UIdaho Law Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-23-2009

State v. Lombard Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36454

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/ idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation

"State v. Lombard Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36454" (2009). *Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs*. 297. https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/297

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

-						
1						
2 3						
4	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO					
5		I OF THE STATE OF IDAHO				
6	STATE OF IDAHO,)				
7	Plaintiff/Respondent,)) Supreme Court Docket #36454-2009				
8	vs.))				
9	VERNA L. LOMBARD)				
10	Defendant/Appellant.)				
11						
12)				
13						
1.						
14	APPELLA	NT'S BRIEF				
14 15 16	Appealed from the District Court of the Solution In and For the Co	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, bunty of Clearwater				
15 16 17	Appealed from the District Court of the S In and For the Co The Honorable John Bradh	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding				
15 16 17 18	Appealed from the District Court of the S In and For the Co The Honorable John Bradk	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding				
15 16 17 18 19	Appealed from the District Court of the S In and For the Co The Honorable John Bradh	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding				
15 16 17 18 19 20	Appealed from the District Court of the S In and For the Co The Honorable John Bradk Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent Lawrence G. Wasden	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding Counsel for Defendant/Appellant John Charles Mitchell				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Appealed from the District Court of the Solution In and For the Court The Honorable John Bradk Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent Lawrence G. Wasden Attorney General 1299 N. Orchard St., Suite 110	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding Counsel for Defendant/Appellant John Charles Mitchell Clark and Feeney P.O. Box Drawer 285				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Appealed from the District Court of the Second Seco	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding Counsel for Defendant/Appellant John Charles Mitchell Clark and Feeney				
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Appealed from the District Court of the Solution In and For the Court The Honorable John Bradk Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent Lawrence G. Wasden Attorney General 1299 N. Orchard St., Suite 110	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding Counsel for Defendant/Appellant John Charles Mitchell Clark and Feeney P.O. Box Drawer 285				
15 16 17 18 19 20	Appealed from the District Court of the Solution In and For the Court The Honorable John Bradk Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent Lawrence G. Wasden Attorney General 1299 N. Orchard St., Suite 110	econd Judicial District in the State of Idaho, ounty of Clearwater oury, District Judge Presiding Counsel for Defendant/Appellant John Charles Mitchell Clark and Feeney P.O. Box Drawer 285 Lewiston, ID 83501				

1	TABLE OF CONTENTS					
2	TABLE OF CONTENTS i					
3	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii					
4	STATEMENT OF THE CASE					
5	A. NATURE OF CASE					
6	B.	COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF				
7		RELEVANT FACTS				
8 9	ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL					
10	ARGUMENT					
11	А.	THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING A				
12		RESTITUTION AMOUNT THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS THUS NOT SUPPORTED BY				
13		SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE				
14	B.	THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANT BY CONSIDERING FACTS				
15		NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD				
16						
17	CONCLUSIC	DN				
18						
19 20						
20						
22						
23						
24	APPELLANT	''S BRIEF i				
25	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
26						
		LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501				

_	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES						
1							
2	CASES						
3	State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 169 P.3d 275 (Ct. App. 2007)						
4							
5	STATUTES/RULES						
6	I.C. § 19-5304						
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							
13							
14							
15							
16							
17							
18							
19							
20							
21							
22							
23							
24	APPELLANT'S BRIEF ii						
25 26							
20	LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501						

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a criminal case in which Defendant/Appellant (hereafter "Lombard") was charged with one count of Burglary and one count of Grand Theft. A written Rule 11 Plea Agreement was rejected by the District Court and Lombard was subsequently found guilty on both counts by a jury. Subsequently Lombard was sentenced and ordered to pay restitution. This *Appeal* takes issue with the District Court's rejection of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Lombard's Sentencing, and the District Court's Order for Restitution.

1

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

The Information in this case was filed April 15, 2008, charging Lombard with one count of Burglary and one count of Grand Theft resulting from alleged conduct while employed with Mary Ann's Grocery (owned by Don and Cammie Ebert) in Weippe, Idaho. (R. pp. 10-11).

After extensive negotiations, the Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter "State") and Lombard entered into a written Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. pp. 99-101). Pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Lombard would have entered a guilty plea to Grand Theft and the State would have then dismissed the Burglary count. *Id.* In exchange for the guilty plea, Lombard would have been entitled to ask for a withheld judgment, any incarceration would not have exceeded six months at the county jail, fines and costs would have been set by the court, the length and term of probation would be set by the court, and Lombard would have paid \$20,000 in restitution. *Id.*

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-1-

However on December 1, 2008, the District Court rejected the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and ordered the case to jury trial because Lombard would not admit to taking \$20,000. (*See* Tr. pp. 4-11). At the change of plea hearing the District Court stated that it would not impose restitution of \$20,000 "unless there's an admission that that's what she did. And if there's not, then we'll go to trial." (Tr. p. 9 lns. 16-19.

A jury trial was subsequently held on January 11-13, 2009. Part of the evidence that was introduced at trial was a taped conversation that Lombard had with Detective Sergeant Jared of the Clearwater County Sheriff's Office on the day of her arrest September 9th, 2007. During this conversation, Lombard admitted to taking cash while at work from Mary Ann's Grocery beginning the end of June of 2007. (Tr. p. 232 lns. 7-21) Lombard admitted to taking \$50 to \$60 dollars a day but she also stated that she did not take cash every day and did not always take cash when she hit the no sale button on the cash register. *Id.* Subsequently on January 13th, 2009, the jury found Lombard guilty of Burglary and Grand Theft.

On March 23, 2009, the District Court sentenced Lombard to concurrent terms of not less than 2 ½ years nor more than 8 years with the District Court retaining jurisdiction. (R pp. 121-23). The PSI recommended local incarceration followed by supervised probation. (Tr. p. 265 lns. 19-20). The District Court set a restitution hearing for April 20, 2009. *Id.*

On April 20, 2009, the State filed an Affidavit for Restitution. (See R. pp. 108-15). Attached to this Affidavit is a letter from Don and Cammie Ebert stating that they believed that Lombard

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

allegedly stole at least \$100,000. (R. p. 111). The Ebert letter offers no support for this conclusion. Also attached to the Affidavit were two separate statistical calculations prepared by Don Ebert. (R. pp. 112-13).

At the restitution hearing, over Lombard's objection, Don Ebert testified with regards to his statistical calculations. (*See* Tr. pgs. 286-297). The District Court overruled Lombard's objection that restitution is required to be established by a preponderance of the evidence and that actual loss needs to be based on substantial evidence and that statistical average or assumptions are not substantial evidence for purpose of determining a restitution amount. (Tr. pg. 289 lns. 14-25, pg. 290 lns. 1-2).

At the hearing, Don Ebert testified that he could not put a black or white number on how much Lombard allegedly took. (Tr. pg. 290 lns. 5-6). At the hearing, he also testified that he could not identify the exact date that allegedly Lombard began taking money from the store, how many times Lombard allegedly took money from the store, and the exact amount for each transaction that was allegedly taken. (Tr. pg. 293 lns. 4-16).

During the trial, Don Ebert also testified that there were legitimate reasons for no sale transactions to occur on the cash register slip, that the number of legitimate no sale transactions each day varied, that different employees used the same till during a shift, and that it was impossible to determine from the cash register slip which employee entered a no sale transaction. (*See* Tr. pgs. 173-177).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO B3501

In deciding the restitution amount the District Court took "the more conservative approach, simply because it seems awfully hard for any reasonable person to question that amount." (Tr. pg. 305 lns 3-6).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A) Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in ordering a restitution amount that was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is thus not supported by substantial evidence.

 B) Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in sentencing Verna Lombard by considering facts not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

ARGUMENT

On a preliminary note, this case has always been about restitution. The Defendant in this case, Verna Lombard, never denied that she engaged in inappropriate conduct while working for Mary Ann's Grocery. In fact, she admitted to Sergeant Detective Mitch Jared on the very day in September of 2007 that she was arrested that she had been taking money from the store since the end of June of 2007 (actually she could not remember if it started the end of June or the first part of July). She admitted that she had taken \$50 to \$60 dollars a day. She also stated that she did not take every single day that she worked since she had started taking in June or July. Further she stated that sometimes when she hit no sale on the cash register she did not take any money. The importance, or alleged importance, of a no sale on the cash register will be addressed in depth shortly.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-4-

This case has always been about restitution, or maybe more accurately, the lack of credible substantiated evidence regarding a restitution amount. It must be emphasized that Verna Lombard fully realizes that she should have to pay restitution, however, just as importantly, and this is equally true to all people whether they are paying or receiving restitution, is that the amount of restitution in a criminal case needs to be based on the **actual** loss of the victim, not some statistical analysis based on assumptions. Criminal defendants are required to pay only what the actual loss was, or an amount that a defendant agreed to pay. Criminal defendants are not required to pay amounts based on assumptions. Victims are entitled to the amount of actual loss, or maybe even more if a defendant agrees, but are not entitled to a windfall. While it should never pay to be a criminal, it should likewise never pay to be a victim.

This case should have been resolved pursuant to the parties' written Rule 11 Plea Agreement. The parties negotiated extensively in coming to the Agreement. Both sides, including the victims, were satisfied with the Agreement hence the presentation of the signed Agreement to the District Court. A restitution amount was agreed to and all sides benefitted. From Verna Lombard's perspective, she got the opportunity to ask for a withheld judgment, got one count dismissed, got the opportunity to argue for the length of local incarceration, and knew what the exact amount of restitution would be. The State got a guilty plea and the victims, who were involved in the plea agreement negotiations, were satisfied with the restitution amount. Plea agreements are contractual and there is no legal authority that requires a defendant to plead to taking the same

-5-

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

amount as agreed to be paid in restitution in a plea agreement. In other words, all that Defendant Verna Lombard needed to do in this case was plead to the elements of grand theft, she did not have to admit to taking the amount that she had agreed to pay as restitution in the Plea Agreement. However the District Court would not let her just plead to the elements of grand theft and rejected her plea and the Plea Agreement between the parties. This abuse of discretion forced Defendant Verna Lombard to stand trial on counts of Burglary and Grand Theft in which she had no chance of prevailing given her admissions to Detective Sergeant Jared. This abuse of discretion led to none of the parties receiving the benefit of the bargain that Verna Lombard entered with the State and the victims.

Subsequently a jury found Verna Lombard guilty of Burglary and Grand Theft. Given that the admissions alone were enough to find Verna guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this was no surprise. While this case has always been about restitution, and we'll get to that in shortly, a summary of the evidence presented at trial is helpful for ultimately understanding the issue of restitution.

The Eberts were allegedly approached by an individual who said that he bought an item from Mary Ann's Grocery that was not run up by Verna Lombard. It was the Eberts' belief that Verna was selling goods to individuals and would hit no sale on the cash register which would then not register as a saleable event on the till. Verna herself confirmed this to Sergeant Detective Jared and told him that she would take the money, hit no sale, give the customer change, and then pocket money from

-6-

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

the sale that registered on the till as a no sale. Verna herself admitted that she had being doing this since late June or early July of 2007 and took approximately \$50 to \$60 a day when she did this. Verna also stated that she did not take every day she worked from when she starting taking and that some times she hit no sale and did not pocket any money from that transaction.

The State introduced video tape surveillance of Verna Lombard taken the day of her arrest and for a few days prior to her arrest in September of 2007. The tapes showed Verna working the cash register and at the very most by themselves only show Verna taking something from the till and putting it in her pockets. They tapes do not show how much was taken each incident and only show a brief period of time.

The State matched the cash register tapes to the videos and established that Verna had actually sold product at times which the cash register tape reads no sale. The video tapes and the cash register tapes themselves still fail to show how much were actually taken in even one incident and again were only for a few day period. In fact, the combination of the cash register tapes and the video tape only confirm what Verna admitted to Sergeant Detective Jared.

The State then introduced cash register tapes for several years The cash register tapes by themselves establish nothing substantial. Don Ebert testified that there were legitimate reasons for no sale entries, the amount of legitimate no sale entries varied day to day, it was impossible to tell what employee run in a no sale entry from the tapes themselves, and the tapes themselves could not identify an actual amount that was taken in even one incident.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-7-

So while the State failed to offer any substantial evidence at trial besides Verna Lombard's admissions regarding the amount taken per incident, the total number of incidents, and the total amount taken by Lombard, the admissions by Verna by themselves were enough to justify a finding of guilt by the jury. Which now leads us to the issue of restitution.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING A RESTITUTION AMOUNT THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS THUS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of the trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. *State v. Smith*, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 2007). "Restitution, however, may be ordered only for **actual** economic loss suffered by a victim, I.C. §§ 19-5304(1)(a), (2), unless the parties consent to a broader restitution order. *See* I.C. 19-5304(9)." The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. *Smith* at 692, 169 P.3d at 281. An appellate court will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown. *Id.* When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-8-

LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO B3501

Α.

such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. *Id.*

At the restitution hearing (*See* Tr. pgs. 277-307), Don Ebert testified that he could not put a black or white number on how much Lombard allegedly took. At the hearing, he also testified that he could not identify the exact date that allegedly Lombard began taking money from the store, how many times Lombard allegedly took money from the store, and the exact amount for each transaction that was allegedly taken. In other words, Don Ebert testified that he could not identify the actual loss.

Don Ebert further testified that it was impossible to determine the amount that was taken and the District Court later agreed by saying that Verna Lombard caused the problem and lack of evidence and thus Don Ebert's statistical model was appropriate to determine restitution. With all due respect to the Don Ebert and the District Court, it was not, or is not, impossible to determine how much Verna took from the store. Its a matter of simple bookkeeping and accounting to determine how much "cash" should have been running through the business based on the sale of inventory. Its then simply a matter of identifying the actual cash versus the amount of cash that should have been running through the store. Its certainly not impossible to determine that amount. The fact that the Eberts did not have adequate control of the financials does not excuse illegal conduct, however it should also not open the door for restitution amounts based on speculation. Restitution is limited to the actual amount of loss and it's the State's burden to make this showing.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-9-

The State failed to make any showing of actual loss. The District Court is required to only award restitution supported by the preponderance of the evidence. The District Court abused its discretion by awarding restitution in an amount not supported by the preponderance of the evidence and there is not substantial evidence in the record to affirm the District Court's award of restitution in this matter. As such, the Defendant respectfully contends that the District Court's order of restitution be reversed.

Restitution is limited to actual loss and thus should not be speculative at all. The statistical analysis offered by Don Ebert and subsequently adopted by the District Court is nothing but speculations. There is not one single factor in the models that do not require major assumptions.

Don Ebert testified that he did not know the number of unlawful events that Verna engaged in, yet the models (*See* R. pgs. 112-13) use no sale entries on the cash register tapes as a measure for the number of unlawful events. As already established there are many legitimate reasons for no sale entries. The legitimate entrees vary day to day, its impossible to determine what employee is responsible for the no sale entry, and numerous employees use the same register throughout a shift. The preponderance of the evidence does not show that no sale entrees is a reliable measure for unlawful transactions. The preponderance of the evidence shows that no sale entrees are not a reliable event indicator and is based entirely on speculation. Restitution is limited to actual loss not speculative loss.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-10-

Don Ebert testified that he did not know how much was taken each unlawful event, yet the model relies on a average take per event which is calculated purely through speculation based on the amount of money Verna Lombard had on her when she was arrested. Don Ebert seeks to base the daily take for 523 days in one model and for 674 days in another model based only on the amount of money that Verna had on her person the date she was arrested. Not to mention that Verna told Sergeant Detective Jared that she had money on her person that was hers legitimately on the date that she was arrested.

The model assumes the date that Verna allegedly began engaging in unlawful conduct. Once model starts with a date in 2004 and then assumes that she took every day she worked thereafter until the day she was arrested! The other model assumes that Verna began taking on the very first day that she worked and took every single day that she worked until the day of her arrest! There is absolutely no reliable evidence that Verna Lombard took from the store 523 straight days that she worked or that she took from the store 674 straight days that she worked.

Restitution is limited to actual loss. Statistical calculations assuming unlawful events, amounts taken each unlawful event, daily takes, and days taken do not establish actual loss and are too speculative for restitution. The problems are almost too numerous to discuss. For example, in both models, Don Ebert assumes that on the date when Verna Lombard began taking, that she proceeded to take every single day until the date of her arrest. There is absolutely no substantial evidence that assumption is correct and its also highly unlikely someone would take every single day.

-11-

* || APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The point being is if this assumption is wrong, say for example illegal events occurred only every other day or only every third day then the amount is too high by half or too high by two thirds.

Another example is assuming what the daily take is and multiplying it by the number of days which unlawful activity allegedly occurred. One model assumes 523 days of illegal activity and wants to calculate the average daily take based on 1 day. Again there is absolutely no evidence that what was taken one day was taken the next day and in this model, assuming only for illustrative purposes, if the daily take is twice as high (\$160) as it should be (\$80) then the amount would be inflated by \$41,840.

Restitution is limited to actual loss. The only reliable evidence regarding actual loss in this case is the admissions that Verna Lombard make which would approximately total \$2,800. However this also assumes she took every day from when she stated in fact that she did not.

Its important to note that the victims agreed to \$20,000 restitution in the Pleas Agreement. Its important to note that amount because it shows how speculative and erroneous the statistical models are. In one model the low end is almost \$72,000 and in the other the high end is over \$204,000. The question has to be asked why someone who thought their actual loss was a minimum of \$72,000 and a maximum of \$204,000 would ever agree to only \$20,000 in restitution.

Restitution is limited to actual loss. This actual loss needs to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and cannot be based on speculation. No sufficient evidence was presented at the restitution hearing regarding actual loss. The preponderance of the evidence does not support the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-12-

District Court's restitution award in this matter. The District Court abused its discretion in awarding restitution based purely on speculation and assumptions without any foundational support. The restitution award is not based on substantial evidence in the record and Defendant Verna Lombard respectfully urges that the award must be reversed.

B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING VERNA LOMBARD BY CONSIDERING FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

The District Court obviously put a lot of weight in the statistical models prepared by Don Ebert when sentencing Verna Lombard in this matter. However as set forth above, these models are based entirely on assumptions and speculations and there is no justification for their use in this matter in setting a restitution amount. The consideration of these models as a restitution amount influenced the District Court's decision on how long Verna Lombard's sentence would be with the District Court's intent that Verna be on probation for up to eight years in order to pay the restitution. As set forth above, the restitution order is erroneous and needs to be set aside and any change in restitution should also change the length of the Verna's probation.

CONCLUSION

This is a case that should have been resolved by the parties' written Rule 11 Plea Agreement but the District Court's abuse of discretion led to a jury trial that was a foregone conclusion based on the admissions made by Verna, a sentencing that relied upon assumptions and speculative

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-13-

LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

evidence regarding restitution, and a restitution order that is purely speculative and flies in the face of well established law regarding restitution.

Verna Lombard acknowledges that her conduct was wrong and that she should be required to pay restitution. However just as importantly is the requirement that the amount of restitution be based only on the actual loss of the victims and that a restitution award needs to be based on a preponderance of the evidence.

It was not impossible for the victims to establish their actual loss in this matter. The State failed to prove the victims' actual loss be a preponderance of the evidence. The only uncontroverted evidence that is reliable and is not based improperly on assumptions and speculations are Verna's admissions to Sergeant Detective Jared that she took \$50 to \$60 some days beginning the end of June or the first part of July 2007 and that sometimes she hit no sale and did not take any money. The video tapes do not show anything different. The cash register tapes do not show anything different. The cash register tapes do not show anything different. At the very most the restitution award should be limited to Verna's admissions.

The statistical models offered by Don Ebert are entirely speculative and rely solely on assumptions and do not offer any evidence whatsoever about the actual loss in this matter. The District Court in this matter abused its discretion by refusing the parties' Rule 11 Plea Agreement, sentencing Verna Lombard based on its reliance of the statistical models, and abused its discretion

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-14-

LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

1	in ordering restitution in an amount not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. This abuse						
2	of discretion has caused the Defendant to suffer manifest injustice.						
3	The District Court clearly abused its discretion with regards to the restitution order and						
4	sentencing in this case. Neither the restitution order nor the sentence is supported by substantial						
5	evidence in the record and as such, Verna Lombard respectfully requests that the restitution order						
6							
7	and the sentence be reversed.						
8	DATED this 17th day of November, 2009.						
9	CLARK AND FEENEY						
10							
11	By: John Charles Mitchell, a member of the firm.						
12	Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant						
13							
14							
15							
16							
17							
18							
19							
20							
21 22							
22							
23							
24 25	APPELLANT'S BRIEF -15-						
26							
	LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEENEY LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501						

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:								
2									
3									
4	Lawrence G. Wasden			U.S. Mail					
5	Attorney General 1299 N. Orchard St., Suite 110			Hand Delivered Overnight Mail					
6	Boise, ID 83706			Telecopy					
7									
8		By:							
9			rs for D	Defendant/Appellant					
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24	APPELLANT'S BRIEF	-16	5-						
25									
26									
				LAW OFFICES OF CLARK AND FEED LEWISTON, IDAHO 8350					