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Evans v. Michigan and the Abrogation of State v. Korsen: A Look at the Effect on Habeas Corpus Claims for Collateral Relief in Idaho

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I. INTRODUCTION

On February 20, 2013, The Supreme Court of the United States issued its holding in the case of Evans v. Michigan. In an eight to one decision, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of a criminal defendant after a court-directed acquittal. Retrial was barred even in the event that the acquittal rested on the trial court’s erroneous understanding of the law. In holding that erroneous acquittals barred a retrial of criminal defendants, this Supreme Court decision overruled the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Korsen. Both Evans and Korsen dealt with the issue of double jeopardy and the constitutional protections guaranteed to defendants in criminal trials, however, in each case, the court reached the opposite conclusion. This paper discusses the positions of each court, the reasoning expressed, and the issues that each court considered.

After fully discussing the positions found in each case, this paper moves on to the question of whether the decision in Evans has retroactive application. Specifi-
cally, whether the decision in Evans provides Idaho prisoners, convicted under now
overruled Idaho precedent, potential retroactive benefit. The retroactivity of Su-
preme Court decisions is an ever-evolving topic that traces back to a key Supreme
Court case, Teague v. Lane.6 This paper discusses the various aspects of a retroac-
tivity determination and the different questions that must be asked concerning the
nature of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the defendant’s position in the review pro-
cess, and the application of established exceptions to the retroactivity analysis
found in Teague.

In so doing, this paper presents a discussion of the implications that Evans
presents for the future of Double Jeopardy Clause defenses in Idaho that criminal
defendants may raise in the wake of erroneous acquittals or acquittals based on
misapprehensions of the law after the abrogation of Korsen. Part II of this paper
discusses the background of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It focuses on the lan-
guage of both the federal and state double jeopardy clauses, the historical purposes
of the clauses, the specific protections enumerated by the courts and how those
protections are interpreted by the courts, the specific protections granted to criminal
defendants in the event of an acquittal, and when the Double Jeopardy Clause may
be triggered.

Part III of this paper discusses the cases of State v. Korsen, and Evans v. Mi-
chigan. First, it discusses the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in the case of
State v. Korsen,7 focusing on how the Idaho Supreme Court defined acquittal, and
specifically what constituted an acquittal for the purposes of triggering the Double
Jeopardy Clause. It further discusses the factual determination necessary for when
an acquittal actually takes place, and the interplay between an acquittal based on a
factual determination by the court in relation to the criminal charge, versus a mis-
apprehension of the law.

Next, this paper discusses the United States Supreme Court case of Evans v. Mi-
chigan8 looking at the reasoning and policy rationales stated by the Supreme
Court in reaching its holding, and how the factual determinations of the Court con-
cerning the definition of acquittal differed in their application from Korsen. Finally,
Part III contains a critique of the decision from Evans. It discusses the dissenting
opinion found in Evans, and the policy rationales for allowing the Double Jeopardy
Clause to trigger despite a clearly recognizable judicial error.

Part IV of this paper discusses the Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane and
the possible retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions. First, it provides a broad
description of the decision in Teague, and how the analysis found therein provides
the starting point for determining retroactivity. Next, it discusses the application of
the three-part test developed in Beard v. Banks9, looking at the finality of the con-
viction, the legal landscape at the time of finality and whether the constitution as
then interpreted compels the new rule, and if the new rule falls within an estab-
lished exception to the doctrine, for determining the retroactivity of Supreme Court
decisions.10

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8. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1069.
10. Id. at 411.
Part V of this paper applies the established retroactivity analysis to the ruling in Evans to determine if the holding announces a new rule. And, whether the abrogation of Korsen has retroactive applicability in Idaho and what that may mean for criminal defendants, and Part VI of this paper discusses the conclusion drawn from the preceding parts.

II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

One of the foundations of criminal jurisprudence is the concept of double jeopardy. The United States Constitution states that no person shall be put in jeopardy of “life and limb” for the same offence twice. The Idaho State Constitution mirrors the United States Constitution and provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”

Historically, like much of our modern jurisprudence, the Double Jeopardy Clause traces its roots back to English common law. While history shows a complicated development of the modern protection we now have, the first American colony to adopt protections against double jeopardy was Massachusetts in 1641. Titled the Body of Liberties, the Massachusetts charter stated that “[n]o man shall (sic) sentenced by Civil Justice for one and the same Crime, offence, or Trespasse.” Departing from English common law, which had only given protection for capital offences, the Body of Liberties extended protection to all crimes. This Body of Liberties served as a model that other colonies used to develop their own protections against double jeopardy. It is also considered an important forerunner to the Bill of Rights. All thirteen states had established state constitutional protection against double jeopardy before the Bill of Rights was added to the federal constitution.

At its core, the constitutional protection provided by the Fifth Amendment is designed to protect individuals from the comparatively limitless resources of the State. Without such protection, individuals may live in a state of continuing anxiety for fear that they will be subjected to embarrassment, expense, and continuing ordeal due to repeated attempts by the State to obtain a conviction. Also, repeated attempts to obtain a conviction enhance the possibility that an innocent individual

11. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
12. Id.
15. Rudstein, supra note 14, at 221–22.
16. Id.
17. Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 14; see also Rudstein, supra note 14, at 221–22.
18. Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 14; see also Rudstein, supra note 14, at 222.
19. Rudstein, supra note 14, at 222.
22. Id.
may be found guilty. 23 Further, the prohibition against trying an individual twice for the same offence protects the courts interest in preserving the “finality of judgments.” 24 Courts argue that protecting the finality of criminal convictions benefits society. 25 It reduces the administrative costs of review and retrials. 26 And, it will lead to better representation of counsel. 27

Analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause requires an understanding of when a person is considered “put in jeopardy.” Under case law, a person is put in jeopardy, and it is said that jeopardy attaches, only at a certain point after a criminal proceeding is under way. 28 In criminal cases brought before a jury, “jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn.” 29 In bench trials, the Supreme Court has held that jeopardy attaches when the judge begins to hear evidence. 30 Once jeopardy attaches to a criminal defendant, the constitutional protections given by the Double Jeopardy Clause are triggered, preventing the person from being “put in jeopardy” by a later proceeding seeking to punish the same offense. 31

Generally, courts have interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to provide three basic protections. 32 First, defendants who have been acquitted of their crimes are protected against a second prosecution for the same offense. 33 Second, defendants who have been convicted of their crime are protected against a second prosecution for the same offense. 34 And third, defendants are protected from being punished a second time for an offense for which they have already been punished once. 35 The protections offered to defendants under the Idaho Constitution align with the policy reasons the Supreme Court states for the individual protections afforded by the United States constitution. 36

Case law has elaborated on when a second proceeding involves the same offense. 37 First, double jeopardy protects a defendant from subsequent prosecution for lesser-included offenses and from charges of crimes for which the original crime

23. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
31. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See State v. Avelar, 979 P.2d 648, 651, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999) (“The multiple prosecution component of double jeopardy ensures that the State does not make repeated attempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced sentence.”) (internal quotations omitted).
was a lesser-included offense. For example, in *State v. Bryant*, the defendant was afforded constitutional double jeopardy protection for a conviction of aggravated assault by display and threat with a gun. The defendant was originally convicted for kidnapping. Because the kidnapping charge already included an enhancement count based on a display and threat with a gun, the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by display and threat with a gun was barred on constitutional double jeopardy grounds. Key to the court’s determination of double jeopardy protection was the question of whether the charges were sufficiently distinguishable from each other and whether each could have been prosecuted separately.

Similarly, in *State v. Pickens*, the defendant was convicted of both rape and assault with the intent to commit rape. The court explained that assault with the intent to commit rape was a lesser-included offense of the defendant’s rape conviction. The court held that subsequent conviction of assault with the intent to commit rape, the lesser-included offense of rape, was barred on constitutional double jeopardy grounds.

Second, courts have drawn distinctions between prosecutions and punishment. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy protects against both multiple prosecutions, and multiple punishments relating to the same offense. Multiple trials dealing with punishment for both civil and criminal punishment corresponding to the same set of circumstances are dealt with in the order in which jeopardy is attached. Further, civil forfeitures generally are not punishment for purposes of the protections afforded by double jeopardy. In *State v. Ross*, the defendant raised a claim of double jeopardy to dispute his conviction and sentencing for delivery of a controlled substance and for money laundering. The defendant argued that that the prior civil forfeiture of property precluded additional criminal punishment. The court held that Supreme Court precedent dictated that civil forfeitures do not constitute punishment and do not raise the issue of double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.

38. *Id.*
40. *Id.* at 355, 127 Idaho at 29.
41. *Id.*
42. *Id.*
44. *Id.* at 1144, 148 Idaho at 555.
45. *Id.* at 1147, 148 Idaho at 558.
47. *Id.*
48. See *id.* at 648–54, 132 Idaho at 775–81 (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to retrial of drug prosecution based on payment of civil drug stamp tax penalties prior to retrial, where no double jeopardy challenge was raised in tax proceedings).
50. *Id.* at 1224, 129 Idaho at 380.
51. *Id.*
52. *Id.* at 1225, 129 Idaho at 381 ("With regard to [the defendant’s] Fifth Amendment claim of double jeopardy, the United States Supreme Court recently determined that civil forfeitures in general, and specifically in cases involving money laundering and drug states, do not constitute ‘punishment’ for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."); Joan Biskupic, *Supreme Court Rules That Civil Fines Don’t Bar Later Criminal Prosecution*, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/wp121197.htm.
Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause sometimes protects criminal defendants after a mistrial. Usually, a criminal defendant can be retried after a mistrial if, for example, the proceeding ends in a mistrial because of a hung jury, the defendant may then be retried. The court must set forth a sufficiently compelling reason to declare a mistrial, such as procedural error that would cause some obstruction of the case. The court must consider how to provide a “full and fair adjudication” of the case so as to provide finality to the action and the charges against the defendant. Further, a defendant may not bring a defense of double jeopardy after a mistrial is declared on the defendant’s own motion. Also, a “retrial following the reversal of a conviction on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence does not offend double jeopardy principles.”

However, acquittals are a different matter. There are many nuances to constitutional double jeopardy protection when it comes to acquittals. After a jury conviction in a criminal action, if the verdict of guilty is set aside by a trial or appellate judge to enter a judgment of acquittal, the prosecution is not barred by constitutional double jeopardy protection from appealing for a reinstatement of the original jury conviction. However, in cases where a judgment of acquittal is granted prior to a jury conviction, further action seeking that conviction may be barred. The prohibition of re-examination and re-prosecution following a court-decreed acquittal in non-jury cases is similarly barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

In a non-jury trial, a judge’s order of acquittal “represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” A trial judge may not control the classification of his action through creative characterization. Pertinent to a double jeopardy analysis of a judgment of acquittal, is whether the basis for the determination of the judgment relied on the sufficiency of the evidence. “When a trial court enters a judgment of acquittal based on a determination that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a charge, the prohibition against double jeopardy bars retrying that charge.” The following cases explore...

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.; See also Reprosecution Following Mistrial, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/amdt5afrag3_user.html (last visited May 17, 2015) (“A mistrial may be the result of ‘manifest necessity,’ such as where, for example, the jury cannot reach a verdict or circumstances plainly prevent the continuation of the trial. Difficult has been the answer, however, when the doctrine of ‘manifest necessity’ has been called upon to justify a second trial following a mistrial granted by the trial judge because of some event within the prosecutor’s control or because of prosecutorial misconduct or because of error or abuse of discretion by the judge himself. There must ordinarily be a balancing of the defendant’s right in having the trial completed against the public interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.”).
60. See id.
61. See id.
63. Id. at 728–29, 150 Idaho at 478–79.
64. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978); Howard, 238 P.3d at 728, 150 Idaho at 478.
65. Howard, 238 P.3d at 728, 150 Idaho at 478.
66. Id.
the relationship between acquittals and the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court and then the United States Supreme Court.

III. KORSEN AND EVANS

The thrust of the two court decisions and their relationship to the protections granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause is the legal concept of acquittal. Both Court decisions deal with trial court judgments granting defendants an acquittal. The disparity between the two decisions deals with the definition of the term acquittal. In the case of State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court defined acquittal as a judgment regarding the determination that the evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the crime charged. That definition focused on the elements of the criminal charge and whether the decision for judgment and the acquittal were linked with the particular elements of the charge. If the judgment for acquittal was based on the sufficiency of the evidence related to an element that was erroneously connected with the criminal charge, then the acquittal would not trigger double jeopardy protection.

However, in Evans v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court defined acquittal in terms relating to the idea of substantive versus procedural rulings. The Court related judgments of acquittal, not on the particular elements of the criminal charge, but rather made the distinction between whether the ruling was related to the sufficiency of the evidence going toward the substantive nature of the case, or whether the judgment related to any particular procedural mistakes the trial court may have made.

A. State v. Korsen

In 2003, in State v. Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court held that retrial of a criminal charge of trespass was not barred because it was a misapprehension of the law that led to the magistrate's ruling to grant the defendant an acquittal and dismiss the case. The defendant, David Korsen, had entered the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare in Boise. Mr. Korsen was there because of his child support obligations. He told the office personnel that he wanted to talk with someone about his obligations, and he indicated that he was not going to leave the office until he was granted some relief from the current requirements he was subject to. He informed the office workers that he might get loud. The office workers told Mr. Korsen that they could not help him. Rather, only the court could do what he was asking.

68. Id.
70. Id.
72. Id. at 130, 138 Idaho at 710.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710.
Mr. Korsen was told that if he wanted his required child support payments changed, he would need to speak with the court. During that discussion, Mr. Korsen began to raise his voice. While Mr. Korsen did not make any threats, nor did he swear at the office workers, Mr. Korsen would not leave the offices. The office workers called the police. When the police arrived, Mr. Korsen “was arrested at the scene on a charge of trespass under I.C. § 18–7008(8), because he refused to leave after being asked by the regional director of the department, who was in charge of the offices, to vacate the premises.”

The case went to trial in magistrate court. The magistrate judge dismissed the trespass charge for two reasons. First, on Constitutional grounds, the magistrate held that the statute was void for vagueness “as applied to public property and because the statute failed to properly inform a person on public property about the specific conduct prohibited by the statute.” Second, the magistrate granted Mr. Korsen an acquittal “under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.” The magistrate concluded that “insufficient evidence had been presented to support a verdict of guilty on the trespass charge.” The magistrate held that “the state failed to prove that Korsen did or said anything to justify the director’s request that Korsen leave the premises.” The State appealed the magistrate’s decision to the district court.

On appeal, Mr. Korsen argued that even if the magistrate had erred when the case was dismissed, Mr. Korsen was protected from retrial by the protections given under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court upheld the magistrate’s determination that the statute was void for vagueness; however, it also ruled that “double jeopardy did not apply because the acquittal by the magistrate was based on an erroneous legal ruling.” On the State’s appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Mr. Korsen argued that “even if the Rule 29 dismissal was made in error, double jeopardy had attached, barring a retrial on the trespass charge in the event of a remand.” After the district court affirmed the magistrate’s void for vagueness determination, at issue before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate erred “by granting Korsen’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal based upon the State’s

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also I.C.R. 29(a) (“The court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence. In the event the court dismisses the charged offense, the court must consider whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain a conviction on a lesser included offense.”).
87. Korsen, 69 P.3d at 130, 138 Idaho at 710.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 136, 138 Idaho at 716.
91. Id.
92. Id.
failure to prove a legitimate reason for asking Korsen to leave the premises, when
the statute has no such requirement as one of its elements?93

In reviewing the case, the Idaho Supreme Court started with the established
principle that double jeopardy will bar the retrial of a criminal defendant if the
court grants an acquittal to the defendant based on an evidentiary determination
that the evidence submitted was insufficient to support the charge.94 The mere charac-
terization of the action as an acquittal is not sufficient to determine that double
jeopardy protection was triggered.95 What that meant, was that for Mr. Korsen to be
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court would have to determine that
the magistrate’s judgment of acquittal was based on a ruling that the State failed to
provide factual evidence sufficient to support that charge.96 The trial court must have
“actually resolved in favor of the defendant a factual element necessary for a
criminal conviction” for the acquittal to be deemed appropriate.97 The factual ele-
ment in question must have been an essential element of the offense charged.98

The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that it was not the resolution of a factual
dispute in favor of the defendant that led to the dismissal; therefore, the dismissal
did not constitute an acquittal necessary to trigger the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion.99 The problem was that the trespass statute in question did not require any
“adequate reason” as required by the magistrate.100 In reviewing the magistrate’s
reasoning for requiring this “adequate reason,” the Idaho Supreme Court deter-
mined that the lower court had made a legal conclusion.101

The Idaho Supreme Court noted that “[t]he determination that the trespass
statute requires this ‘adequate reason’ element was a legal one.”102 But, “[t]he de-
termination that the reason in this case was not adequate was, at least arguably,
factual.”103 Where the magistrate went wrong, was that the factual findings and the
legal conclusion did not actually determine any essential element of the crime of
trespass.104 And again, the determination of whether double jeopardy bars a retrial hinges upon the determination of an essential element of the crime charged.105

The Idaho Supreme Court explained that “by requiring proof of an adequate
reason for asking someone to leave public property, the magistrate effectively cre-
ated an additional statutory element to I.C. § 18–7008(8) that the law does not re-
quire.”106 The Court held that because “the magistrate’s determination that there
was inadequate reason for asking Korsen to leave the Health and Welfare offices

94. Id. at 136–37, 138 Idaho at 716–17.
95. Id. at 137, 138 Idaho at 717.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
100. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7008(8) (West 2013) (“Every person, except under landlord-
tenant relationship, who, being first notified in writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the
owner of real property, to immediately depart from the same and who refuses to so depart, or who, without
permission or invitation, returns and enters said property within a year, after being so notified.”).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
did not resolve an essential element of trespassing, the dismissal of the case on that ground does not constitute an ‘acquittal’ implicating double jeopardy concerns. Retrial is therefore not barred.”

The Court found that the policy rationales that underlie the principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause permitted retrial in this case because the prosecution was not being given an opportunity to bring in new evidence that it failed to supply during the first trial, rather, the retrial was the result of a legal error in which the prosecution was required to prove and element that was not necessary for a conviction.

Seven years later, in *State v. Howard*, the Idaho Supreme Court once again explained the significance of judicial determination based on evidence that is factually sufficient to support the charge of the crime. Citing *Korsen* as precedent, the Idaho Supreme Court in *Howard* explained that double jeopardy is generally triggered upon acquittal in criminal actions. That is true even if the acquittal was based on erroneous legal rulings. However, in certain cases, such as *Korsen*, the erroneous legal rulings create a situation in which the defendant cannot be considered to have been “acquitted” so as to trigger double jeopardy. The ultimate determination is whether or not the acquittal was based on the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the elements of the crime charged.

**B. Evans v. Michigan**

In an eight to one decision, the United States Supreme Court held, in *Evans v. Michigan*, that when the trial court rules that a state has failed to produce sufficient evidence of guilt and renders an acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial for the offense. This holds true even if the trial court misunderstands the elements of the charged offense. In *Evans*, the defendant, Lamar Evans, was charged with burning other real property, a violation of Michigan statutory law. Mr. Evans was arrested after police heard an explosion and they saw Mr. Evans moving away from a burning building carrying a gasoline can. Mr. Evans admitted that

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107. *Korsen*, 69 P.2d at 137, 138 Idaho at 717; see also *Howard*, 248 P.3d at 730, 150 Idaho at 479 (“In *Korsen*, the magistrate erroneously required the State to prove an additional element for trespass, and the magistrate dismissed the case upon concluding that the State failed to prove this additional, unnecessary, factual element. Due to this misapprehension of the law, the magistrate dismissed the case without resolving any factual element in the defendant's favor. Thus, on appeal, we held that the magistrate’s dismissal did not constitute an “acquittal” that triggers double jeopardy.”) (internal citations omitted).


109. *Howard*, 248 P.3d at 729, 150 Idaho at 478 (“When a trial court enters a judgment of acquittal based on a determination that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a charge, the prohibition against double jeopardy bars retrying that charge.”).

110. *Id.* at 730, 150 Idaho at 479.

111. *Id.*

112. *Id.*

113. *See id.*


115. *Id.* at 1073.

116. *Id.* at 1082 (Alito, J., dissenting).
he was the one who had set the house on fire.\footnote{117} The house was unoccupied at the time.\footnote{118}

If the building had been a “dwelling house,” Mr. Evans might have been charged with burning a dwelling, a crime under a statute punishable by up to twenty years in prison.\footnote{119} However, because the building was not occupied at the time, Mr. Evans was only charged with burning other real property, a crime under a statute only punishable by up to ten years in prison.\footnote{120} The crime of burning other real property was a lesser-included offense of the crime of burning a dwelling house.\footnote{121}

After the prosecution had presented their evidence, Mr. Evans moved for a directed verdict.\footnote{122} Mr. Evans argued that the prosecution had failed to prove all of the elements of the charged offense.\footnote{123} Specifically, Mr. Evans argued that the prosecution was required to prove that the building in question was not a dwelling, and failing to so prove, Mr. Evans was entitled to a directed verdict.\footnote{124} Despite the prosecution’s denial that the charged offense required any such element to be proven, the trial judge concluded that the prosecution was, in fact, required to establish that the building was not a dwelling.\footnote{125} After the trial judge determined that the State had failed to prove that the building was not a dwelling, the judge granted Mr. Evans’ petition for a directed verdict.\footnote{126} The order entered into the record was labeled an acquittal.\footnote{127}

The State appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, and Mr. Evans conceded that his original position concerning the elements of the charged offense was wrong.\footnote{128} The judge had erred by adding and element to the offense that was not required by statute.\footnote{129} The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded for a retrial.\footnote{130} The court held that trial court’s order did not constitute an acquittal and did not trigger double jeopardy protection because there was no resolution of a factual element of the criminal offense.\footnote{131} The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. The Court held that when an acquittal is based on the erroneous addition of an essential element to a charged offense, then the decision does not constitute a resolution of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged offense so as to trigger double jeopardy protection.\footnote{132} The United States Supreme Court granted review.\footnote{133}
In its decision, the Supreme Court started its reasoning and analysis looking at precedent. The Court proclaimed, “It has been half a century since we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is ‘based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.’” The Court was referring to the case of Fong Foo v. United States. In Fong Foo, the defendants were charged with conspiracy and concealing material facts “in a matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” During the trial, the district judge “directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal as to all the defendants.” However, the trial court did not have the power to issue such a direction.

The Supreme Court held that a verdict of acquittal, even acquittals based on “egregiously erroneous” foundations, were final. Therefore, verdicts of acquittal could not be reviewed. The Court found that “[t]he petitioners were tried under a valid indictment in a federal court which had jurisdiction over them and over the subject matter. The trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment” but rather “[i]t terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petitioner.” The Court held that while “[t]he Court of Appeals thought, not without reason, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Nevertheless, the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed without putting the petitioners twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.”

The Court further noted that in Smith v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that a mistake in the understanding of what evidence would be sufficient for a conviction to be sustained, barred retrial after a court-decreed acquittal. The Court stated, “[W]e have long held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.” Going further, the Court stated that “any contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause must itself (even absent provision by the State) leave open a way of correcting legal errors is at odds with the well-established rule that the bar will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”

Similarly, the Court explained that in Sanabria v. United States, the Court held that verdicts of acquittal are final, even if based on erroneous decisions that

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134. Id.
135. Id. at 1074 (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)).
136. Id.
138. Id. at 142.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 143.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143.
144. Smith, 543 U.S. at 473.
145. Id. at 467.
146. Id. at 473.
147. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“That a verdict of acquittal may not be reviewed without putting the defendant twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution, has recently been described as the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.”).
exclude pertinent evidence. However, if after the court renders a guilty verdict the indictment was dismissed, then constitutional double jeopardy protection would not stop the verdict from being reinstated. And, in Arizona v. Rumsey, the Court held that an acquittal based on a "misconstruction of the statute" barred a retrial. The Court reasoned that "an acquittal on the merits by the sole decision maker in the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge." The Court held that application of double jeopardy principals barred the imposition of the death penalty after a sentencing of life imprisonment.

In Evans, The Supreme Court recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial of any acquittal decreed by the court. It makes no difference if the acquittal is based upon a legal error. An acquittal cannot be reviewed without triggering double jeopardy in violation of the Constitution. Supreme Court cases have "defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense." Acquittal would, therefore, include rulings by the courts on the insufficiency of evidence to convict. Also, factual findings that necessarily establish a criminal defendant’s lack of culpability, and “any other ruling which relates to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence” would fall under the category of acquittal.

The Supreme Court differentiated between two types of rulings. The Court explained that there are both substantive and procedural rulings. Both substantive and procedural rulings may end a trial early. However, the consequences of each type of ruling are different. Substantive rulings are different from procedural rulings because if a retrial is allowed due to a substantive ruling, the superior resources of the Government may wear down the defendant to a point where the innocent may be found guilty.

Procedural dismissals relate to questions of factual guilt that are not related but serve other purposes such as a judgment that a defendant may not be punished due to an error with the indictment. The courts generally refer to procedural ter-

\[\text{\footnotesize 148. Id. at 78.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 149. Id. at 63.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 151. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 152. Id. at 205.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 153. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1073.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 154. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 155. See id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 156. Id. at 1074–75.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 157. Id. at 1075.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 158. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 159. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1075.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 160. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 161. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 162. Id. (“And retrial following an acquittal would upset a defendant's expectation of repose, for it would subject him to additional embarrassment, expense and ordeal while compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. In contrast, a termination of the proceedings against a defendant on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, some procedural ground, does not pose the same concerns, because no expectation of finality attaches to a properly granted mistrial.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 163. Id.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 164. Id. at 1073–76.}\]
minations as dismissal or mistrial. Procedural rulings may also cause a case to be terminated midtrial. However, procedural rulings do not pose the same concerns as substantive rulings because they do not produce the same expectation of finality in a defendant that substantive rulings do.

The Court admitted that “[t]here [was] no question the trial court’s ruling was wrong; it was predicated upon a clear misunderstanding of what facts the State needed to prove under State law.” However, the Court explained that all precedent cases instruct that any acquittal based on the insufficiency of evidence precludes a retrial regardless of whether the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence was based on a correct ruling of the law. The Court drew a distinction between the accuracy of the trial court’s judgment to acquit, and the essential character of an acquittal itself.

The Supreme Court explained that the trial court had granted the defendant’s motion in the context of a finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Further evidence showed that the trial court had made its determination of the testimony presented by the State. And as such, “the trial court's judgment of acquittal resolved the question of Evans' guilt or innocence as a matter of the sufficiency of the evidence, not on unrelated procedural grounds. That judgment, 'however erroneous' it was, precludes reprosecution on this charge, and so should have barred the State's appeal as well.”

The Court went on to state that “for cases such as this, in which a trial court's interpretation of the relevant criminal statute is likely to prove dispositive, we see no reason why jurisdictions could not provide for mandatory continuances or expedited interlocutory appeals if they wished to prevent misguided acquittals from being entered.” The Court explained that “having chosen to vest its courts with the power to grant midtrial acquittals, the State must bear the corresponding risk that some acquittals will be granted in error.”

Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was not a procedural dismissal that was unrelated to the factual guilt or innocent of the defendant, but rather “a determination that the State had failed to prove its case.” Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, such a ruling constituted an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy and triggered the defendant’s constitutional protection.

C. The Evans Dissent

A strong critique of the Evans decision is found in Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion.
ion. Justice Alito provides strong opposition to the majority’s decision, finding fault with its reasoning and its interpretation of Court precedent. First, the Court’s decision “is not consistent with the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

The Fifth Amendment states that no “person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” As such, the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause focus on the offense that an individual is subject to. The offense, or criminal charge, is defined by the specific elements of the charge. For that reason, the Court has consistently held that an acquittal must represent a resolution of “some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”

However, the Court’s decision, in Evans, rejects the entire notion that the elements of an offense play a part in the definition of an acquittal, rather, the Court reached the conclusion that acquittal was defined by a determination of the substantive or procedural nature of the judgment. This rejection of an element based definition of acquittal for a substantive or procedural based determination of the judgment is not in line with the Court’s precedent.

Further, the Court’s decision opens up the legal system to exploitation from any silver-tongued litigator who is able to convince a trial judge of a misapplication of the law. As Justice Alito notes in his dissent, the Supreme Court ordered the application of double jeopardy protection because an “attorney managed to convince a judge to terminate petitioner’s first trial prior to verdict on the specious ground that the offense with which he was charged contains an imaginary ‘element’ that the prosecution could not prove.” If all acquittals trigger application of double jeopardy protection, regardless of any factual or legal errors, so long as the acquittal is based on the substantive aspect of the criminal charge, then defendants may start invoking outlandish defenses based on quasi-legal analysis in the hopes of enticing an acquittal because once that acquittal is granted, the defendants are home free.

Finally, the Court’s decision in Evans is inconsistent with the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Amendment is designed to protect individuals from the comparatively limitless resources of the State. Without such protection, individuals may live in a state of continuing anxiety for fear that they will be subjected to embarrassment, expense, and continuing ordeal due to repeated attempts by the State to obtain a conviction. Also, repeated attempts to obtain a conviction enhance the possibility that an innocent individual may be found guilty.

However, the Court’s decision here does not follow from those designed protections, and “[a]llowing retrial in the circumstances of the present case would not

178. Id. at 1082 (J. Alito dissenting).
179. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
180. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1081–82 (J. Alito dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1085 (quoting Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468 (2005)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1081–82.
187. Id.
188. Id.
result in any such abuse.”189 Allowing a retrial would simply give the prosecution an opportunity to persuade the trial judge based on the actual elements of the offense.190 This is not a case where the prosecution is attempting to convict the defendant multiple times in an exercise of limitless resources being used to gain a guilty verdict.191 It was, in fact, the defendant who “fooled the judge into committing an error.”192

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that States have a recognizable interest in receiving a chance to convict individuals who violate State laws.193 However, the Court’s decision in this case takes that chance away from Michigan, and sets a precedent for taking that chance away from many States in the future.

IV. TEAGUE V. LANE: THE RETROACTIVITY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A fundamental component necessary for answering the question of what effect Evans has on habeas corpus claims in Idaho, is an understanding of when a Supreme Court decision may be applied retroactively on collateral appeals. This part first presents the Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane that sets forth a three-step analysis for determining when Supreme Court decisions are given retroactive effect, then takes a closer look at when a Supreme Court decision is determined to have announced a new rule.

A. Teague v. Lane

In Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court analyzed and established the current rule concerning the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions in matters of new rules concerning constitutional criminal procedure.194 The retroactivity analysis prior to the Teague ruling was constantly in flux,195 and the Court had been looking for a way to simplify the analysis.196 Further, prior to the Teague ruling, the Court often set forth a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and applied it then and there to the current defendant.197 In some instances the Court addressed the question of retroactivity in the same case.198 However, in most cases the Court would take up any retroactivity discussion concerning that new rule at a later time when brought by a new petitioner.199

However, in Teague, the Court changed its position.200 The Court stated that “the question whether a decision announcing a new rule should be given prospec-
tive or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of that decision.\textsuperscript{201} As such, the Court noted that “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”\textsuperscript{202} The Court became fully committed to the idea that questions concerning the retroactivity of new rules dealing with constitutional criminal procedure needed to be answered first.\textsuperscript{203} The Court stated that “we should ask whether such a rule would be applied retroactively to the case at issue.”\textsuperscript{204}

The general rule established in \textit{Teague} is that “new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases which had become final on direct review at the time the new rule was decided.”\textsuperscript{205} The Court stated that “it has long been established that a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule.”\textsuperscript{206} The Court was trying to protect the finality of criminal convictions.\textsuperscript{207} The Court understood that States had a vested interest in that finality.\textsuperscript{208} The Court stated that “[a]pplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”\textsuperscript{209} The deterrent effect of the criminal justice system is lost if finality is taken away.\textsuperscript{210}

The Court adopted a retroactivity approach based on the “principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure,” except under limited circumstances.\textsuperscript{211} Convictions may become final in a number of different ways. For purposes of determining the finality of convictions, “[s]tate convictions are final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted.”\textsuperscript{212} Further, for conviction to be final, “the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari” must have elapsed.\textsuperscript{213} Additionally, a conviction is final if a filed petition for a writ of certiorari has been denied.\textsuperscript{214}

In \textit{Teague}, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between cases that were still on direct appeal when a new rule was established, and those cases that were on collateral review at the time of the new rule.\textsuperscript{215} In criminal jurisprudence, there are two different types of appeals. There is direct appeal, and there is a collateral appeal. A direct appeal is an appeal of a criminal verdict made directly to the state or federal court of appeals or from the court of appeals to a higher court from the trial

\textsuperscript{201} Id.
\textsuperscript{202} Id.
\textsuperscript{203} See \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 299.
\textsuperscript{204} Id. at 301.
\textsuperscript{205} Blume & Pratt, supra note 195, at 325.
\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 308.
\textsuperscript{207} Blume & Pratt, supra note 195, at 326.
\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 309.
\textsuperscript{210} See id.
\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 316.
\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Beard}, 542 U.S. at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted).
\textsuperscript{213} Id.
\textsuperscript{214} Id.
\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 301.
court. Collateral appeal starts when a defendant files a habeas corpus petition. Because habeas corpus petitions are civil law cases, they use the rules of civil procedure and appellate procedure.

While the Supreme Court established that new rules of criminal procedure will not be generally applied retroactively to collateral review cases,216 the Court stated that there was the possibility of retroactivity if “those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have articulated.”217

First, retroactivity should apply if the new rule changes the fundamental nature of what kinds of conduct may or may not be proscribed by the criminal system.218 In other words, this exception is understood to apply to new rules dealing grounds relating to substantive due process.219 Substantive rules, are rules that “alter[,] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”220 For example, in Street v. New York, the conduct in question was the act of saying words and was up as a matter of constitutional interpretation that put individuals constitutionally protected conduct in question.221

Second, retroactivity should apply if the new rule of constitutional criminal procedure implicates the fundamental fairness of a trial.222 In other words, “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”223 A rule falling under the second exception would need to be of a type that without it, the “likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”224 While not completely out of the realm of possibility, the Court stated, “Because we operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.”225 The Court indicated that such an exception would rarely be met.226

The analysis coming out of Teague, when determining whether to retroactively apply a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, is a three-step test.227 First, the court must consider nature of the defendant’s conviction.228 That is, whether the conviction is final or not.229 Second, the court must consider the legal landscape at the time of the conviction.230 The court must consider the new rule, and whether the constitution and existing precedent would have compelled the new rule at the time of the conviction.231 In essence, the second question asks the court to determine if

216. Id. at 316.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 307.
222. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307; see also Boshkoff, supra note 219, at 656.
223. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 312.
224. Boshkoff, supra note 219, at 656 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).
225. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
226. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
the rule is actually new, or just a different interpretation of already existing law.\textsuperscript{232} If the court determines that the new law is, in fact, new, then the final step asks the court to determine whether the new law fits under either of the two exceptions that would allow the rule to have retroactive effect.\textsuperscript{231}

B. What Constitutes a New Rule?

One of the primary components, if not the primary component, of a retroactivity analysis, is the determination that a Court decision announces a new rule.\textsuperscript{234} Looking back at the difference between direct review and collateral review, court decisions that do not announce a new rule are generally applicable in all cases on direct review because, in those cases, judicial finality is not threatened; however, for cases on collateral review, absent the announcement of a new rule, falling into the accompanying exceptions, the general rule coming out of \textit{Teague} establishes that judicial decisions are not available as a basis for collateral relief. Thus for petitioners on collateral review, it is vital to establish what constitutes a new rule, and when the Court announces a new rule.

In \textit{Teague}, the Court explained that there are two circumstances in which the Court will have announced a new rule.\textsuperscript{235} First, a Court holding that breaks new legal ground will constitute the announcement of a new rule.\textsuperscript{236} Second, a Court holding that “imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” will constitute the announcement of a new rule.\textsuperscript{237} Or rather, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”\textsuperscript{238} But again, the Court went on to state that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”\textsuperscript{239}

In \textit{Graham v. Collins}, the Court explained that if the new rule of constitutional criminal procedure expressly overrules a prior decision, the Court may easily hold that it constitutes a new rule.\textsuperscript{240} However, determining whether an extension of the reasoning found in precedent cases constitutes a new rule is more difficult.\textsuperscript{241} The purpose of federal habeas review is to ensure that criminal proceedings are conducted in accordance with timely interpretation of the constitution.\textsuperscript{242} As such, a good faith interpretation of existing precedent at the time of the conviction will not be held as contrary to later decisions sufficient to announce a new rule.\textsuperscript{243} In so reasoning, the Court drew distinctions on the time frame for when the Court should apply a constitutional analysis for determining if a new rule was announced. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{233} \textit{Beard}, 542 U.S. at 411.
\item \textsuperscript{234} \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 301.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Id. at 310.
\item \textsuperscript{240} \textit{Graham v. Collins}, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993).
\item \textsuperscript{241} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{243} Id.
\end{itemize}
timely interpretation of the constitution was not meant as a present interpretation, but rather an interpretation at the time of the precedent’s decision.

The Court in *Graham* provided that it was the precedent Court that was given a good faith interpretation on the constitution and that the present Court should place the focus, not on a constitutional interpretation of the rule under circumstances present at the time of the current conviction, but rather how the constitution was interpreted at the time of the precedent Court’s decision. Thus, announcing a new rule based simply on the overruling of a precedent decision was no longer a straightforward affair but consisted of looking at the precedent Court’s decision and applying a good faith standard to its constitutional interpretation at the time of the original decision.

With such a standard that allows the Court to give precedent Courts the benefit of a good faith constitutional interpretation, new rules are almost never announced. The language used in *Teague* is mirrored in *Chaidez v. United States*, where the Supreme Court explained *Teague*’s application of the new rule analysis stating that the Court announces a new rule “when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the government.” Or, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”

However, the *Chaidez* Court went further and explained that there is a flipside to the *Teague* holding. The Court noted that “*Teague* also made clear that a case does not announce a new rule, when it is merely an application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.” The Court was referring to situations where an established legal standard was being applied to a different set of facts. Specifically, the *Chaidez* Court noted the cases of *Strickland v. Washington* and *Padilla v. Kentucky*. The legal standard at issue in *Strickland* was whether the assistance of counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. While application of that standard to different factual circumstances may yield different or even contradictory outcomes, it does not rise to the level of establishing a new rule. The *Chaidez* Court noted that “we have granted relief under *Strickland* in diverse contexts without ever suggesting that doing so required a new rule.”

Comparing *Strickland to Padilla*, the Court explained that “*Padilla* would not have created a new rule had it only applied *Strickland*’s general standard to yet another factual situation . . . .” However, the Court went on to explain that *Padilla* added a question prior to the application of the standard found in *Strickland*. The *Padilla* Court asked the question whether the *Strickland* standard should even

244. See *Chaidez v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1108.
254. Id.
255. Id.
be applied under the circumstances. While the simple application of the standard from Strickland did not rise to the level of a new rule, the Chaidez Court held that adding that prior question was sufficient to hold that Padilla did announce a new rule.

Distinguishing between the two cases, the Court went on to explain that “the beginning point of [the Court’s] analysis is a rule of general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts.” Additionally, the Court noted that “it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.” In other words, “when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes.”

V. APPLICATION OF TEAGUE’S RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS TO EVANS

Teague’s three-step retroactivity analysis provides the framework for deciding if a Supreme Court decision has retroactive application. This part first considers whether the Court in Evans announced a new rule and, if so, whether either of the two exceptions to the general rule against the retroactive application of new rules to petitioners on collateral review would apply, then considers what effect, in any, the Evans ruling has for habeas corpus claims in Idaho.

A. Does Evans Announce a New Rule?

The question then, is did Evans announce a new rule that would have retroactive applicability to criminal defendant petitioners in Idaho who wish to bring a habeas corpus action due to the abrogation of Korsen? Remember, the Court in Teague explained that there are two circumstances in which the Supreme Court will have announced a new rule. First, a Court holding that breaks new legal ground will constitute the announcement of a new rule. Second, a Court holding that “imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” will constitute the announcement of a new rule. Or rather, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”

The Court in Evans was quick to find existing precedent more than sufficient to show the application of a general standard. The Court explained the application of precedent within its holding. And, speaking to the matter of precedent, the Court stated that “we do not write on a clean slate. Quite the opposite. It has been half a century since we first recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial

256. Id.
257. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107–08.
258. Id. at 1107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
266. Id.
following a court-decree acquittal, even if the acquittal is based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.” The Court explained that “mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless.” The Court based its legal conclusion on the difference between two types of rulings. The general standard the Court applied hinged on whether the lower court’s acquittal was based on substantive or procedural rulings. The Court reasoned that even though erroneous procedural rulings may terminate a trial, the risks associated with procedural rulings are not as severe as the risks associated with substantive rulings. The Court considers the judicial interest in finality to be much stronger in cases of court determinations based on substantive rulings because it more adequately protects the defendant.

However, erroneous procedural rulings do not trigger the same judicial protection for defendants because they are not sufficiently based on the factual determination of guilt or innocence. The Court’s main focus in defining this differentiation was to maintain the defendant’s expectation of finality. As such, the Court held that substantive judicial rulings, but not procedural rulings, that end in a court-decree acquittal, trigger double jeopardy protection for criminal defendants regardless of any erroneous foundation. Based on the majority’s reasoning for its decision in Evans, and Teague’s holding that “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Evans did not announce a new rule.

However, while the majority opinion in Evans held that an acquittal based on a substantive ruling cannot be reviewed, “on error or otherwise, without putting a defendant twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution,” the dissenting opinion raised some concerns. The primary objection to the majority’s position is that it breaks from the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause by switching the focus from the elements of the offense, to a categorical determination of substantive verses procedural rulings. As the dissent notes, the text of the Fifth Amendment reads that no “person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” A plain reading of the text shows that the “offence” is the pivotal part of the amendment. A criminal charge is defined by the elements that comprise the charge. The dissent noted that by moving away from the specific elements of the charge, the majority held contrary to established precedent that had consistently

267. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1074–75.
270. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1074–75.
271. Id. at 1073–76.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1074.
277. Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1074.
278. See id. at 1085 (Alito, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 1081–82.
280. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
281. See Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1081–82 (Alito, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
held that an acquittal must represent a resolution of “some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Holding that an acquittal was valid based on a determination that a substantive, rather than procedural, ruling was issued, regardless of any connection to the actual elements of the offense charged, changed the nature of the Court’s view on the protections granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Under the dissent’s characterization of what the majority held, Evans looks like a fundamental change in the nature of how the Double Jeopardy Clause is interpreted by the Supreme Court, and a decision that was “not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” As such, the dissent’s understanding of what the majority held may be interpreted to characterize the decision in Evans as announcing a new rule that may provide relief to criminal defendants on collateral appeal if the new rule were to fall into one of the two exceptions.

B. The Effect of Evans on Habeas Corpus Claims in Idaho

With the Court in Evans holding for double jeopardy protection in cases dealing with erroneous judicial determinations, and with the abrogation of the Idaho Supreme Court case of Korsen, the question arises of what, if any, effect the Court’s holding in Evans will have on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. That question is answered through an application of the three-step test for retroactivity discussed in Teague.

Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Evans, the abrogation of Korsen will not have any effect on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. Starting with the three-step analysis established by the Court in Teague, first, the court must consider the nature of the defendant’s conviction. That is, whether the conviction is final or not. This is a case specific question that the Court will consider at the time. This first inquiry is almost a threshold question based on the holding in Teague that “new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases which had become final on direct review at the time the new rule was decided.”

If the petitioner’s conviction is not yet final, then if a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure was announced, it would be applied to any petitioner currently on direct review.

Second, the Court must consider the legal landscape at the time of the conviction and whether the constitution and existing precedent would have compelled the new rule at the time of the conviction. In Evans, the Court clearly expressed that its decision was based on established precedent that sufficiently showed the general standard for analysis of a claim under double jeopardy protection. The Court

283. Id. at 1082.
284. See id.
285. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
287. Id.
289. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
290. Beard, 542 U.S. at 411.
291. See Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1074.
expressed that its decision was based on the presence of a long standing recognition that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from a retrial after a court-decreed acquittal even if that acquittal was based on an erroneous legal foundation.\textsuperscript{292}

While a defendant may argue that the abrogation of the ruling in \textit{Korsen} was a rule of constitutional criminal procedure that expressly overruled a prior decision and, therefore, the Court should hold that it constitutes a new rule,\textsuperscript{293} as previously noted, determining whether an extension of the reasoning found in precedent cases constitutes a new rule is not an easy task.\textsuperscript{294} In any future claim for collateral relief based on the decision in \textit{Evans}, the Court would apply the good faith interpretation of existing precedent found in \textit{Graham}.\textsuperscript{295} Based on the clear statements of the majority opinion in \textit{Evans}, the Court might easily hold that at the time of the \textit{Evans} decision, the Court’s ruling was based on an adequate interpretation of the constitutional landscape at the time.\textsuperscript{296} Therefore, \textit{Evans} did not announce a new rule, and the three-step \textit{Teague} analysis would end there.

However, some weight may be given to the arguments given in the \textit{Evans} dissent. The precedent cases and the analysis of the Court’s decision to base its ruling of the condition of substantive rulings versus procedural rulings rather than an analysis of the elements of the criminal charged, as found through the use of the word offence in the Fifth Amendment, is strong support for the argument that the Court in \textit{Evans} did, in fact, announce a new rule. A rule that changed how the Double Jeopardy Clause would be analyzed for triggering constitutional protections for criminal defendants in situations where a court-decreed acquittal was based on an erroneous determination of one of the essential elements of the charged offense. As such, an analysis of the third \textit{Teague} step is informative. If the Court determined that the holding in \textit{Evans} did announce a new rule, then the Court would continue on to the final step in the \textit{Teague} analysis.\textsuperscript{297}

Finally, the Court will determine if either of the exceptions to the general rule against the retroactivity of new rules announced by the Supreme Court are applicable. First, a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure will be given retroactive effect if it changes the fundamental nature of what kinds of conduct may or may not be proscribed by the criminal system.\textsuperscript{298} What that means, is that if a new rule relates to substantive due process,\textsuperscript{299} or rather, alters “the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” then it will be given retroactive effect.\textsuperscript{300}

It would strain any possible interpretation of the ruling in \textit{Evans} to find satisfaction of this first exception to the rule against retroactivity. The circumstances dealing with the protections granted by the Double Jeopardy Clause fall outside the range of substantive due process and bear no relation on prohibited or proscribed conduct of the defendants, and further, bears no relationship to any specific class of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{292. Id.}
\footnote{293. See Graham, 506 U.S. at 467.}
\footnote{294. Id.}
\footnote{295. See id.}
\footnote{296. See id.}
\footnote{297. \textit{Beard}, 542 U.S. at 411.}
\footnote{298. \textit{Teague}, 489 U.S. at 307.}
\footnote{299. Boshkoff, \textit{supra} note 219, at 655.}
\footnote{300. \textit{Schrero}, 542 U.S. at 353.}
\end{footnotes}
defendant. Even if the Court found that Evans announced a new rule, that new rule would not fall within the first exception.

Second, retroactivity should apply if the new rule of constitutional criminal procedure implicates the fundamental fairness of a trial.\textsuperscript{301} The Court has categorized this exception to mean “watershed rules of criminal procedure.”\textsuperscript{302} Or rather, this second exception deals with rules so fundamental to the judicial process that without them, the “likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”\textsuperscript{303} The Court has stated that it considers such basic rules, that are fundamental to the judicial process, to be “so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.”\textsuperscript{304} It is only in the rarest circumstances that such an exception would be met.\textsuperscript{305} While the decision in Evans may influence the accuracy of convictions dealing with erroneous substantive rulings, it would again strain a reasonable interpretation to find that it impact the basic, fundamental, likelihood for an accurate determination of innocence or guilt that is required under the second exception.

And so, while an alternate interpretation of the ruling in Evans would suggest that it did, in fact, announce a new rule, under an application of the Teague analysis for retroactivity—even if the Court found that Evans announced a new rule—such a judicial determination would fall outside of the two exceptions to the general rule against the retroactivity of Supreme Court decisions. Thus, Evans, despite its abrogation of Korsen, would have no effect on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the Supreme Court case of Evans v. Michigan, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the retrial of a criminal defendant after a court-directed acquittal. Retrial was barred even in the event that the acquittal rested on the trial court’s erroneous understanding of the law. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Evans, it is safe to say that the abrogation of Korsen will not have any effect on habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho. The likely interpretation of the ruling in Evans was that the Court did not announce a new rule, and even if it did, that new rule announced does not fall within the two exceptions that would allow retroactive application to petitioners in habeas corpus claims for collateral relief.

The Supreme Court in Evans did not announce a new rule. The two established circumstances that the Supreme Court has stated announce a new rule are not applicable to Evans. The Court discussed a number of established precedent cases dealing with acquittals and the majority opinion clearly sets forth the precedent from which it drew its decision and the general standard from which its ruling stems; that being the distinction between an erroneous court-decree acquittal based on a substantive ruling versus one based on a procedural ruling. The Su-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{301} Boshkoff, supra note 219, at 656.
\item \textsuperscript{302} Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Boshkoff, supra note 219, at 656.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
\item \textsuperscript{305} Id.
\end{itemize}
preme Court explained that it was not the application of a new rule but rather a clar-
ification of existing precedent to a new set of circumstances. As such, the holding in Evans did not break new legal ground.

Further, even an interpretation of Evans that establishes a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure would offer no benefit to petitioners on collateral appeal. While the shift from a focus on the essential elements of a criminal offence to a categorical determination of the ruling based on its substantive or procedural na-
ture might constitute a new rule and trigger a Teague retroactivity analysis, such a new rule still fails to satisfy either of the two exceptions to the general rule against the retroactive application of new rules for petitioners on collateral appeal.

Such a new rule does not change the fundamental nature of what kinds of conduct may or may not be proscribed by the criminal system or alter the class of person that the law encompasses. The Double Jeopardy Clause and its protections are awarded to all classes of persons, and the protection against the retrial of criminal defendants is, at its core, procedural. Additionally, such a new rule does not seriously increase the likelihood of an accurate conviction. Only new rules that the Court considers fundamental to the judicial process on a level that is central in determining the innocence or guilt of a criminal defendant will be given retroactive application. A presumed new rule coming out of Evans fails to meet such a definition.

Looking at the entirety of the Teague analysis, the Court’s decision in Evans fails to meet the established conditions for announcing a new rule. An interpreta-
tion of the Evans holding, as set forth by Justice Alito in the dissent, does cast the majority’s decision in a light favoring establishment of a new rule. However, even if that were true, the new rule established in Evans fails to fall within the two ex-
ceptions to the general rule against retroactive application of new rules of criminal procedure that was established in Teague.

Based on the holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause offers protection to criminal defendants from retrials after a court-directed acquittal, and a determina-
tion that retrial is barred even when the acquittal is founded on the trial court’s er-
roneous understanding of the law, the Supreme Court case of Evans v. Michigan will not act as a source for a claim by criminal defendant petitioners upon which they may seek collateral relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court case of Evans v. Michigan, and its abrogation of State v. Korsen, will have no effect on the state of habeas corpus claims for collateral relief in Idaho.

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