2005

Preserving the Foundation of Liberty

Elizabeth Brandt

University of Idaho College of Law, ebrandt@uidaho.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship

Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation


This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
PRESERVING THE FOUNDATION OF LIBERTY

C. L. "BUTCH" OTTER* & ELIZABETH BARKER BRANDT**

The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.

—Alexander Hamilton

Foundations are supposed to be steadfast. The very idea of a foundation is to provide a pinion between the fixed and the transient, the permanent and the temporary. The foundation is the unalterable base upon which to build. So it is with our Constitution and Bill of Rights. They are the rock upon which we have built our modern republic, while protecting the individual from the government itself. For more than two centuries, they have provided the firm foundation of liberty and opportunity from which America and its people have taken wing, enjoying success and weathering failure, celebrating triumph and mourning tragedy.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forgetting our past and fearing our future, Congress began turning that foundation on its head, acting as if physical security requires the

---

* United States Representative, First District of Idaho.
** James E. Rogers Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.


2. The debate about the role to be played by the intent of the Framers in constitutional interpretation has been significant in recent years. Some legal scholars have argued that the Framers' intentions place limits on the scope of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990). Others have suggested a less-restrictive interpretive approach to the Framers' intentions, arguing that the Constitution is a living document that must respond to the needs of the times. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Constitutional Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1989). The co-authors of this essay approach the Constitution from opposite sides of this interpretive divide. Regardless of whether the Framers' intentions are viewed as the primary interpretive mechanism or as a foundational interpretive mechanism, the importance of those intentions to our modern understanding of the document is profound.
sacrifice of individual rights to government imperatives. While paying lip service to our heritage of limited government and individual liberty, we began acting as if individual rights are conditional, derived not from God nor inherent in the human condition, but subject to the collective expression of our fears. Worst of all, we convinced ourselves we were doing nothing of the kind, or that the manifest benefit of a safer society was worth risking the loss of individual liberties.

Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act just weeks after the September 11 attacks, while the dead from the World Trade Center towers in Manhattan, the Pentagon in Washington, and from Flight 93 in Pennsylvania were still being buried. An anthrax threat, assumed by many at the time to be another terrorist attack, had forced members of Congress out of their offices. Few, if any, lawmakers were truly aware of the new and expanded law enforcement authority within the PATRIOT Act. They only knew that they had to do something to quiet the public's fears, and their own.

This was not an executive order from a president reacting to a concrete and immediate threat. This was not the temporary


5. See Todd S. Purdum, More Checked For Anthrax: U.S. Officials Acknowledge Underestimating Mail Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at A1 (quoting President Bush as saying that the nation was "still under attack").

6. Id. As noted earlier, work on the PATRIOT Act was completed during an anthrax scare that moved many legislators out of their offices and was believed to be another terror attack. Id. The result was a bill adopted in an extremely short period of time with little or no open congressional deliberation. The 402 page act, which amends over thirty sections of the U.S. Code and adds a number of new sections, was signed into law forty-five days after the September 11 attacks, without a single public hearing.

7. There has been much criticism regarding heavy-handed use of executive authority even during times of national emergency. See generally Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973). See also John Dean, The History of, and Challenges to, Presidential Lawmaking: Why the Bush Administration’s Use of Executive Orders is Nothing Novel, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY (Dec. 21, 2001), at http://writ.findlaw.com/dean/20011221.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). Nonetheless, executive orders are generally viewed as a more temporal and limited response than legislation. This view appears to be rooted in the notion that executive orders need only
imposition of martial law in response to a natural disaster or military assault. This was the world’s greatest deliberative body hastily enacting an incredibly detailed, complex, and comprehensive piece of legislation without all the facts. That haste and lack of deliberation left advocates backfilling many of the arguments in support of certain provisions of the law that now appear to be glaringly at odds with constitutional principles.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

The Framers of our Constitution drew on an extensive body of law and tradition to recognize certain rights were inalienable—they transcended the power of government. The colonists who fostered the tree of liberty recognized that individual rights were its taproot. The notion that “a man’s home is his castle,” a place free from the intrusion of government, was a time-honored theme—part of both the Code of Hammurabi and the pronouncements of the Roman Emperor Justinian. This notion was one of the inalienable rights with which Englishmen were thought endowed and which the English barons sought to protect as long as a particular presidential administration as they can be revoked unilaterally by a new administration. See generally Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. Legis. 1 (2002) (examining the continuing controversy surrounding the proper nature of executive power and the limitations that should be placed upon it, especially in regard to the issuance of executive orders).


tect, through the Magna Carta, from the ad hoc interference of King John. 12

The concept of inalienable rights infused the colonists' understanding of liberty. It can be seen in diverse writings, from Patrick Henry's rousing appeal for self-determination in the Parsons' Cause case of 1763 13 to the claim of the Declaration of Independence that "all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . ."14 More than a desire for independence or equality, the idea that made America a reality and continues to make America great is that individual rights are God-given and unalienable and that government should be neither more nor less than man's collective expression of those rights. That is the contract, the foundation upon which America was imagined. It is designed to protect individuals—their persons, homes, property, speech, worship, associations, and privacy—from the tyranny of government by the majority.

Yet, the Fourth Amendment reflected more than a generalized notion of inalienable rights. It was a specific response to the British government's pre-constitutional violation of colonists' individual rights through the use of "Writs of Assistance." The writs were general, universal, perpetual, and transferable search warrants used to enforce smuggling laws so the cash-strapped British crown could wring revenue from the colonies to satisfy the crushing debt of a worldwide empire. They authorized "all

12. The Magna Carta did not directly confer rights; it protected the rights of Englishmen—rights not conferred by the state, but pre-existing the state and above the law of the state. Interestingly, the Magna Carta did not directly address search and seizure. Rather, it was an attempt to limit the power of the Monarch to interfere unilaterally with unnamed and presumably transcendent rights of Englishmen. It is one of the early sources of the notion of substantive due process. See generally SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FROM KING JOHN TO JOHN ASHCROFT (2004) (describing a recent discussion of the Magna Carta and its role in the development of search and seizure law); see also SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 22 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959). It was understood by the Framers of the United States Constitution as a protection of inalienable rights against the power of the king. See Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 760 (2001); see also Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 45 (1992).

13. STEPHAN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52–54 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the cases collectively known as the "Parsons' Cause"). The cases involved resistance to British authority disapproving of the lowering of clergy salaries by the Virginia Colonial legislature. Henry argued for the legitimacy of the Virginia enactment based on the consent of the people of Virginia to be governed by the colonial legislature. Id.

14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
and singular justices, sheriffs, constables, and all other officers and subjects” to enter homes and businesses at will—ostensibly in search of smuggled items—and to seize virtually any property without accounting or recompense.\(^{15}\) Writs of Assistance blatantly disregarded personal privacy and offended basic civil liberties, as they were understood by colonial times. Not only were the writs broad and intrusive but many of the colonists believed they had been outlawed in Britain—that only the colonists were subject to such intrusions.\(^{16}\)

The infringement on personal privacy and property rights represented by the Writs of Assistance was so outrageous that, in 1761, it prompted Boston attorney James Otis, a loyal officer of King George III, to resign his position as an advocate general in the vice admiralty court.\(^{17}\) Subsequently, he was commissioned by Boston merchants to make their case against renewal of the writs. Otis’s stirring five-hour argument indicted the expansion of government authority in violation of the individual rights of British subjects. “It appears to me (may it please your honours) the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book.”\(^{18}\) Otis’s argument in the Writs of Assistance case hinged on several major points, one of which was the invocation of the ancient notion regarding the


16. See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (holding general warrants issued in Britain were unlawful). The court concluded that the secretary of state could not “lawfully break into a man’s house and study to search for evidence against him; this would be worse than the Spanish Inquisition; for ransacking a man’s secret drawers and Boxes to come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret thoughts.” Id. The holding in Entick probably only meant that the King did not unilaterally have the jurisdiction to issue a general warrant, but that the King in council could issue such warrants. Nonetheless, the opinion, written in grand language, was understood by some members of Parliament at the time and by the colonists to be an unequivocal condemnation of general warrants. See Dash, supra note 12, at 1 (William Pitt declared to Parliament, “The poorest man may in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”); see also Dash, supra note 14, at 26–32.


18. Otis’s argument in the famous case was not transcribed or reported but was summarized by John Adams. See John Adams, Abstract of the Argument, in 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 134, 140 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
sanctity of the home. Otis argued that householders were reduced to servants under the writs because their homes were subject to search at any time: "Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege."

John Adams, then a young lawyer, was in the courtroom to hear Otis's argument. Fifty-six years later, in a letter to a colleague, the founding father and America's second president recalled the impassioned defense of liberty as a transcendent moment on the path to revolution: "Then and there, the child Independence was born."

Also born that day, and reared to maturity by Adams and many others, was a critical element of America's constitutional foundation—the commitment to protect "the freedom of one's house," which became the Fourth Amendment. The idea that those rights transcend the needs of any particular time and place is embedded in our jurisprudence. Justice Robert Jackson wrote:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

With those words, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the widely popular practice, adopted in a burst of patriotism during World War II, of requiring public school students to salute the

---

22. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, the debate over whether to include an enumerated charter of rights was significant. Many argued against such inclusion believing that there was no need to enumerate such transcendent rights when the powers of government were appropriately limited, and worrying that any such enumeration would be incomplete. They also believed the people would be protected by the individual states' Bills of Rights. Others, having just fought a revolution, lacked confidence in government's limited powers and sought to enumerate the liberties for which they had fought. See Dash, supra note 12, at 39–41.
American flag. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson crystal-
lized the argument for protecting most vigorously the least popu-
lar of our individual rights in the overheated political climate of
the moment. While public displeasure served as a natural
defense of liberty against the Writs of Assistance once Otis
sounded the alarm, the Constitution and Bill of Rights institu-
tionalized protection of minority rights from majority will and
created a foundation for individual liberty. The test of such a
foundation is how firmly it is reinforced against time and tides.

II. "SNEAK-AND-PEEK" WARRANTS PRIOR TO THE USA
PATRIOT ACT

Just as the British crown felt compelled, in the interest of
empire, to sacrifice the rights of citizens remote from the seat of
government, section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, in the name of
fighting terrorism, deprives Americans of the right to be "as well
guarded as a prince in his castle." Section 213 of the PATRIOT
Act greatly expands what already was constitutionally questiona-
ble authority for delayed notification of the execution of search
warrants.

Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure established the framework for the execution and
return of warrants. Rule 41 (f) requires that the officer executing
the warrant enter the date and time of its execution on its face.
It further requires that an officer present at the search prepare
and verify an inventory of any property seized. Moreover, Rule
41 (f) provides that the officer executing the warrant "give a copy
of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person
from whom or from whose premises, the property was taken" or
"leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the
officer took the property."24 Congress recognized an extremely
limited exception to the notification requirements under certain
circumstances where notification would endanger the life or
physical safety of an individual, would result in flight from prose-
cution, destruction of evidence, or intimidation of witnesses, or
would otherwise jeopardize an investigation.25

searches involving electronic communications held in third party storage for
more than ninety days where there "is reason to believe that notification of the
existence of the court order may have an adverse result . . . ." Id. "Adverse
result" is defined in section 2705 as:
(a) endangering the life and physical safety of an individual;
(b) flight from prosecution;
(c) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
The case law regarding surreptitious searches was unsettled at the time the USA PATRIOT Act was adopted. The U.S. Supreme Court never directly addressed the constitutionality of a broad surreptitious search provision. In *Berger v. New York*, the Court struck down New York's wiretapping statute because it lacked a number of procedural safeguards to limit the intrusiveness of wiretapping. Among the statute's deficiencies was that it had no requirement for notice. And, in contrast to other wiretapping statutes, the New York provision did not make up for this deficiency by requiring a showing of exigent circumstances to justify the lack of notice. However, in *Dalia v. United States*, the Court refused to hold all surreptitious searches per se unconstitutional. Rather, the Court reasoned that under some circumstances, surreptitious searches could be authorized where such searches were reasonable, such as where they were supported by a warrant.

On this landscape, the federal circuit courts addressed the constitutionality of delayed notification of searches. In *United States v. Freitas*, the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant that failed to provide notice of search until conclusion of investigation violated Rule 41 and the Constitution but was excused because officers acted in good faith. The surreptitious warrants in both *Johns* and *Sitton* were issued before the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Freitas*, leading, in part, to the good faith determinations in both cases.

---

(d) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(e) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

Id. As pointed out later, these provisions are not an effective limit on the power to search surreptitiously. The threat of section 2705 is limited, however, by its scope (only electronic communications stored with third parties). *See infra* note 49 and accompanying text.

27. Id. at 60.
28. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). *Dalia* involved a surreptitious entry to install bugging devices. *Id.* The entry was not explicitly authorized in the warrant although it was implicitly necessary to effectuate the warrant. *Id.*
29. *Id.* at 246-47. The Court relied on a number of its earlier decisions, including *Irvine v. California*, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954) (holding a warrantless entry to install bugging devices unconstitutional); *Silverman v. United States*, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (concluding that the warrantless secret entry into a home was unconstitutional); *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) (holding that officers need not knock and announce their purpose when conducting an otherwise authorized search when it would provoke the escape of the subject or the destruction of critical evidence); *United States v. Donovan*, 429 U.S. 413, 429 n.19 (1977) (upholding wiretap statute as constitutional where it authorized notice upon completion of surveillance).
30. 800 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986); *see also* *United States v. Johns*, 948 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the failure to provide notice of search until conclusion of investigation violated Rule 41 and the Constitution but was excused because officers acted in good faith). *United States v. Sitton*, 968 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that search violated standard of *Freitas*, but was excused by the good faith of the officers). The surreptitious warrants in both *Johns* and *Sitton* were issued before the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Freitas*, leading, in part, to the good faith determinations in both cases.
to provide for notice within a "reasonable, but short time" after the surreptitious entry was constitutionally defective. The Freitas court held that a delay in notification should not exceed seven days, except when supported by a "strong showing of necessity."\(^{32}\)

Even courts upholding delayed notification of search warrants have imposed significant limitations on such searches. In United States v. Villegas,\(^{33}\) the Second Circuit reasoned:

Though we believe that certain safeguards are required where the entry is to be covert and only intangible evidence is to be seized, we conclude that appropriate conditions were imposed in this case. Certain types of searches or surveillances depend for their success on the absence of premature disclosure. The use of a wiretap or a "bug," or a pen register, or a video camera would likely produce little evidence of wrongdoing if the wrongdoers knew in advance that their conversations or actions would be monitored. When non-disclosure of the authorized search is essential to its success, neither Rule 41 nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits covert entry.\(^{34}\)

The Second Circuit determined that a number of safeguards applied to surreptitious searches. First, the court noted that if tangible evidence was seized during the search, officers must leave an inventory of the property taken at the location or must provide the inventory to the owner of the searched premises.\(^{35}\) Additionally, the court concluded that, with regard to electronic surveillance, the requirements of federal wiretapping laws provided significant safeguards.\(^{36}\) The court further reasoned that the safeguards of the federal wiretapping statute also apply by analogy to video surveillance.\(^{37}\) Even with regard to surreptitious entries in which no tangible property is seized, the Second Circuit held that law enforcement officers must establish that there is a reasonable necessity for the delay of notice and must provide

\(^{31}\) Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1453.  
^{32} Id. at 1456.  
^{33} 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990).  
^{34} Id. at 1336.  
^{35} Id. at 1337.  
^{36} Id. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2000), provides for a number of safeguards: the period of surveillance must be no longer than necessary, the surveillance techniques must minimize the interception of communications by individuals not targets of the surveillance, and an inventory of the surveillance must be provided within ninety days of the end of the surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.  
^{37} Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1337.
notice within a reasonable, but short, period of time after the search. Although the Villegas court did not adopt the seven-day limitation of Freitas, the court did conclude that, as an initial matter, delays of longer than seven days should not be authorized.

While there is a paucity of case law on the general question of whether and when notice of the execution of a search is required, significant authority also establishes the closely related notion that law enforcement officials must knock and announce themselves before executing a search warrant. Even before American independence, British law required law enforcement officials to knock and announce themselves before executing a search warrant. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that whether law enforcement officers knock and announce themselves is a factor to be considered in determining whether a search is reasonable. The Court’s reasoning was based substantially on the notion that government officials must

38. The court specifically reasoned that the showing of necessity need not rise to the level required for a wiretap. *Id.* By statute, officers are required to certify that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).

39. *Villegas*, 899 F.2d at 1337; see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[I]nsofar as the . . . [search] satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, i.e., it was conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, we perceive no basis for concluding that the forty-five day delay in notice rendered the search unconstitutional.”); United States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 453–55 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the notice requirement of Rule 41 is not constitutionally required).


41. See Williams v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). Significant debate exists among various justices of the Supreme Court and scholars regarding whether the principal command of the Fourth Amendment is that a search is reasonable (regardless of whether it is supported by a warrant), or whether the command of the Fourth Amendment is twofold—that searches be both supported by a warrant and be reasonable. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, *In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century*, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990); Davies, *supra* note 19. Regardless of the debate, only reasonableness is implicated in both the “knock and announce” cases and the “sneak-and-peek” cases, as both situations generally arise where law enforcement officials have secured a warrant. See also Richardson v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (finding that a state blanket exception to “knock and announce” rule in drug cases violated the Fourth Amendment).
provide notice before entering a person's home. The Court acknowledged that this notion formed part of the Framers' understanding of what constituted a reasonable search. While the Court has recognized an exigency exception to the "knock and announce" rule, it has not overruled it.

Thus, at the time the PATRIOT Act was adopted, no federal court had authorized unlimited use of "sneak-and-peek" warrants. Moreover, even those courts authorizing limited surreptitious entry had placed significant limitations on such searches.

III. "SNEAK-AND-PEEK" WARRANTS UNDER THE USA PATRIOT ACT

No federal court has ever confronted the virtually unlimited authority to dispense with notice contained in the PATRIOT Act. Section 213 eliminates the time limits for notification under prior federal law, makes judicial review of the necessity of delayed notification perfunctory and so loosens the standard for delayed notification as to render it meaningless. It strikes at the foundation of liberty embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and at the essential protections of probable cause, due process, and separation of powers.

Section 213 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3103a to add the following language:

With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may be delayed if (1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of a warrant may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705); (2) the warrant prohibits seizure of any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121,

42. See Williams, 514 U.S. at 931-34 ("Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry to a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search.").

43. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967) ("[O]fficers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence.").

44. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2705, see supra note 25.
any stored wire or electronic information, except where
the court finds reasonable necessity of the seizure; and
(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice
within a reasonable period of its execution, which period
may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause
shown.45

Section 213 changes prior federal law regarding notification
of searches in several important ways. First, it permits delayed
notification of a search in any case in which the government
demonstrates that one of several adverse factors “may” occur,
regardless of whether the investigation involves terrorism or the
gathering of foreign intelligence. The adverse factors justifying
delayed notice are that notification would endanger the life or
physical safety of an individual, would result in flight from prose-
cution, destruction of evidence, intimidation of witnesses, or
would otherwise jeopardize an investigation or unduly delay a
trial.46

This standard is so open-ended that these invasive warrants
could be obtained as a matter of course; the government need
only state that notification of a search “may” “seriously jeopard-
ize” an investigation. Although the standard for delay was part of
pre-PATRIOT law, the earlier statute was limited to covert
seizures of electronic communications held in third-party
storage.

The nature of criminal investigation is that unpredictable
things may happen. It is always conceivable that the target of a
search may act in an unpredictable fashion when he or she is
notified of the warrant and thereby jeopardize an investigation.
As a result, section 213 places virtually no limit on “sneak-and-
peek” searches.

The second distinction between the PATRIOT Act and prior
law is that officers may seize tangible property using a covert war-
rant under the PATRIOT Act without leaving an inventory of the
property taken. Thus, the PATRIOT Act actually authorizes
“sneak-and-steal” warrants. The law requires only that the war-
rant “provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable
period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended
by the court for good cause shown.”47

sions of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure into federal statu-
tory law). Thus, the new language of section 3103a, added by the PATRIOT
Act, applies to all warrants issued to federal law enforcement officials.
46. See supra note 25.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a; see also supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
Again, prior statutory provisions for delayed notification applied only to electronic communications in third-party storage. The cases dealing with delayed notification authorized surreptitious entry but required officers to leave an inventory if property was taken.48 Although the approach of courts like the Second Circuit in Villegas, in our view, did not properly limit the use of "sneak-and-peek" warrants, it is significantly more limited than the PATRIOT Act approach.

Third, section 213 permits delayed notification even where the government seizes electronic information, so long as the court issuing the warrant finds "reasonable necessity" for the seizure. Thus, if officers get a warrant under federal wiretapping statutes, they still must comply with a complex set of safeguards.49 For all other warrants involving electronic communications—those involving video or Internet surveillance, for example—delayed notification under the PATRIOT Act applies.

Fourth, section 213 places no express limit on the length of the delay. Instead, it authorizes delay for a "reasonable period" of time and permits extensions of the delay for "good cause shown." Section 213 opens the door for secret searches extending over months or even years without the knowledge of the target of the search. Such delays render notice meaningless. Although the judge in any particular case may impose a specific deadline by which notice must be given, the statute does not require such a deadline. Where the warrant itself does not impose specific time limits, judicial review of the necessity of continuing delay in notification is impaired. No concrete timeframe triggers a governmental duty to justify continued delay. Because the target of the search is, by definition, unaware of the search, he or she cannot be expected to seek review of the need for continued delay. Courts would have the opportunity to review the necessity of delay only after the fact, while also under the pressure to prosecute and admit evidence obtained through the notice-less search.

Finally, section 213 extends the availability of "sneak-and-peek" warrants far beyond the PATRIOT Act's stated purpose of fighting terrorism. The provision contains no limitation on the types of cases in which a covert warrant could be used.

**Conclusion**

The threatening nature of section 213 is not obvious, and thus, it is more dangerous to the cause of preserving liberty. If

48. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 36.
the public is blinded by fear of terrorism or ignorance of what is at risk, section 213 has the potential to become the insidious mechanism of steady but discernible erosion in the foundation of our freedoms. Section 213 takes the exception and makes it the rule—in fact, makes it the law of the land. It gives broad statutory authority to secret searches in virtually any criminal case. Even if the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of such practices, Congress can—and should—limit them by statute. In such cases, justice delayed truly is justice denied.

Terrorism is a scourge that must be addressed. Government has a fundamental duty to protect its people from enemies, foreign or domestic. Fear of terrorism, or anything else, deprives us of free choice as surely as does tyranny; indeed, terrorism is an instrument of tyranny. We must not, however, allow fear to erode the constitutional foundation of our freedom. We can no more gain real security by being less free than we can gain wealth or wisdom or anything else of value. No such trade-off is possible. That is the definition of "unalienable"—rights with which we were endowed by our Creator, and which therefore cannot be repudiated or transferred to another. Our Constitution recognizes that higher law, and we ignore it at our peril.

We now are engaged in a national crisis, an unconventional war in which our surreptitious enemies use the camouflage of a free society’s commitment to privacy and diversity to achieve their goals. Our government is justified in adapting its law enforcement methods to the new threat, but we must take care to ensure those methods are consistent with the timeless principles of our founding.\textsuperscript{50} To do less is to sanction a dangerous expansion of governmental authority and a corresponding reduction of personal privacy.

Our body of laws serves as both a connecting mortar and a protective barrier between the foundation of our Constitution and the structure of our government. Laws are necessary for applying constitutional principles to the endless variety of every-

\textsuperscript{50} A narrowly tailored response to the current crisis could be crafted. For example, the proposed Security and Freedom Ensured Act of 2003 (SAFE Act), S. 1709, 108th Cong. (2003), would permit delayed notification, but only where the government demonstrates that notice of the search "will" result in endangering the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction of evidence or intimidation of witnesses, or will otherwise seriously impair the investigation or delay trial. Moreover, the SAFE Act requires that notice be provided within seven days of the search. SAFE Act, S. 1709, § 3. Another possible approach would be to limit "sneak-and-peek" searches only to terrorism investigations and/or to provide the power to delay notification of a search until some time in the future when the current crisis has passed.
day life. They join the abstract and the concrete. They enable us to safely explore our freedom and realize the potential of liberty.

However, when laws reach beyond limits imposed by the Constitution, when they grant too much power to government and too little deference to the source of that power, they cease to connect or protect. If unchecked, these laws can destroy the foundation of individual rights. Proponents contend that we have nothing to fear from section 213 or any other provision of the PATRIOT Act. This may be true, as long as the public is as vigilant as the American colonists were after Otis inflamed their passions regarding the Writs of Assistance. But can we trust that the law will be used as judiciously, with as much care to protecting civil liberties, once the public's attention has turned to other matters?

The concern is not new or unique to the PATRIOT Act. Few of our Founding Fathers had greater faith in his fellow man than Thomas Jefferson. Yet that faith had its limits. In the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson wrote:

[I]t would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism—free government is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further, our confidence may go . . . .

Due process. Probable cause. Those are the constitutional limits within which we "bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power" and preserve our individual rights. A law that sets those limits aside, or obfuscates them in vague statutory language and legalistic definitions, has the potential for eroding the foundation of freedom as surely as terrorists have the potential for breaching the ramparts of our security. An informed people and a vigilant and responsive Congress are the keys to guaranteeing that our rights to security and freedom are ensured. They are essential to protecting the foundation of liberty and preserving each individual's God-given role as the architect of his or her own destiny. As John Stuart Mill warned:

A people may prefer a free government, but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public

---

spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty.  