touching leaves scars. To recognize the power imbalance in policing would lead us to abolish the consent doctrine and end Terry’s claim to fighting crime. So Happy Birthday Terry, #Timesup!

---