Remedial and Preventive Responses to the Unauthorized Practice of Immigration Law

Monique C. Lillard

University of Idaho College of Law, lillard@uidaho.edu

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REMEDIAL AND PREVENTIVE RESPONSES TO THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF IMMIGRATION LAW

MONICA SCHURTMAN* & MONIQUE C. LILLARD**

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* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. Many people used their myriad talents to help with this article. In particular, the authors wish to thank students Lola Velazquez, Yvonne Perez, Adrian Fox, and Aaron Tracy. Additionally we are grateful to Cindy Maylott and Todd Bowman for their assistance, D. Benjamin Beard and Duncan Palmatier for reading earlier drafts, and Brad Andrews, Brad Winter, Robert B. Mather, and Monica Salazar for sharing their experiences in combating the unauthorized practice of immigration law.

** Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
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Unauthorized practice of immigration law (UPIL), often called “notario fraud,” continues to be rampant in the United States. Practitioners of UPIL are individuals or
organizations that (1) “hold themselves out as immigration law experts, even though they are not attorneys” or (2) “act as gatekeepers for ‘appearance attorneys’ with limited or no knowledge of their client’s immigration case.” Individuals properly accredited through a federally recognized organization charging only nominal fees are excluded from this definition.

Although notarios sometimes provide useful services, they can irreparably damage the lives of immigrants and their citizen family members. Families are separated, and individuals are deported to countries they scarcely remember and where they often have no relatives or friends. Immigrants may lose thousands of hard-earned dollars to scammers who falsely promise “papers” that would allow them and their families to live lawfully in the United States. Immigrant workers and their families can lose their livelihoods, and U.S. employers lose valuable workers. UPIL also compromises the rule of law and faith in the U.S. legal system.

in Filene's Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2006) (discussing case studies of smuggling in Chinese immigrant communities). Other common terms used by non-lawyers who engage in UPIL are “immigration consultants,” “visa consultants,” and “immigrant assistants.” Id. at 1488.

3. See Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1074, 1077 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the “immigration system in this country is plagued with ‘notarios’ who prey on uneducated immigrants”).

4. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 675 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011). Gatekeeper notarios are also referred to as “intermediaries.” See Abel, supra note 2, at 1488. They characteristically “chargin[ ] clients; choos[ ] lawyers; collect[ ] and translate[ ] documents; maintain[ ] the file; prepar[e] clients for hearings; interpret[ ]; and even choos[e] litigation strategies... In some cases the client will not even know who his lawyer is... who is actually doing the work for him.” Id. at 1488, 1488 n.312 (quoting JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 163 (1962)).

5. See infra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing federal and state regulation of immigration practice).


7. Unless otherwise indicated, in this article we use the word “immigrant” colloquially to mean any non-citizen residing in the United States temporarily or permanently, with or without authorization. When we need to make clear that an individual may be in the United States without authorization, we use the descriptors “undocumented” or “unauthorized.” Where appropriate, we also use the word “alien.” The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). Under the INA, “the term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within [an enumerated] class[ ] of nonimmigrant[s].” INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). The “immigrant” designation ordinarily refers to an individual who intends to reside permanently in the United States but is not a U.S. citizen or national. See id. (defining “immigrant” by way of exclusion). Synonymous terms for individuals with immigrant status include: permanent resident; green card holder; and resident alien. A “non-immigrant” is an alien in the United States temporarily for a specific purpose permitted by law. Id. Common nonimmigrant statuses include: visitors (B-1 visa holders); foreign students (F-1 visa holders), agricultural and non-seasonal, unskilled workers (respectively, H-2A and H2B visa holders). See id. (listing classes of non-immigrants).

8. We use the term “immigration consumer” to refer to non-U.S. citizens seeking immigration benefits or relief from removal and their U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident family members or employers who want to assist them in the process of seeking to reside lawfully in the United States.
Several factors contribute to the prevalence of UPIL: the sheer number of immigration consumers;9 the multiple vulnerabilities of people seeking to obtain or retain immigration status;10 the scarcity of affordable and competent immigration representation;11 and the inadequate regulation and punishment of UPIL.12 A meaningful response to the problem of notario fraud must address all of these realities.

In the last few years private and governmental actors have begun to challenge the persistence of UPIL in several ways, including: (1) conducting campaigns to educate the public about the harm that notarios can cause, how to identify the unlawful practice of immigration law, and what individuals and communities can do about it;13 (2) enacting laws that more effectively address unauthorized immigration practice;14 (3) undertaking capacity-building efforts aimed at building a greater pool of lawyers and government-accredited representatives to represent immigrants;15 and (4) taking civil and criminal legal action against alleged notarios.16 In a particularly welcome development, federal, state, and local government actors increasingly coordinate these efforts with one another and with non-government entities.17

Current models for addressing notario fraud can be roughly conceptualized as: (1) prevention-oriented actions such as regulation of immigration law-related practices, capacity building, and public education; (2) remedial approaches such as civil and administrative re-

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10. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 2, at 1488 (explaining that immigrants are often poor, uneducated, "ignorant of language and culture, and threatened with losing everything they have so painfully won"); Katzmann, supra note 9, at 292 (highlighting the vulnerabilities of immigrants).

11. See Katzmann, supra note 9, at 301 (describing the significant need among immigrants for competent legal representation).

12. See Moore, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the prevalence of UPIL practices and resultant setbacks to the immigration administrative system).

13. See, e.g., CATHOLIC CHARITIES PETITION, supra note 9, at 17-18 (highlighting consumer education initiatives to combat the unauthorized practice of immigration law).

14. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing various legislative initiatives intended to address the unauthorized practice of immigration law).

15. See infra Part VI (discussing capacity building efforts).

16. See, e.g., CATHOLIC CHARITIES PETITION, supra note 9, at 15-16 (describing state enforcement actions and private litigation for violation of state consumer protection statutes).

storative actions; and (3) deterrence measures such as enhanced enforcement and punishment. These efforts depend on better reporting and information-sharing mechanisms among government and non-government federal, state, and local actors. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) "sentinel system," which collects reports of suspected fraud, is one such example.¹⁸

In this article, we examine recent initiatives to fight UPIL and the roles played by community-based organizations, federal, state, and local governmental agencies, national professional associations, judges, private attorneys, and federal and state legislators. We conclude that these generally positive, but still piecemeal, approaches to combat UPIL could be rendered more effectively with the adoption of multi-pronged strategies that consciously seek to integrate legal actions, regulation and oversight, education, capacity building, and to coordinate the work of diverse private and public actors at national, state, and local levels.

Isolated approaches to fight notario fraud will achieve limited success. Public education, for example, goes only so far if immigrants and their families do not have access to attorneys and federally accredited representatives competent in immigration law. Therefore, capacity-building measures are as necessary as education campaigns. Similarly, the ability to pursue successful legal remedies is limited because they require significant expenditures of time, money, and labor, all of which immigrant families often lack. Criminal prosecution, likewise, is money and labor intensive, especially given the evidentiary burden required to prevail. Adopting legal rules to strengthen safeguards against UPIL results in mere negligible gains if unaccompanied by strong enforcement of those rules.

The authors urge public and private stakeholders to consider, in a deliberate manner, how best to exploit the connections and complementary relationships that exist among preventive, remedial, and deterrent responses to notario fraud when developing anti-notario strategies.¹⁹ In an effort to spur further thought about a comprehensive approach to reducing UPIL as well as the individual and systemic harm it causes, this article brings together in one

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¹⁹ The authors live and work in Idaho and Eastern Washington, largely rural areas. Historically, immigrant populations have been concentrated in urban areas; however, recent years have seen significant growth outside of major cities. Catholic Charities Petition, supra note 9, at 3. Procuring access to quality immigration assistance in the rural United States is particularly challenging. The difficulties arise from geography, demographics, and virtually non-existent public transportation. Small towns are separated by vast stretches of fields, rangeland, and wilderness. Many immigrants in the region cannot obtain drivers' licenses or car insurance, or afford the cost of gasoline to drive long distances from town-to-town. Immigrants in rural areas are often further isolated in remote labor camps. It is generally not cost-effective for attorneys to set up offices in such areas, and without private or public transportation, immigrants cannot travel to secure appropriate representation. Such isolation makes it relatively easy for a notario who may be shut down in one community to move a short distance away to start up in a new community without detection. Government and non-governmental organizations in rural regions need to develop strategies to increase access to competent legal assistance, and marshal enforcement and education resources efficiently to ultimately reduce instances of notario fraud.
place an analysis of existing responses to the problem. As comprehensive immigration reform moves closer toward becoming a reality, the need for creative solutions grows even more urgent.

In Part I, we categorize the kinds of harms notario fraud can inflict on individuals, families, and the broader legal system. Part II discusses the limited procedures available to victims of UPIL that try to "undo" harm to their immigration cases and offers a compendium of legal remedies that may provide them monetary relief. This section addresses the application of traditional remedial approaches, a model that has received relatively scant attention in legal literature on UPIL. Part III lays out legal mechanisms that could potentially stop individual notarios from repeating their UPIL. Part IV analyzes federal and state regulation and sanctioning of unauthorized practitioners of immigration law. Parts V and VI address public education efforts including reporting initiatives and capacity-building programs, respectively, and stress the need for further joint actions among federal, state, and local governmental and private entities.

I. Harms Caused by Unauthorized Immigration Service Providers

A. The Dangers of UPIL

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that "[t]he proliferation of immigration laws and regulations has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate." The Supreme Court is blunt in its assessment, acknowledging that "nothing is ever simple with immigration law." By entrusting their cases to notarios or to the appearance attorneys with whom notarios sometimes work, immigrants face an elevated risk of irreparable harm to their claims.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the regulations implementing its provisions exceed 2,000 pages. Each year, federal appellate courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") issue hundreds of decisions interpreting immigration statutes and regulations. These decisions frequently turn on the interaction of immigration law with federal and state laws and precedent that govern subjects such as family relationships and criminal conduct.

Unlike what many immigration consumers believe—and what notarios often fail to tell them—obtaining immigration benefits is not simply a matter of filling out forms correctly, paying application fees, living in the United States for a long time, or having U.S. citizen relatives. Reliance on notarios for immigration assistance can result in the denial of claims, deportation, and permanent inadmissibility. Trying to undo the harm is often impossible. The following examples illustrate several common problems.

1. Family-Based Immigration Law Examples

Contrary to popular perception, immigration through family members is limited and turns on definitions of family peculiar to immigration law. For instance, in the immigration context, an “immediate relative” refers only to the spouse, minor unmarried child, and parent of a son or daughter twenty-one years of age or older who is a U.S. citizen. The spouse, minor unmarried child, and parent of a son or daughter twenty-one years of age or older of a legal permanent resident are not considered “immediate relatives” under immigration law; they fall into the “family preference” category. The distinction is huge. Immediate relatives can become permanent residents when paperwork has been processed and a successful adjudication is complete. By contrast, family preference relatives often have to wait years, sometimes decades, to become permanent residents and cannot live lawfully in the United States during that time. Notarios often do not know or do not bother to tell immigration consumers about this difference.

In most cases, both immediate relative and family preference beneficiaries who entered the United States without inspection cannot become permanent residents by adjusting status in the United States. Instead, they have to return to their home countries to process their applications through a U.S. consulate. If they resided unlawfully in the United

23. Qualifying relationships are limited to spouses, children, parents of a child who is at least 21 years old, and siblings of adult U.S. citizens. See INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151; INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153. Family-based immigration is further constrained by laws that result in lengthy waiting periods—even after approval of a petition—before individuals can apply for permanent resident status and live lawfully in the United States. See Family-based Immigrant Visas, U.S. Dep't of State, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1306.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (discussing wait times for family-based immigrant visas). For example, the current waiting period for Chinese-citizen sibling beneficiaries of petitions filed by U.S. citizens is approximately twenty-four years. See id. (showing that Chinese-citizen sibling beneficiaries of petitions filed by their U.S. siblings in 1989 only became eligible to apply for legal permanent residence in March 2013). The waiting period for Mexican spouses and minor children of lawful permanent residents is approximately two-and-a-half years. See id. (providing an estimate of the waiting period). Mexican unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents currently wait approximately twenty years. See id. (providing an estimate of the waiting period).


26. See Family-based Immigrant Visas, supra note 23 (explaining family-based visa petitions and processing).

States for more than 180 days but less than one year, they are barred from return for three years, notwithstanding an approved application. Immigrants who resided unlawfully in the United States for more than one year are barred from return for ten years. Notarios often do not explain to immigration consumers that unlawful presence bars exist, and parents, children, and spouses can find themselves separated from one another for the duration of the re-entry prohibition.

Waivers may be available to individuals who establish that separation would cause “extreme hardship” to their spouses or parents in the United States. In many cases, proving extreme hardship is challenging. Although the INA does not define “extreme hardship,” “mere separation” from family is not, by itself, considered to be sufficient for an extreme hardship waiver. Competent attorneys and government-accredited representatives know that demonstrating extreme hardship requires an evaluation of a family’s circumstances to determine whether there are factors that individually or cumulatively constitute extreme hardship for purposes of the waiver. They also know that the waiver application must be accompanied by ample documentation of the claimed hardship. Notarios often fail to advise consumers about waiver options or that they must submit solid evidence of extreme hardship.

2. Criminal Law Examples

Notarios also frequently do not know or do not bother to advise customers that certain criminal convictions with negligible consequences for U.S. citizens can result in the removal of non-citizens (including legal permanent residents), no matter how long they have lived in the United States. If such non-citizens file immigration applications, they risk the

30. INA § 212(a)(9)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(v). Note that immigration law does not provide for waivers for extreme hardship to children. See id.
31. See, e.g., In re Teresa de Jesus Losada, 2004 WL 2952349, at *2 (BIA 2004) (“[M]ere separation from friends and family has been held not to constitute . . . extreme hardship.”).
33. For example, in the course of representing a non-citizen client who suffered from an eating disorder, University of Idaho College of Law Immigration Clinic interns discovered that shoplifting a $5.00 box of laxatives could be deemed a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of immigration law and preclude an otherwise eligible individual from remaining in the United States. A guilty plea to the possession of a marijuana pipe typically precludes non-citizens
government initiating removal proceedings against them and will have wasted thousands of dollars pursuing an immigration status that they will never get. Unauthorized practitioners of immigration law are also less likely to know about case law or statutory waivers that could prevent removal.

B. Harms to Immigration Consumers

Stories of harm caused by notarios are legion.34 Harm typically falls into one or more, and sometimes all, of the following categories: (1) removal—often to countries with which immigrants no longer have ties or where they have experienced or risk serious physical harm;35 (2) loss of documents needed to establish eligibility for an immigration benefit;36 (3) bars to regularizing immigration status;37 (4) long-term or even permanent separation of families;38 (5) financial damage caused by paying for useless or harmful procedures, including payment for applications that are never filed;39 (6) loss of employment;40 and (7) long-term detention.41 Harm can also be physical, as in the case of an asylum applicant who is tortured or killed if deported to her country of origin because of UPIL.42 The following stories are representative of hundreds of thousands of others.


35. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.

36. Many immigration claims, particularly those that require proof of long-time residence in the United States or of persecution in an asylum applicant’s home country, turn on documentation in the form of letters, photos, signed affidavits, and records from foreign and sometimes defunct governments. Often only one copy exists of a required document. If documents are lost, so too may be the ability to establish eligibility for lawful immigration status. For this reason, immigration lawyers typically do not retain original documents until necessary for a formal CIS appointment for adjudication or immigration court hearing. Ironically, attempts by law enforcement to shut down a notario’s business may inadvertently exacerbate the problem of missing documents if the offices of the notario become a crime scene, and law enforcement retains paperwork as potential evidence in a criminal proceeding. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.

37. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.

38. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.


40. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.

41. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.

42. The Indiana Supreme Court wrote the following regarding the unauthorized practice of immigration of law and the potential for particularly horrifying consequences for individuals whose opportunities to obtain asylum are ruined:

The practice of law without a license is not a ‘victimless crime’ because the legal interests of people assisted by those who are not qualified to act as attorneys can be irreparably damaged. This is espe-
1. Celia Perez’s Customers

Celia Perez, operator of “an immigration and naturalization consultation service” in Jerome, Idaho, is the subject of numerous complaints of notario fraud made by immigration consumers and attorneys assisting individuals seeking to rectify the harm she caused.43 According to a 2010 complaint filed by the Idaho Attorney General under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act,44 Ms. Perez ran an immigration consultation business for many years,45 charging customers thousands of dollars to perform tasks related to completing and filing applications with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).46 Allegedly misrepresenting herself to immigration consumers as an attorney,47 Ms. Perez was in fact a licensed Idaho notary public.48 Individual immigration consumers assert that they paid Ms. Perez as much as $28,000 each over a period of several years to provide legal advice, prepare and submit paperwork to USCIS, and cover fees charged by the agency.49 Some appear to have been undocumented immigrants seeking to legalize their immigration status. Others were in the United States lawfully and wanted to apply for citizenship or to assist others to secure lawful immigration status. Ms. Perez’s alleged victims stated that they were not trying to buy forged immigration documents but rather that “they were trying to take the legal route.”50

Immigration consumers involved with Ms. Perez claimed not only irreparable financial harm but also lost opportunities to regularize their status, missing documents, emotional and physical harm, and deportation of family members. Although a default judgment was entered against her, as of this writing, even people who subsequently retained...
competent counsel have not been able to recover documents she took from them or court-ordered restitution.\footnote{See Alison Gene Smith, *Hearing Scheduled for Woman Accused of Swindling Immigrants*, *Times-News* (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/hearing-scheduled-for-woman-accused-of-fraud (explaining that in 2011 a state court judge issued a default judgment against Perez for $103,500, which included $85,000 in restitution for six of Perez’s victims, and that according to an Idaho Attorney General’s Office spokeswoman, “[Perez] never responded and we never collected any money.”).} On October 8, 2013, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted Ms. Perez on twelve charges of mail fraud related to her alleged notario activities after investigations conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and USCIS.\footnote{Jerome Woman Indicted for Mail Fraud, *The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Idaho, U.S. Dep’t of Justice* (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2013/oct/perez10112013.html [hereinafter *Jerome Woman Indicted for Mail Fraud*]; John Sowell, *Defendant Pleads Not Guilty in Immigration Scam*, *Idaho Statesman* (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/10/16/2818853/defendant-pleads-not-guilty-in-fraud.} The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Idaho, which is prosecuting the case, noted that mail fraud is punishable by up to twenty years in prison, a maximum fine of $250,000, and up to three years of supervised release.\footnote{Smith, supra note 51; Jerome Woman Admits Using U.S. Mail in Immigration Fraud Scheme, *The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of Idaho, U.S. Dep’t of Justice* (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2014/feb/perez02122014.html.} A spokesperson for the Idaho Attorney General stated that: “Now that [Ms. Perez] has been indicted, the state is exploring its options trying to collect the [2011 civil court] judgment” against her for defrauding immigration consumers; Ms. Perez pleaded guilty on February 12, 2014 to “two counts of using the mail to execute an immigration services fraud scheme,” and sentencing is scheduled for April 29, 2014.\footnote{Chen v. INS, 266 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001).}

2. Yi Quan Chen

Yi Quan Chen left China in April 1995, seeking refuge from officials who wanted to punish him and his wife for conceiving a child in violation of China’s family planning laws.\footnote{Id.} He paid smugglers to help him flee to the United States.\footnote{Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, *Chen v. INS*, No. 00-70478 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2001).} He thought he was also paying them for bona fide legal representation.\footnote{Chen, 266 F.3d at 1097.}

Immigration authorities detained Mr. Chen immediately upon his arrival in the United States.\footnote{Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 57, at 4.} Trusting the immigration “assistant” who visited him in detention, Mr. Chen signed an asylum application in English, a language he did not understand.\footnote{Chen, 266 F.3d at 1097.} Instead of explaining why he fled China, however, the application gave an entirely different reason for his claim.\footnote{Chen, 266 F.3d at 1097.} Consequently, because Mr. Chen’s written application conflicted with
courtroom testimony, the immigration judge (IJ) made an adverse credibility finding and ordered him deported.61

Once Mr. Chen returned to China, government officials arrested and severely beat him.62 After escaping detention in China, Mr. Chen fled to the United States for the second time.63 Immigration authorities again apprehended him, and he remained in custody for several years while he fought deportation.64 Mr. Chen filed a new asylum application based on his real reason for seeking asylum. However, an IJ again ruled against him on a finding of adverse credibility due to inconsistencies between his new application and the 1995 application, which had been filed on his behalf by the immigrant consultant.65 The IJ ordered him deported, and the BIA affirmed the ruling.66

The University of Idaho Legal Aid Clinic, appointed by the Ninth Circuit pro bono program, discovered that Mr. Chen was one of many victims of immigration fraud involving attorney Robert E. Porges, a Harvard Law School graduate, and his Chinese-born wife, Sherry Lu Porges, immigration “assistants” engaged in UPIL and immigrant smugglers.67 The criminal prosecution against them revealed that they had constructed stock asylum applications based on claims they fabricated. Porges and his assistants would file one of the fictitious applications for clients such as Mr. Chen, and Porges or one of his employees would then appear in court on behalf of the client.68 Porges, his wife, and twelve of their employees were convicted in 2002 of several charges, including racketeering, immigration fraud, alien smuggling, and tax evasion, and sentenced to eight years in prison.69 The government estimated that between 1993 and 2000 Porges made profits of more than $13.5 million from defrauding his clients.70 After sentencing, Porges’s lawyer argued that his client had been unfairly singled out and that he was “going to jail for conduct which is conducted every day
Mr. Chen received no compensation for the years he spent in immigration detention nor for the considerable sum he had spent for Porges’s fraudulent services, but, unlike many of Porges’s victims, he did eventually obtain asylum.

C. Systematic Harm Caused by UPIL

In addition to wreaking havoc in the lives of immigrants and their families, practitioners of UPIL cause systemic harm by compromising the rule of law. They mock and manipulate government functions. Their improper conduct and the obstacles their victims face in trying to repair the damage foster distrust of the law. The limited recourse available to victims of notario fraud creates the perception by immigrant communities that they simply cannot obtain justice in the United States.

Confidence in the legal profession is undermined when notarios hold themselves out as lawyers or work in concert with attorneys to defraud immigrants. Furthermore, UPIL fosters public distrust of immigrants themselves. In the wake of the Porges prosecution, for example, advocates saw increased cynicism about the legitimacy of Chinese asylum cases. As one observer noted, “[B]oilerplate asylum claims put forth by shady practitioners make it hard to win legitimate cases.”

UPIL causes additional systemic harm by burdening USCIS, IJs, and the federal courts of appeal. Specifically, “[i]ncomplete, unwarranted, unnecessary, or inaccurate petitions and applications filed by [notarios] burden the administrative and judicial docket[,] increasing administrative costs and delaying the processing” of legitimately filed cases. Judges and government officials spend time trying to sort out what to do with cases that have been tainted by notario malfeasance. For example, the Porges firm’s immigration fraud

71. Id. Several months after Porges, his wife, and twelve of their “immigration assistants” were convicted, attorney Joseph Muto was disbarred for acting as an appearance attorney for an “immigration agency,” a group of non-lawyers who filed applications on behalf of Chinese immigrants. Id. According to many observers, such practices are common in Chinese immigrant communities. Id.

72. Commenting on the conviction of Idaho notario Crystal Tijerina, ICE-HSI special agent Leigh Winchell made exactly this point, observing that “fraud schemes like this not only victimize the most vulnerable in our society, they also potentially undermine the integrity of our legal immigration system.” *Idaho Woman Sentenced for Mail Fraud, Misuse of U.S. Government Seals, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.* (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111013boise.htm. People not only relied on Tijerina’s false assertions that she knew the immigration system and was authorized to practice immigration law, she deceived them into believing that they had obtained the right to live and work in the United States. *See Jackson, supra* note 43 (discussing the plight of Tiburcio Bedolla after becoming a victim of immigration fraud).

73. *See Hamblett, supra* note 68 (“[T]here will be more cynicism about Chinese [asylum] cases.”).


75. *CATHOLIC CHARITIES PETITION, supra* note 9, at 10.
caused the government to conduct a special review of an estimated 7,000 asylum cases nationwide.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, immigration consultant fraud raises due process questions about whether an alien’s right to a full and fair hearing has been compromised. More specifically, would a negative outcome in an immigration case have been positive absent notario involvement? In his dissent in \textit{Angeles Castro v. Gonzalez}, Ninth Circuit Judge Harry J. Pregerson eloquently articulated both the individual and the systemic harms that UPIL causes:

\begin{quote}
We are a country that believes in fairness. We are a country that believes in the rule of law. We believe that those who are called into our courts deserve the aid of a counselor who will advocate for the client vigorously and with professionalism. And yet the system we have in place makes a mockery of these things we claim to hold dear. Not only does it deprive a vulnerable group of people of competent representation, it does so in a context in which people believe they are receiving competent representation. We tolerate the inevitable result of proceedings like this: that families are broken up, and that United States citizen children are discarded from this country because their parents could not afford better representation. Removing a person from the United States—a person who has set down roots, who has become part of our community, who has children and family here—should be a grave act attended with the utmost caution. To remove a person whose only guides have been notarios and appearance attorneys is to secure a cheap victory at the cost of fairness... Because prejudice is inherent in this notario system, I would grant the petition solely on the basis of egregious violations of Petitioners’ constitutional right to due process.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

\section*{II. Remedies to “Undo” Harm Done by Notarios}

\subsection*{A. \textit{Immigration Law Remedies}}

Notario fraud sometimes results in the denial of an otherwise meritorious immigration claim. Immigration remedies for victims are limited, even for people who may have had—or currently have—a strong immigration case but for the fraud. Not only do few remedies exist, they characteristically involve complex procedures, formidable burdens of proof, and an understanding of how to persuade and negotiate with government officials. Absent

\begin{itemize}
\item 76. Hayes, \textit{supra} note 70.
\item 77. Angeles Castro v. Gonzalez, 176 F. App’x 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2006).
\end{itemize}
competent counsel, obtaining immigration relief based on notario fraud is usually impossible, especially if a court has issued a removal order.

This section of the article addresses three mechanisms that have the potential to remedy an individual's immigration case: motions to re-open, fraud waivers, and U visas. Notably, not only are these processes limited as a matter of law and practice, every one of them is discretionary. They also require payment of additional filing fees, sometimes amounting to thousands of dollars, beyond what the victim has already paid. Because these fees are non-refundable, if remedial efforts fail, victims lose even more money than what they have already wasted because of notario fraud.

Despite these obstacles, pursuing one or more of these approaches may prove worthwhile in certain cases. If nothing else, a sympathetic government official presented with compelling facts might agree to a review of the merits of the underlying immigration claim. And, as a matter of broader advocacy, the more frequently judges, USCIS adjudicators, and government attorneys are presented with the realities of notario fraud, the more willing they may become to exercise favorable discretion.

1. Motions to Re-open Removal Orders

A successful motion to re-open results in de novo consideration of a claim for immigration relief. Most courts analyze motions to re-open UPIL cases under Fifth Amendment due process standards or principles of basic fairness and equity. USCIS may adjudicate requests to re-open in limited circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. §103.5(a)(2) (2013) (describing requirements for motions to re-open). For an excellent "nuts-and-bolts" discussion of filing requests to re-open with USCIS, see Ayuda & the CMTY. JUSTICE Project, NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES: A PRACTICAL MANUAL FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS 60-62 (2013) [hereinafter NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES]. Victims of notario fraud may also ask U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In the immigration context, "prosecutorial discretion includes decisions about whether or not to arrest, detain, and charge non-citizens with immigration violations, to proceed with removal proceedings...to execute final orders of removal, and to re-open proceedings in order to permit a non-citizen to seek immigration status." Anna Marie Gallagher, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Immigration Context, 12-11 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 2 (Nov. 2012). Individuals deciding whether or not to file a request for prosecutorial discretion should exercise particular caution and explore the potential pros and cons with a competent immigration attorney. See NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 26-37 (describing prosecutorial discretion possibilities for victims of notario fraud), Appendix Sec. IIB(1) (providing a sample request for prosecutorial discretion based on notario fraud).

78. USCIS may adjudicate requests to re-open in limited circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. §103.5(a)(2) (2013) (describing requirements for motions to re-open). For an excellent "nuts-and-bolts" discussion of filing requests to re-open with USCIS, see Ayuda & the CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES: A PRACTICAL MANUAL FOR IMMIGRATION PRACTITIONERS 60-62 (2013) [hereinafter NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES]. Victims of notario fraud may also ask U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In the immigration context, "prosecutorial discretion includes decisions about whether or not to arrest, detain, and charge non-citizens with immigration violations, to proceed with removal proceedings...to execute final orders of removal, and to re-open proceedings in order to permit a non-citizen to seek immigration status." Anna Marie Gallagher, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Immigration Context, 12-11 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 2 (Nov. 2012). Individuals deciding whether or not to file a request for prosecutorial discretion should exercise particular caution and explore the potential pros and cons with a competent immigration attorney. See NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 26-37 (describing prosecutorial discretion possibilities for victims of notario fraud), Appendix Sec. IIB(1) (providing a sample request for prosecutorial discretion based on notario fraud).

79. The stronger safeguards of the Sixth Amendment do not apply in immigration cases, which are civil, rather than criminal, in nature. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Sixth Amendment rights in criminal versus civil immigration proceedings). Accordingly, there is no Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel in immigration proceedings. Id. However, courts have recognized that immigrants have an important liberty interest in not being deported, which triggers the Fifth Amendment right to due process. See id. at 1017 (discussing Fifth Amendment rights in immigration proceedings). Under this theory, grossly ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes a denial of due process. Id. Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 confers on immigrants in removal cases a statutory right to counsel at no expense to the government. Id. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment should give non-


REMEDIAL AND PREVENTIVE RESPONSES TO UPIL

**Holder,** the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]n ineffectual assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”

Some notarios work in tandem with “appearance attorneys.” In such instances, the notario serves as a conduit to the attorney, often recruiting clients and engaging in authorized practice of law; meanwhile, the attorney may have met the client briefly, if at all, before appearing in court for a hearing on the merits of the client’s immigration claim. Because an attorney is involved in the fraud, ineffectual assistance of counsel and Fifth Amendment due process rights are implicated.

The BIA and appellate courts typically frame cases involving motions to re-open for “notario-only” fraud in terms of fairness and equity rather than directly under the Fifth Amendment, because the conduct of an actual attorney is not at issue. Accordingly, consideration of motions based on “notario-only” fraud is rooted in an immigrant’s reliance on the deception, fraud, or error of notarios holding themselves out as lawyers.

Regardless of which analytical construct is applied, significant and complex procedural and substantive law challenges make winning a motion to re-open based on UPIL an uphill battle. Motions to re-open are generally disfavored and are therefore granted sparingly. Immigrants face additional hurdles, such as compliance with the requirements of *Matter of Lozada,* as well as the exhaustion of administrative remedies, due diligence, establishing prejudice, time-consuming processes and backlogs.

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80. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ray v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 2010) (providing the same); Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing the same); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985) (providing the same); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 198-199 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing fundamental fairness).

81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

82. See, e.g., Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 675 (explaining that Avagyan retained a notario who said that an attorney would represent her for $2000 and that Avagyan first met the attorney at her removal hearing, where the attorney did not ask her any questions about her case); Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing how Morales Apolinar’s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel).


84. See, e.g., Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting petitioner’s motion to re-open because he relied on the false statements, misconduct, and erroneous advice of a notario claiming to be an attorney).

85. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 315 (1992) (“Motions for re-opening immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing ad motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.”).

86. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) (specifying the requirements for motions to re-open).
a. Compliance with Lozada and Other Prerequisites

Individuals who seek to re-open a removal case based on notario wrongdoing in which an attorney was involved must first comply with requirements established by the BIA in *Matter of Lozada*.\(^{87}\) Lozada affirmed previous rulings that, although respondents in deportation proceedings may have a Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, they must take certain actions before filing a motion to re-open based on deficient representation.\(^{88}\) The BIA held that compliance with the *Lozada* rules is important to: (1) reassure the agency that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is legitimate and (2) increase its ability to monitor lawyers representing individuals in proceedings.\(^{89}\)

*Lozada* has three requirements. First, individuals who seek to re-open based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel must submit an affidavit detailing the agreement with counsel about the actions to be taken in the immigration case, any representations or promises that counsel made about the case, and whether counsel explored all avenues of relief available to the alien.\(^{90}\) Second, they must notify counsel of the specific allegations of ineffective assistance and provide counsel the opportunity to respond.\(^{91}\) Finally, they must file a complaint with an appropriate disciplinary authority, such as the BIA or the attorney's state bar, explaining why they believe that the lawyer violated reasonable or ethical legal standards.\(^{92}\) After the respondent satisfies the *Lozada* requirements, the agency may con-

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87. *See id.* (specifying the requirements for motions to re-open).
88. *See id.* at 638 (explaining what a non-citizen must show to demonstrate denial of due process in an immigration proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel). The George W. Bush Administration called these principles into question when Attorney General Michael Mukasey held that respondents in removal proceedings have no constitutionally protected right to counsel and therefore no right to file a motion to re-open based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. *In re Compean*, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (BIA 2009) [hereinafter *Compean I*]. *Compean I* effectively overturned decades of precedent that guaranteed Fifth Amendment due process to individuals in removal proceedings. *See id.* at 712 (noting the implications of the decision on precedent). Several months later, Eric Holder, Attorney General under the Obama Administration, withdrew Mukasey's order and directed the BIA and immigration judges to continue to apply *Lozada*, pending the results of a rulemaking process regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims. *See In re Compean*, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2009) [hereinafter *Compean II*] ("[T]his Order vacates *Compean* in its entirety. . . . *T*he Board and Immigration Judges should apply the pre-*Compean* standards to all pending and future motions to re-open based on ineffective assistance of counsel.").
90. *Id.* at 639.
91. *Id.*
92. *Id.* Alternatively, movants may explain why they did not file such a complaint. *See id.* (providing that if a complaint has not been filed with the proper disciplinary authorities the movant should specify why not). One reason might be that the attorney admitted his or her failure to provide effective assistance of counsel. The Ninth and Second Circuits have maintained a flexible approach to meeting the *Lozada* requirements. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 676 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that although petitioners must generally comply with *Lozada*, failure to do so "is not necessarily fatal to a motion to re-open"); Yang v. Gonzalez, 478 F.3d 133,143 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the *Lozada* requirements "are not sacrosanct if the facts are plain on the administrative record"). The other circuits' approaches to *Lozada* vary. *See generally* Kaplan, supra note 83, at 351 ("Courts . . . differ in their willingness to re-open claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel especially when the alien does not meet all three *Lozada* factors.").
sider whether the attorney's alleged malfeasance violated the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.93

Failure to file a Lozada complaint is generally less problematic if the basis of a motion to re-open is "notario-only" fraud.94 The touchstone here is fairness. Movants must demonstrate that the notario's deception, fraud, or error actually or constructively precluded them from undertaking actions necessary to their immigration cases, thereby depriving them of a fair hearing and causing injury.

b. Exhaustion of Remedies

Whichever kind of notario fraud is involved, an immigrant must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a motion to re-open. This means that movants must first file the motion with either immigration court or the BIA, depending on the procedural posture of the case and when they discovered the fraud or ineffective assistance of counsel. If they learned of it after an IJ entered a removal order but before the BIA assumed jurisdiction over the case (or if the movant did not file an appeal to the BIA), they must file a motion to re-open with immigration court. If they discovered the misconduct after the BIA affirmed an IJ's removal order, they must file the motion with the BIA.

The exhaustion requirement is complicated by the deadlines imposed on motions to re-open, which are ninety days after an administrative decision and removal order is entered or 180 days in the case of an in-absentia order.95 Unfortunately, people usually do not become aware of the notario fraud until after the deadlines have past. Given the slipshod nature of notario practice, notarios may not even notify their clients of the outcomes until long after the re-opening time has passed.

c. Due Diligence and Equitable Tolling

When a motion to re-open is filed after the expiration of the ordinary time limit, new hurdles arise. In such case, establishing a prima facie case for a violation of due process or

93. See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a deportation proceeding the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment still must be afforded to an alien petitioner."); Kaplan, supra note 83, at 375-376 (discussing Mohammed v. Gonzalez).

94. Although filing a Lozada complaint is not required in cases which do not involve an attorney, aggrieved individuals should still strongly consider filing a complaint with the FTC, BIA, USCIS, a state consumer fraud division, bar, notary licensing agency, or a similar entity. First, filing a formal complaint will strengthen the motion to re-open. Second, complaints to the appropriate state and federal agencies may assist them in identifying individuals and organizations who engage in a pattern and practice of fraudulent immigration representation, and thereby enhance broader efforts to combat notario fraud. See supra notes 85-86 for a discussion of the challenges of filing a complaint.

95. See INA § 240(c)(7)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (providing the deadline for motions to re-open).
fundamental fairness due to notario fraud is not sufficient to persuade the agency to re-open a removal proceeding. The movant must also persuade the agency to equitably toll the time limit.\textsuperscript{96} Equitable tolling rests on a movant’s ability to demonstrate to the agency’s satisfaction that she exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud, deception, or error caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel or notario and attempted to remedy it.\textsuperscript{97}

d. Establishing Prejudice

The next challenge in a motion to re-open for ineffective assistance of counsel or notario fraud is to prove that the representation “was so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the proceedings.”\textsuperscript{98} In other words, movants must demonstrate that the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that they were prevented from reasonably presenting their case.\textsuperscript{99} Movants must therefore not only show grossly inadequate representation, they must also establish that they would likely have had an immigration remedy available but for the incompetence or fraud.\textsuperscript{100}

e. Time-Consuming Process and Immigration Court Backlogs

The final obstacle an immigrant may face in ultimately prevailing on a motion to re-open based on notario fraud relates to the exhaustion doctrine.\textsuperscript{101} If an IJ denies a motion to re-open for notario fraud, the respondent may appeal to the BIA by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the denial.\textsuperscript{102} The BIA can either affirm the IJ’s denial, reverse the decision, or remand for further proceedings. If the BIA denies a motion to re-open in the first instance or affirms the denial of an IJ’s decision, the movant can file a petition for review with the federal court of appeals where the case arose. Even if notario victims can persuade an appellate court that the agency erred in denying their motions to re-open, the exhaustion doctrine usually requires the court to remand the case to the agency for addi-

\textsuperscript{96} See, e.g., Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining and applying the equitable tolling principle). Currently, most circuits have found that the INA’s deadlines for re-opening are non-jurisdictional claim processing rules subject to equitable tolling and that therefore motions to re-open after the prescribed time limits may be considered in certain instances, including situations of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and notario fraud. See, e.g., Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 717 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 2013); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2005); Borges v. Gonzalez, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2005); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2000).

\textsuperscript{97} See Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 825-27 (holding that the BIA failed to properly assess due diligence in denying the petitioner’s motion to re-open for notario fraud and remanding the case for further consideration).

\textsuperscript{98} Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F. 3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003).

\textsuperscript{99} Ray v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)).

\textsuperscript{100} See \textit{Notario Fraud Remedies}, \textit{supra} note 78, at 64-66 (providing suggestions on how to document prejudice).

\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{supra} notes 78-84 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{102} See 8 C.F.R. §1003.38(b) (explaining deadlines for appealing the decision of an immigration judge to the BIA).
tional action consistent with the court’s decision. Consequently, even with a court victory, notario victims may have to wait years for a final resolution of their immigration claims.

2. Section 212(i) Fraud Waiver

Not surprisingly, UPIL victims who do not have removal orders entered against them face fewer hurdles in trying to regularize their immigration status. Nevertheless, obstacles exist. These victims may be eligible or subsequently become eligible for permanent residence—but for the fraud committed by the notario.

These situations arise, for example, when an individual qualifies for permanent residence, but the government imputes to the applicant the fraud committed by a notario in a previously filed application. In such cases, the government may charge that the applicant is inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), which states that “any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under [the Immigration and Nationality Act] is inadmissible.”

In situations where a notario included fraudulent information in previously filed paperwork, the applicant can challenge fraud allegations by arguing a lack of knowledge and intent to commit fraud. If an applicant decides not to pursue such a challenge or the challenge fails, advocates should explore whether the applicant qualifies for a discretionary fraud waiver under INA § 212(i) (“212(i) waiver”). Absent such a waiver, a non-citizen typically cannot adjust status.

103. University of Idaho Immigration Clinic participants recently spoke with an individual referred to here as “A.B.” A.B., who has resided in the United States for more than 30 years, relied on a notario decades ago to file a claim for permanent residence. The notario filed an application that contained apparently fraudulent facts even though A.B. may have actually had a valid claim for permanent residence. A.B. was devastated when he discovered that USCIS denied his application and subsequently revoked his work authorization. His adult daughter, who recently naturalized, now wants to file an immediate relative petition for him so that he can apply for permanent residence. The information in the original application may require him to return to his country of origin to apply for admission as a legal permanent resident. Such departure would likely trigger the unlawful presence bar, and he would be prohibited from reentering the United States for ten years. Additionally, the false information contained in A.B.’s original application may render him inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7). Although a discretionary hardship waiver exists for this kind of fraud, it is not clear that A.B. will meet its requirements. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (describing discretionary waiver for extreme hardship). Notario fraud, although performed many years ago, may now prevent A.B. from becoming a permanent resident and result in his eventual removal.


106. See, e.g., Jun Min Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that an alien who has engaged in immigration fraud cannot adjust status absent a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(i)).
Section 212(i) authorizes an immigration judge or a USCIS adjudicator, as an exercise of discretion, to waive a finding of fraud or misrepresentation under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(1). The section 212(i) statute states, in pertinent part, that such a waiver may be granted

in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, [adult] son, or [adult] daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the [judge or adjudicator] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.107

In effect, section 212(i) is limited to applicants for permanent residence who can show that their removal from or inadmissibility to the United States would cause extreme hardship to their U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouse or parent. Under the plain language of the statute, extreme hardship to other family members, including minor children, will not be considered.

An applicant for a waiver must establish extreme hardship to the qualifying relative if the qualifying relative remains in the United States without the applicant and if the qualifying relative accompanies the applicant to the applicant’s home country.108 The phrase “extreme hardship” is not defined by statute,109 and whether or not extreme hardship exists is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.110 The Supreme Court has held that the term, although flexible, may be construed narrowly.111 In Perez v. INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit stated that “‘extreme hardship’ is hardship that is ‘unusual or beyond that which would be normally expected’ upon deportation.”112 That court found, for example, that uprooting family and separation from friends and community does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship “but represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.”113

109. See id. at 565 (noting that the phrase “extreme hardship” does not have a fixed meaning).
110. See id. (“Extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”); Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629, 635 (BIA 1978) (providing the same); Matter of Kim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 88, 89 (BIA 1974) (providing the same); Matter of Sangster, 11 I. & N. Dec. 309, 313 (BIA 1965) (providing the same).
111. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (“The Attorney General and his delegates have the authority to construe ‘extreme hardship’ narrowly should they deem it wise to do so.”).
112. Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994).
The BIA and federal courts have come to a general consensus that factors relevant to determining extreme hardship include: (1) the qualifying relative’s family and community ties in the United States and in the applicant’s home country; (2) the financial impact on the qualifying relative if the applicant cannot reside in the United States; (3) whether or not the qualifying relative has health problems that require treatment in the United States or for which suitable treatment in the applicant’s home country is unavailable; (4) the strength and kind of relationship the qualifying relative has with the applicant, including the emotional impact on the qualifying relative if separated from the applicant; (5) the age of the qualifying relative; (6) whether or not the qualifying relative depends on the applicant for assistance in caring for children or parents; (7) economic, political, and social conditions in the country to which the qualifying relative would have to relocate; or (8) other circumstances that would cause undue hardship to the qualifying relative.114

These factors are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and a proper determination should rest on whether “the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.”115 Accordingly, in a case of notario fraud, an adjudicator should take into account hardships directly related to the fraud. Depending on the particular circumstances, an extreme hardship assessment might include the emotional impact on qualifying relatives who believed, to their detriment, that a notario’s assurances that the contents of the application filed were true or the economic consequences for a qualifying relative of the applicant’s removal as well as the money paid to the notario for a useless application and the expenses involved in trying to rectify the problems.

3. U-Visas

The U visa, for which victims of certain crimes may qualify, offers another potential immigration remedy for notario fraud.116 The results of U visa petitions based on notario offenses are decidedly mixed. During the last half of 2013, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that USCIS may be more willing to approve U visas rooted in UPIL-related conduct.117

114. See id. (discussing factors considered in making an extreme hardship determination); Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144-46 (discussing the same); Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the same); Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 562-64 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the same); Matter of L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 416-20 (BIA 1996) (discussing the same); Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 381, 382-84 (BIA 1996) (discussing the same); Matter of Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 882-83 (BIA 1994) (discussing the same); Matter of Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596, 597-98 (BIA 1978) (discussing the same).
Law enforcement and humanitarian purposes motivated Congress to enact the U visa statute. First, it is intended to encourage undocumented victims to report crime without fear of deportation and to cooperate with law enforcement officials in the investigation and prosecution of alleged perpetrators. Second, the statute seeks to afford victims protection and assistance. To help meet these objectives, the statute permits certain victims of the following twenty-six qualifying crimes to petition for a U visa:

[R]ape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, abusive sexual contact, prostitution, sexual exploitation, female genital mutilation, hostage taking, peonage, involuntary servitude, slave trade, kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment, blackmail, extortion, manslaughter, murder, felonious assault, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above-listed crimes, or any similar activity in violation of federal, state or local criminal law.

U visa beneficiaries are authorized to remain in the United States temporarily and to apply for employment authorization. In certain circumstances, the individual may qualify for lawful permanent residence after three years in U status.

Petitioners for a U visa must demonstrate that they (1) have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of one or more of the twenty-six qualifying criminal activities; (2) possess credible and reliable information establishing knowledge of the facts of the qualifying crime upon which the visa petition is based; (3) have been helpful, are being helpful, or are likely to be helpful to a certifying federal, state, or local agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity; and (4) have been a victim of the qualifying criminal activity in the United States or of a federal offense that provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction.

118. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (describing the purpose of providing protection to crime victims); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., USCIS PUBLISHES NEW RULE FOR NONIMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/U-visa_05SeptO7.pdf (“Many immigrant crime victims fear coming forward to assist law enforcement because they may not have legal status.... We’re confident that we have developed a rule that meets the spirit of the Act; to help curtail criminal activity, protect victims, and encourage them to fully participate in proceedings that will aid in bringing perpetrators to justice.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

119. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U). The term “any similar activity” refers to criminal offenses in which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal activities.

120. INA § 245(m); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (m).

121. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U)(i); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). Because our discussion of U visas focuses on threshold eligibility hurdles that notario victims face, we have not included guidance about the actual filing of a U visa petition and supporting evidence. For a comprehensive treatment of the practicalities involved in such a filing, see NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 44-56, Appendix IIIB(1)-(7).
a. The Challenges that Notario Victims Face in Qualifying for a U-Visa

In general, victims of notario fraud can meet three of the above four criteria required for securing a U visa. The frequency with which successful investigation or prosecution of immigration scammers is based on information and assistance provided by their victims demonstrates that many victims both possess credible, reliable, and detailed information about the crime, and that they are willing to cooperate with law enforcement. Also, notario fraud typically, though not always, occurs in the United States. The main hurdle that notario victims face in obtaining U visas is establishing that they were victims of qualifying criminal activity and that they suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been victimized.

i. Establishing Qualifying Criminal Activity

“Fraud” alone is not a qualifying crime for purposes of the U statute. Notario fraud, however, sometimes includes conduct that comes within the ambit of several of the crimes enumerated in U statute. Extortion, blackmail, perjury, and obstruction of justice constitute common qualifying crimes suffered by victims of notario fraud. Other qualifying criminal behavior, such as assault, may occur in the context of notario fraud, especially when victims confront perpetrators.

Regulatory guidance supports such an approach in defining the qualifying criminal activity. The Federal Register states that for the purposes of U eligibility, “[q]ualifying criminal activity may occur during the commission of non-qualifying criminal activity. For varying reasons, the perpetrator may not be charged or prosecuted for the qualifying criminal activity, but instead, for the non-qualifying criminal activity.” Consequently, framing the qualifying crime turns on the original qualifying criminal activity investigated or prosecuted rather than the ultimate offense of conviction. This approach extends to civil actions; the key question is whether an underlying crime was committed, even if the cause of action is civil. Immigration attorney James A. Benzoni explains this concept by pointing to the RICO statute, which is “a civil action based on underlying criminal conduct (predicate crimes). The crimes need not have been charged, only committed.” Accordingly, in preparing U visa petitions, advocates should strive to frame notario fraud as a qualifying crime enumerated in the U statute.

122. See Notario Fraud Remedies, supra note 78, at 41-42.
ii. Establishing Substantial Physical or Mental Harm as a Result of a Qualifying Crime

For purposes of U visa eligibility, “[p]hysical or mental abuse means injury or harm to the victim’s physical person, or harm to or impairment of the emotional or psychological soundness of the victim,” as a result of the qualifying crime. In determining whether abuse is substantial, a number of factors are considered, individually and cumulatively, including but not limited to:

The nature of the injury inflicted or suffered; the severity of the perpetrator’s conduct; the severity of the harm suffered; the duration of the infliction of the harm; and the extent to which there is permanent or serious harm to the appearance, health, or physical or mental soundness of the victim, including aggravation of pre-existing conditions.

The harms suffered by notario fraud victims typically affect their mental health and soundness. They can be severe, serious, and permanent, particularly when the result is removal or inability to lawfully reside in the United States. As the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions, deportation may deprive a person “of all that makes life worth living.”

For many victims, uncertainty about their future and afraid of separation from family members carries with it extreme depression and anxiety. In the case of asylum applicants who fled egregious physical harm, threat of removal exacerbates existing mental health problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. In some cases, the shock, shame, and self-recrimination for having blindly relied on a fraudster adds to this psychological unmooring. Further, the financial ruin frequently caused by notario fraud may result in further psychological damage. Finally, violence and threats of violence by notarios against victims causes emotional harm and in some cases, physical harm.

125. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(8).
126. Id. § 214.14(b)(1).
127. See supra Part I.
128. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Similarly, the Court declared in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948), that “deportation is a drastic measure, and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”
129. See NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 44-46 (discussing how to prove substantial harm); COHEN, supra note 34, at 39-40 (discussing the same).
iii. Obstruction of Justice and Perjury as Qualifying Crimes

The "U" regulations specifically address harm suffered because of obstruction of justice and perjury, stating in relevant part, that U visa petitioners may be considered qualifying victims if they have been:

Directly and proximately harmed by the perpetrator of . . . the obstruction of justice or perjury; and . . . there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the perpetrator committed the . . . obstruction of justice or perjury at least in principal part, as a means . . . to further the perpetrator's abuse or exploitation of or undue control over the petitioner through the manipulation of the legal system.\(^ {130} \)

Some fraud victims suffer substantial harm as a result of a notario's perjury and obstruction of justice. It is not uncommon for notarios to commit obstruction of justice, perjury, or analogous offenses to further their control over victims through misuse of the legal system.\(^ {131} \) For example, in a recent Idaho case, a notario used U.S. government seals to deceive immigrants into believing she was authorized to provide immigration assistance.\(^ {132} \) In announcing the judgment against the notario, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agent who investigated and helped prosecute her characterized her actions as undermining the integrity of the legal system.\(^ {133} \)

b. Recommendations

The U visa statute supports relief for certain victims of notario fraud, despite the fact that fraud is not specifically enumerated as a qualifying crime. Several strategies could maximize the possibility that notario fraud victims may secure U visas. Advocates need to explain to law enforcement officials the importance of investigating and prosecuting a qualifying crime related to notario fraud or to characterize the crime as such in the law enforcement certifications required by statute. Similarly, advocates should explain to USCIS adjudicators that notario fraud may relate to a qualifying crime.

Ideally, Congress should amend the U visa statute to explicitly include notario fraud as a qualifying crime. In the absence of a statutory amendment, USCIS should issue official guidance making clear that the U statute should, in appropriate circumstances, be inter-

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131. See supra Part I.C (discussing systemic harm caused by UPIL).
133. Id.
B. Monetary Relief for Victims

Some notarios are deliberate fraudsters who alight in a community, bilk people, and then move on to another community. Other times, lay people slip into UPIL in a misguided attempt to help immigrants. Their apparent good-heartedness does not obviate the extreme harm that they can do, and they should not have to be told more than once that they have strayed from their legitimate endeavors. Many notarios fall in a middle ground, running multi-service business enterprises that handle travel arrangements, divorce papers, taxes, and immigration work. Some or much of the immigration work they do may cross the line into UPIL, often with disastrous results. These notarios are often well established in the community, owning both businesses and personal property, but they are often reckless in their promises and forays into legal territory. The following discussion of remedies will refer back to these three UPIL scenarios—the “fraudster notario,” the “strayer,” and the “business notario”—and identify the mechanisms best suited to each UPIL situation.

A discussion of these mechanisms begins with a list of the likely monetary harms suffered by the victim. Most obviously, the victim has lost the fees paid to the notario for non-existent or improperly handled services. Additionally, the notario’s errors or mishandling of documents may proximately cause the victim to incur legal fees to repair the legal harm done or simply alleviate victims’ uncertainty over their immigration status. Also, if the notario’s errors caused a delay in obtaining status, the victim has lost the monetary gains that come with legal status, usually in the form of better employment opportunities.

Remedies law requires certainty. Lost employment opportunities may be too speculative to be recoverable, but in an unusual case the victim may be able to produce evidence of

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134. The first time the person missteps may not be deliberate, but harm to the public good has still occurred. Certainly if, after admonition, the individual persists in engaging in UPIL, his or her “good-heartedness” is called into question and that person becomes more like a business notario.

135. Those businesses may be engaged in other forms of unauthorized practice of law, if they dabble in, for example, divorce law. They may misstate what the law is to their customers and potentially encourage their clients to engage in fraud, especially in the tax area. See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, Vargas v. Casa Latina, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1568 (D.N.Ga. May 4, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, Vargas v. Casa Latina]; SAMUEL C. ROCK, AMER. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N, THE INTERSECTION OF INCOME TAX AND IMMIGRATION LAW WITH A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON TAX BENEFITS FOR HAITIAN TPS RECIPIENTS 797, 802 (2010).

136. These categories of notario are being made for the purpose of matching the best remedy to the situation, as opposed to the “gatekeeper” or “stand alone” categories. The gatekeeper type of notario referenced above could fall into either the fraudster or the notario business category. See supra note 4 (describing gatekeeper-type notarios).

137. For a successful example of this recovery, which includes a thoughtful analysis by the court, see Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 842 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
a contract or solid offer that could not be fulfilled because of the lack of proper immigration documentation. Additional monetary harm may be proven, for instance, if an individual had to sell his or her home because of deportation and sold it at a loss. Normally, the victim has suffered emotional harm, including prolonged stress, shock at the betrayal by the notario, uncertainty about how to proceed, worry, fear of separation from loved ones, and so forth. In sum, notarios’ errors can cause immense financial and emotional damage. As happens so often in the law, the more cataclysmic the harm, the more difficult damages may be to prove.

Remediation of harm is possible through various mechanisms. Restitution may be available from governmental prosecution of the notario under federal or state statutes prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices, or state penal codes. Alternatively, the victim may sue in a private action under state Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practice (UDAP) laws or state common law, including traditional restitution and small claims. These remedial mechanisms may be combined, as long as the recovery is not duplicative. Collections are a challenge, but various practical suggestions have emerged from recent successful cases against notarios.138

1. Victim Compensation Through Governmental Prosecutions of Notarios

a. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices139

The federal government and all states have consumer protection acts that prohibit unfair or deceptive practices.140 Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”141 An “unfair” practice is defined as one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”142

Notario fraudsters easily fall within this prohibition, and business notarios usually do as well. The consumers are substantially injured, as described above. The consumers have sometimes only recently arrived in the United States and are non-lawyers, not fluent in English, and not accustomed to our legal system. As such, they usually cannot see through the

138. Not all footnoted cases arise in the UPIL context. Effort has been made to find apposite or analogous factual contexts, where possible. Cases are cited for general propositions of law and concentrate on Idaho, Washington and Texas.
139. To get an overview of UDAP law, see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES].
142. Id.
misrepresentations of scurrilous notarios and lack an understanding of the intricacies of immigration law. Notarios often misrepresent that they have authorization to provide immigration and naturalization services, that fees paid cover all costs associated with submitting documents to USCIS, that customers can obtain immigration documents not actually available to them, or even that the notario's "immigration service" is affiliated with the United States government.\textsuperscript{143}

The Federal Trade Commission prosecutes violations of the FTC Act in U.S. district court. In addition to seeking civil or criminal penalties and cease and desist orders, the FTC usually requests "monetary equitable relief"\textsuperscript{144} in the form of consumer refunds or redress. The refunds are essentially intended to be restitutionary and to prevent defendants from profiting from their wrongdoing; they are viewed as equitable disgorgement\textsuperscript{145} and are neither full compensatory nor punitive damages.\textsuperscript{146} When the FTC sues, the victim can get a refund of the moneys paid to the notario, but the statute does not contemplate compensation for other consequential financial, emotional, or physical harm.\textsuperscript{147}

All states have UDAP laws.\textsuperscript{148} Prohibitions relevant to notario fraud include: "causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another;"\textsuperscript{149} representing that a person has a status, connection, qualifications or license that he does not have; representing that services are of a particular standard, quality or grade when in fact they are not; representing that services are needed if they are not; providing services that are not needed; and "[e]ngaging in any act or practice

\textsuperscript{143} Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 7-12, F.T.C. v. Immigration Ctr., No. 311-CV-00055 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint Against Immigration Ctr.].

\textsuperscript{144} FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Administrative adjudication is an alternative procedural route through which the FTC seeks cease and desist orders. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). After such order is granted, the FTC may go to district court and seek redress for consumer injury caused by the conduct at issue in the administrative proceeding. FTC Act § 17b, 15 U.S.C. § 57b.

\textsuperscript{145} The nomenclature for the types of equitable monetary relief available under the FTC Act differs to some extent from traditional restitution described in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. See infra notes 171, 205-08 and accompanying text. The FTC distinguishes between restitution (repayment to victims in the amount that they paid to the defrauder, which essentially amounts to a rescission of the fraudulent contract) and disgorgement (paid to the U.S. Treasury and measured as gross profits less allowable costs). See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-470 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)). Another source of consumer redress is Section 19(b) of the FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (discussing civil actions). Disgorgement is discussed at greater length in Part IV.

\textsuperscript{146} FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining the character of such monetary damages).

\textsuperscript{147} CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 278 (August Horvath & John Villafranco, eds., 2010) ("The major purpose of the FTC Act is to protect consumers from economic injury. . . .").

\textsuperscript{148} Federal discussion on the FTC Act informs interpretation of state UDAP law, and vice versa. See Amback v. French, 173 P.3d 941, 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he [Washington] legislature expressed its intent that Washington courts should be guided by federal decisions and orders of the federal trade commission when construing the CPA.").

\textsuperscript{149} See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(3) (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(3) (2007). Thirty-eight states use this phrasing.
that is otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer."\(^{150}\)

The essence of the proof is not the mens rea of the service provider—his intent to defraud—nor any actual damage to the public; rather, the question is whether the practice "possesses a tendency or capacity to deceive consumers."\(^{151}\) A few states expressly proscribe "any unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce."\(^{152}\) This includes behavior where an individual "knowingly or with reason to know, took advantage of a consumer reasonably unable to protect his interest because of . . . ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language, . . . or similar factor."\(^{153}\) Other state legislatures leave the prohibition general by providing, for example, "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade of commerce are hereby declared unlawful."\(^{154}\) Such general language leaves further refinement to enforcement agencies and courts.\(^{155}\)

Deceptive trade acts do not fail because of a consumer's contributory negligence in failing to realize that the tradesperson is a fraud,\(^{156}\) nor must the government prove that victims suffered actual harm from the notarios' deceptive trade practices. The harm is in the deception.\(^{157}\)

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150. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 48-603(17).
153. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 48-603C(2)(a) (using such language).
155. Smith v. Stockdale, 271 P.3d 917, 922 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the meaning of the terms "unfair and deceptive"). Compare State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 629-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to prosecute purveyors of natural medicine since no finding of a deceptive practice), with Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193, 197 (Wash. 1983) (upholding prosecution of title agent for UDAP). The court in State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc. concluded, "A party practicing law or medicine without a license does not deceive the public if they do not claim to be licensed and are, in fact, competent or skilled in doing what they represent they can do. Someone who practices law or medicine without a license is not necessarily incompetent to perform the service that constitutes the practice of law or medicine. Under Bowers, the issue is whether that person in fact misrepresented his or her level of competence." 143 P.3d at 629-630.
156. The Supreme Court has written, "There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception." FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
157. Notarios in Texas attempted to argue that because an alleged victim obtained her citizenship, their violation of state UDAP, "if any, [was] not serious." Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). This evidence was properly excluded, and the proper inquiry is the gravity of the act, not the gravity of the harm done by engaging in the act. Id. at 637-38; see also State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribrs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122-23 (Idaho 1980) (discussing
Monetary relief for victims is contemplated under state consumer protection laws.\(^\text{158}\) State attorneys general may recover, on behalf of wronged consumers, amounts needed to restore the victims. The primary measure of these amounts is the fees paid for the notario's services.\(^\text{159}\)

Victims need not testify or be named in the government’s complaint to recover restitution.\(^\text{160}\) For instance, *Thomas v. State* illustrates the breadth and flexibility of the government’s remedies in the notario context.\(^\text{161}\) The State of Texas, acting through the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General’s Office, sued Ruth and John Thomas, who conducted business as *Tramites Migratorios*.\(^\text{162}\) After presenting “abundant evidence”\(^\text{163}\) that the defendants violated the Notary Public Act and the state UDAP Act, the state used defendants’ own receipt books\(^\text{164}\) to prove that each defendant had “acquired $469,416.50 by means of an unlawful act or practice.”\(^\text{165}\) Restitution to consumers was allowed even though the state had not specified the persons entitled to the restitution nor how much each identified person should be paid.\(^\text{166}\) Allocation of the money among consumers was left to “the sole discretion” of the Texas Attorney General’s office.\(^\text{167}\) The appellate court allowed restitution for amounts dating back further than the two-year statute of limitations; the court held that the two-year limitation expressly attached only to “actual damages,” distinguishing

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\(^{158}\) See, e.g., *IDAHO CODE ANN.* § 48-606(1)(b) (noting possibility of monetary relief); *WASH. REV. CODE* § 19.86.080 (discussing possibility of monetary relief).


\(^{162}\) *Id.* at 700.

\(^{163}\) *Id.* at 704.

\(^{164}\) See *id.* at 705 (discussing of hearsay and business records evidence rules in this context).

\(^{165}\) *Id.* at 704.

\(^{166}\) Some states with differently worded statutes have reached contrary results, whereas some other jurisdictions are in accord and have found that this does not violate defendants’ constitutional rights. See *State ex rel. Reno v. Barquet*, 358 So.2d 230, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the State Attorney may not obtain damages on behalf of the State under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Law); *State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth*, Inc., 510 P.2d 233 (Wash. 1973) (discussing the issue in the context of used car sales).

\(^{167}\) *Thomas*, 226 S.W.3d at 707. In Idaho, the district court may establish the allocation of money to consumers. See *State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs.*, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho 1980) (giving that the district court may establish allocation of money to consumers); *Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth*, Inc., 553 P.2d at 438 (discussing appropriate procedures for allocation of money).
"restitution" as an equitable remedy. These rulings were sustained even though the matter was not brought as a class action because it was "a de facto class action."

UDAP laws also provide more indirect benefits to victims through assessment of civil penalties. These penalties are paid to the state, and their primary purpose is punishment and prevention. Sometimes, however, the state diverts the money in a way that addresses victims' harm, or at least the sufferings of people similarly situated to the victims. For example, in Massachusetts a false advertising case against a mattress company was settled by requiring the company to provide $100,000 worth of bedding for local homeless shelters. This approach could be applied in a UPIL scenario. The government, for instance, could use monies fraudulently received to pay for educational efforts to caution recent immigrants away from notarios.

A different approach was taken in an unfair condominium sale in California. Although "no cognizable direct victim" was identified, the court mandated the seller to be disgorged of money illegally acquired and deposited in a "fluid" recovery fund that could ultimately be used to benefit people similarly situated to plaintiffs. Careen Shannon thought along these same lines in her article calling for a statute governing UPIL. As part of a multi-faceted plan, she suggested that some of the funds collected in civil damages and paid to the state be put into a trust for funding immigration legal services around the state. Her plan goes beyond helping the victims of notario fraud in that it would prevent notarios from getting a foothold by diverting their clientele to legitimate providers.

b. Restitution for State Crimes

State prosecutors may charge notarios with crimes, as discussed later in this article. Criminal prosecution opens the door for victims to recover lost money by using reparation or restitution statues in effect in many states. These statutes "allow and facilitate the monetary


170. See discussion infra Part IV (examining civil penalties).

171. UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 139, § 15.5.4.3 (citing a news release of the Massachusetts Office of Attorney General from Dec 9, 1992).


173. See Careen Shannon, To License Or Not To License? A Look at Differing Approaches to Policing the Activities of Nonlawyer Immigration Service Providers, 33 CARDozo L. REV. 437, 483 (2011) [hereinafter To License Or Not To License] (describing the need to establish a trust fund to finance the provision of free immigration legal services).
compensation of crime victims." In addition to criminal penalties, some states punish crimes of fraud by requiring that the perpetrator pay the victim treble the victim's actual loss. For instance, a fraudulent investment counselor in Arizona was ordered to pay his victims three times their actual loss, for a total of $1.6 million. Such case law, though not within the notario context, could guide recovery for victims in a notario prosecution.

2. Private Actions by Victims

a. UDAP

The federal FTC Act does not allow for private actions, but victims have the right to sue in every state under state UDAP laws. Victims of all types of UPIL should seek "out of pocket" costs, primarily the amounts paid to the notario, and proximately-caused consequential damages, including lost jobs, time, and additional legal fees. Wages lost by taking time away from work to deal with the legal tangles created by notarios may also be recoverable. In some states, elderly or disabled people bringing actions may recover enhanced damages.

Damages for mental anguish or emotional distress should be allowed as well, unless the state UDAP statute excludes them. Some UDAP statutes require business or prop-

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174. George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute, 15 A.L.R. 5th 391, 432. The use of the word "restitution" in the Restatement differs somewhat from its use in this context, as here the word more describes compensatory damages paid to undo at least some of the harm caused by a crime. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.753 (2003) (discussing restitution).

175. See State v. Henderson, 717 P.2d 933, 934-35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, in order to secure a more favorable plea agreement in a state RICO action, defendant could consent to forfeiture of some property not the fruit of the illegal activity).


178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting the three types of UPIL situations).


180. See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 899 (Wash. 2009) (holding that plaintiff's time away from his business was sufficient injury, as was an adverse effect on credit rating resulting in a loss of business profits).

181. See id. at 902 (explaining that measurement of legal fees must carefully distinguish among (1) resolution of the underlying immigration matter; (2) untangling of the mess created by the notario; and (3) fees incurred to bring the UDAP case).

182. See id. at 900-03 (discussing losses and expenses that may be recoverable).

183. In Idaho, for example, the enhancement is the greater of $15,000 or treble the actual damages, upon proof of certain losses enumerated in the statute, including "loss of assets essential to the health or welfare of the elderly or disabled person." Idaho Code Ann. § 48-608(2).

184. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(a) (providing express allowance for mental anguish damages); Barnette v. Brook Road, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741, 751 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("Compensatory damages are those allowed as a recompense for loss or injury actually received and include loss occurring to property, necessary expenses, insult, pain, mental suffering, injury to the reputation, and the like.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
property injury, as opposed to general injury. In those states, recovery for pure emotional harm may not be allowed. However, proof of minimal, temporary or intangible economic injury will sometimes provide a sufficient platform to support recovery for emotional distress.

If proof of actual damage is lacking, plaintiffs should check their respective state's UDAP statutes: about half of the states allow private litigants to recover minimum statutory damages in amounts ranging from $25 to $10,000. These are neither punitive damages nor penalties paid to the state. Rather, designed to overcome proof issues and to encourage private litigation, these damages are a substitute for actual damages that do not meet the minimum amount, even in cases with no showing of actual injury. They may be aggregated for multiple violations or tripled as a punitive measure.

Attorneys' fees for the costs of bringing the UDAP claim are normally recoverable to make prosecution of the claims economically feasible and to encourage private enforcement. Punitive damages are possible in most states, often in the form of treble damages upon proof of intent, bad faith, or simply as a matter of the court's discretion. While punitive damages are intended primarily to punish, deter, and prevent future bad acts, the fact that these damages are paid to plaintiffs suggests that there is a compensatory aspect to them as well.

185. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 (requiring there must be injury to “business or property,” not solely personal injuries); Panag, 204 P.3d at 899 (“Personal injuries, as opposed to injuries to ‘business or property’ are not compensable and do not satisfy the injury requirement.”).

186. See Panag, 204 P.3d at 899-902 (allowing recovery of pecuniary loss occasioned by inconvenience, id at 899, as well as money for postage, parking, and consulting an attorney). Note that the Panag court distinguished damages from injury and stated that unquantifiable damages would suffice. Id. at 900. In the case of a notario’s victim, the lower status of being without long-term, secure documentation may result in lower wages and a smaller range of possible jobs.

187. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, supra note 139, §§ 13.4.1 et seq.


190. See, e.g., Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 679 (Tenn. 2005) (“The potential award of attorneys’ fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is intended to make prosecution of such claims economically viable to plaintiff.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

191. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 587 S.E.2d 581, 584 (Va. 2003) (“The fee shifting provisions of the VCPA are designed to encourage private enforcement of the provisions of the statute.”).

192. See Idaho Code Ann. § 48-608 (authorizing treble the actual damages for an elderly or disabled person bringing suit); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §17.50(h) (authorizing up to treble the actual damages); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.090 (authorizing treble of actual damages up to $25,000).
All of these rules should be applied liberally, with an eye to avoidance of deceptive practices and restoration of the victim to his or her rightful position. The law in this area is quite helpful for consumers and may serve as a starting place for victim’s advocates.\footnote{193}

\textit{b. State Common Law}

Victims can bring common law causes of action against notarios for fraud, fraudulent concealment, conversion, deceit, forgery, breach of fiduciary duty, and even simple breach of contract.\footnote{194} It is usually more difficult to prevail on a common law fraud claim than a statutory UDAP claim, as a plaintiff has more to prove.\footnote{195} Further, the fraud defendant may push back by citing the victim’s negligence, unreasonable reliance, or lack of due diligence. On the other hand, “where the person making the statement has inhibited plaintiff’s inquires by . . . creating a false sense of security,” the failure to inquire into facts that could be made available to the plaintiff is not fatal.\footnote{196} In the notario context, the \textit{modus operandi} is to create a false sense of security. The notario presents himself as the one with knowledge of the American language, culture, and legal system. Therefore, the reasonableness of plaintiff’s conduct should be a question of fact for the jury.

Some notarios may also be liable for attorney or notary malpractice.\footnote{197} The negligence per se doctrine might help establish breach of tort duty when the notario has violated a statute that, for example, prohibits unauthorized practice of law. Standard recovery would include out-of-pocket expenses, consequential damages, and likely punitive damages. This remedy applies to all of the notario scenarios but is particularly useful against the strayer.

\footnote{193}{State and federal civil RICO should also be considered as a means of recovery against both fraudsters and the business notario. \textit{See}, e.g., Complaint, Vargas v. Casa Latina, \textit{supra} note 135, at 10-13 (outlining alleged state and federal RICO violations by defendants). Discussion of these actions, however, is beyond the scope of this article.}

\footnote{194}{These are generally state claims and should be brought in state court. \textit{See} De Pacheco v. Martinez, 515 F. Supp. 2d 773, 783 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (denying federal question jurisdiction to several of these types of tortious claims).}

\footnote{195}{The court in \textit{Miller v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc.}, 762 N.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), engages in an interesting discussion of common law fraud and statutory UDAP. The reliance element of fraud is largely eliminated in UDAP, and the plaintiff’s diligence is not required. \textit{Id.} at 12-13. Also, the intent to deceive required in fraud becomes merely the intent that statements be relied upon in UDAP. \textit{Id.} at 12.}


\footnote{197}{Other states take the opposite tack, holding that a non-attorney may not be liable for legal malpractice. \textit{See} \textit{UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES}, \textit{supra} note 139, §10.4.2.5; Sande L. Buhai, \textit{Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law}, 2007 \textit{Utah L. Rev.} 87, 97 (2007) (“A majority [of jurisdictions] hold that when an unauthorized law practice is conducted by a layman, he is held, at a minimum, to the standards of competency of a lawyer. Failure to conform to that standard constitutes actionable negligence.”).}
c. **Small Claims Court**

For those who are damaged in an amount less than the statutory maximum for the jurisdictional court system, small claims court may be an excellent option because the rules of evidence are relaxed and no attorneys are required.\(^{198}\) In a recent case from Wisconsin, a notario’s advice led to the deportation of the plaintiff’s wife.\(^{199}\) The plaintiff sued in small claims court for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach of an implied duty of good faith, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, UDAP violations, notary misconduct, and negligent provision of services.\(^{200}\) The small claims judge granted summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing and that his wife “was here illegally by her own choice,” thereby making the contract in question “unenforceable.”\(^{201}\)

The appellate court reversed, explaining that the plaintiff did have standing because he had a personal stake in the outcome and had incurred legal and travel expenses.\(^{202}\) The Wisconsin court did not expressly refute the assertion that the contract was unenforceable, but other courts have not viewed such arguments as dispositive.\(^{203}\) Although this Wisconsin plaintiff was represented by a lawyer who was willing to take the case through appeal, perhaps some victims could begin to use the small claims courts *pro se* if these actions could gain some traction.

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198. EVELYN CRUZ & KATHY BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., HOW TO SUE AN IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT 6-7 (2001).


200. *Id.*

201. *Id.*

202. *Id.* at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court hinted at the plaintiff’s likely emotional harm and expressly noted his expenditures to keep his family together, including both legal fees and travel expenses to take his children to be with his wife in Mexico. *Id.* at 2. Defendants appealed, decrying the opening of the floodgates of litigation; their appeal was summarily denied. Enciso-Lopez, 806 N.W.2d at 639; see also Georgia Pabst, “Notarios” Ask for Supreme Court Review, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL ONLINE (July 11, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/125382578.html (discussing the case).

203. See, e.g., Gamboa v. Alvarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1016-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (characterizing a scheme for fake immigration papers as increasingly criminal). When plaintiffs realized that they had been scammed, they sued in state court for common law fraud, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Illinois UDAP act. *Id.* at 1015. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs had entered into an illegal contract, violated the law and public policy, and that the parties were in pari delicto. *Id.* at 1017-18. Dismissal on those grounds was reversed, because (1) the plaintiffs were seeking to get back money for being misled and (2) the plaintiffs were not in pari—equally—bad as defendants: “plaintiffs spoke little English, did not know defendants were lying/unable to deliver on their promise and would not necessarily know the agreement was illegal.” *Id.*
Traditional Restitution

UPIL committed by the established business notario\(^\text{204}\) is ripe for another civil approach, the oft-forgotten theory of restitution for unjust enrichment.\(^\text{205}\) Restitution operates on the simple concept that “a person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”\(^\text{206}\) The acts and deceptions of notarios are wrong. Fraud is “one of the principal grounds for restitution and one of the principal sources of unjust enrichment.”\(^\text{207}\) A victim of fraud is entitled to disgorge the perpetrator of the proceeds of the fraud; that is, the money paid over by the victim. Accordingly, the “restitutionary” remedy is congruent with the standard common law remedy of “out of pocket loss,” but providing proof may be easier, especially in a suit against an established business that keeps records. If a victim or a group of victims has insufficient paperwork to prove how much the notario’s UPIL has cost them but can prove the amount gained by the notario, that amount should be returned to the victims.\(^\text{208}\)

Restitution shines in measures like the constructive trust. In such cases, the victim may be able to recover more than he lost and get some preferences in bankruptcy. When notarios are well established in the community, with traceable personal and business assets,\(^\text{209}\) plaintiffs should be able to make good use of this remedy. Consider this illustration from the Restatement commentary:

Victim loses $100,000 to Embezzler. After discovering the fraud, Victim is able to establish that embezzler used Victim’s money to purchase Blackacre. Because Blackacre qualifies as Embezzler’s homestead, it would be exempt from execution on a judgment for damages. Restitution gives Victim ownership of Blackacre, rather than a judgment to be satisfied from a property of Embezzler. Relief will usually take the form of a decree that Embezzler holds Blackacre in constructive trust for Victim.\(^\text{210}\)

The tracing component of restitutionary recovery is not easy\(^\text{211}\) but may be significant. For example, if the business notario’s UPIL profits provided the money for the notario

\(^{204}\) See supra note 136 and accompanying text (highlighting the typology of notario scenarios).

\(^{205}\) See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) [hereinafter Restatement].

\(^{206}\) Id. § 3.

\(^{207}\) Id. § 13 cmt. a.


\(^{209}\) This remedy works especially well for the business notario. See supra note 115 (describing the “business” notario).

\(^{210}\) Restatement, supra note 205, § 13 cmt. h, illus. 25.

\(^{211}\) Examples abound of funds commingled among victims and innocent dealings of the defendant, direct and indirect transactions, sequential withdrawals and contributions, and so forth. See, e.g., Restatement, supra note 205, § 59 cmts. c, d.
to buy real property or assets. \textsuperscript{212} UPIL victims may be able to disgorge from the notarios the value of the property or even obtain actual ownership of the property. This approach may be lucrative if the property has increased in value since its initial purchase. Victims may benefit from the simplicity of receiving title to the property rather than having to prove its value. \textsuperscript{213} The victims’ interest may be paramount to other unsecured creditors. \textsuperscript{214} Multiple claimants may aggregate their claims and then divide the funds to receive shares in proportion to contributions. \textsuperscript{215}

Fraud is just one of the relevant wrongs enumerated in the Restatement. Notarios may also be charged with conversion, \textsuperscript{216} breach of fiduciary relation, \textsuperscript{217} and occasionally “undue influence.” \textsuperscript{218} The advantages of restitution are significant and, at times, startling. \textsuperscript{219} It should be in every litigator’s toolkit.

3. Practicalities

Before the lucre of private civil recovery shines too bright, reality must cast its shadow. A prerequisite to these legal mechanisms is the victim’s willingness to come forward. Fear of law enforcement and lack of familiarity with our nation’s legal system commonly deter reporting such conduct. In addition, those who do venture forward may be discouraged by slow processes and the fluidity of the notario’s \textit{modus operandi}. For instance, a notario may have folded up shop and moved on by the time fraud is discovered, especially in larger states with fluid immigrant populations. Nonetheless, the possibility of monetary

\textsuperscript{212} Similarly, if the money were traced to the purchase of stock or any other asset that might appreciate, the same theories would hold.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Restatement}, supra note 205, \textsection 51 cmt. b, illus. 2.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Id.} \textsection 51 cmt. b, illus. 3; see also \textit{id.} \textsection 55 cmt. c (describing the policies behind the balancing of interests between the victims and other creditors).

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Id.} \textsection 59 cmt. f. Also consider this illustration: “Acting wrongfully, X obtains $1000 from A on January 1, $2000 from B on February 1, and $3000 from C on March 1, depositing these funds (and no others) in a single account. The account is closed on April 1, leaving a balance of $2000. . . A, B, and C share pro rata to their losses (i) any traceable product of the April withdrawal and (ii) the $2000 closing balance.” \textit{Id.} \textsection 59, illus. 17.

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Id.} \textsection 40.

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Id.} \textsection 43.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Id.} \textsection 15. Victims may also be able to cite \textsection 44(c), which provides that “when the object of a legal prohibition of general application is to protect persons in the position of the claimant, the circumstances of an intentional and profitable violation will sometimes permit the conclusion that the wrongdoer has been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense.” The illustrations to this comment are not on point, but the wording may permit inclusion of the unauthorized practice of law and unpermitted provision of immigration services.

\textsuperscript{219} In addition to the benefits listed in the text, the statutes of limitations may be more generous than for some other causes of action. Given the confusion over restitutionary claims and the unfolding of the history of restitution, “the question of limitations may be especially challenging” in this context. \textit{See id.} \textsection 70 cmt. a. (discussing the question of limitations). The equitable doctrine of laches may also come into play. \textit{Id.}
redress might incentivize victims to report fraud and provide evidence, though they should be made aware of the difficulties of proof and collecting the damages.

The various roads to monetary recovery outlined above may be combined, with a few obvious limitations. As always, when thinking about remedies, the key is to pause, reflect, and use common sense. Parallel criminal or civil governmental proceedings do not preclude private actions for damages or restitution. Although victims may not recover duplicative remedies, strong complaints will set forth a variety of causes of action. One complaint, for example, may allege multiple counts under UDAP, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts ("RICO"), fraud, restitution, and breach of contract. A plaintiff "is . . . entitled to one award of compensatory damages, one award of exemplary damages, and one award of attorney's fees." All lawyers know that a judgment, even a monetary judgment, is just a piece of paper. The judgment must be collected, and there must be assets from which to wring the cash. The business notario, well established in the community for years, has traceable assets. This bespeaks some stability and some sense of being within the system. Fraudster notarios, on the other hand, are essentially criminals. It is not uncommon for a notario to get wind of an exposure or legal crackdown and go into hiding, relocate, and set up a new shop shortly thereafter. If the notario is jailed pursuant to a concomitant criminal action, the

220. A further lure to reporting may be injunctions available with lawsuits. See discussion infra Part III.A.
221. Statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees are all conceptually different, and all may be collected in the same lawsuit. On the other hand, treble damages and punitive damages are usually duplicative. Statutory damage amounts are substitutes for actual, proven damages, so they should not be collected together for the same harm, but it is possible to recover statutory damages for one violation and actual damages for another. Plaintiffs may collect punitive damages on a fraud claim and treble damages on a UDAP claim. Common law fraud does not usually give rise to an award of attorneys' fees but statutory claims do. See, e.g., Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tenn. 2005) (finding the award of punitive damages duplicative of treble damages but not of attorney fees).
225. Lawyers from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Idaho State Attorney General's Office have commented on the difficulty, in many cases, of being able to collect the full amount of consumer injury from a fraudster notario. Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission (June 15, 2011). If a legitimate immigration consultant strays or errs in California, collection may be easier still because that state requires posting of a bond. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 22443.1 (2013).
226. For example, in the small claims action mentioned previously, the plaintiff collected some money (undisclosed pursuant to agreement) and, more importantly for the public good, defendants changed their signs and business cards to make clear that they could not provide legal services. Telephone Interview with Mike J. Gonring, Attorney, Quarles & Brady (June 25, 2012).
227. The authors have been careful to avoid disclosures about pending or potential moves against notarios.
notario is not making money. Most notarios significant enough to be prosecuted by the government are fraudsters used to flying over legal lines and savvy about concealing assets.\textsuperscript{228}

With this in mind, the FTC usually moves quickly to file for an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO). The showing to get the order ex parte requires providing information about the defendant’s tendency to hide assets and destroy documents, as well as the FTC’s track record with fraudsters. The TRO often includes an order to stop deceptive practices, appoint a receiver, freeze assets,\textsuperscript{229} grant immediate access to business premises, and, if necessary, secure mailboxes and safety deposit boxes. The receiver, protected by local or federal law enforcement, promptly invites the FTC into the notario’s place of business to examine all potential evidence. The evidence is immediately copied to prevent spoliation and to obviate lengthy discovery processes.\textsuperscript{230}

A state attorney general may be prevented, to some degree, from taking as aggressive an approach as the FTC. By statute, many state attorneys general must attempt to obtain “voluntary compliance” before filing the complaint, unless doing so will “substantially and materially impair” the provision’s purposes by causing a delay in instituting legal proceedings.\textsuperscript{231} The provision’s purposes may be impaired, for example, if the target has advanced warning and can hide assets or even evade jurisdiction. To mitigate the possibility of such consequences, these statutes usually have exceptions for situations where the attorney general finds that the purposes of the law will be substantially and materially impaired by delay in instituting legal proceedings. Some state attorneys general have it within their power to move to freeze assets, order preliminary placement into escrow of all amounts received from consumers, or appoint a receiver to administer a violator’s assets.\textsuperscript{232}

Two recent victories by the FTC provide insight into the comprehensive and full frontal attack required to remedy notario fraud.\textsuperscript{233} These cases involve the fraudster-type

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[228.] Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, \textit{supra} note 225. Winter quoted his boss as saying, “We go after people who step across the line, and we go after people who live across the line.” \textit{Id.} The aim is to prevent fraud.
\item[229.] The asset freeze is common in RICO litigation as well.
\item[230.] Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, \textit{supra} note 225.
\item[231.] See, \textit{e.g.}, \textsc{Idaho Code Ann.} \S 48-606(3) (2001) (using quoted language); \textsc{Tex. Bus. \& Com. Code Ann.} \S 17.58(b) (“The acceptance of an assurance of voluntary compliance may be conditioned [on restoring] any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of [violative] acts or practices.”)
\item[232.] See, \textit{e.g.}, \textsc{FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc.}, 668 F.2d 1107, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the power to freeze assets); David Jason West \& Pydia, Inc. \textit{v. State}, 212 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing the power to freeze assets); \textit{but see} \textsc{State v. Gartenberg}, 488 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (disallowing requirement of loan brokers to escrow prejudgment monies); \textsc{Avila v. State}, 252 S.W.3d 632, 647-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (finding injunction to be overly broad).
\item[233.] See \textsc{Gamboa v. Alvarado}, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1017-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding for plaintiffs and against purveyor of criminal schemes to obtain immigration status).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
notario, with the least traceable assets of the various notario types. Nonetheless, the thorough approach of the FTC is ideal for all types of notario scenarios because it preserves evidence, documents, and assets, insofar as possible.

For over ten years, Manuel and Lola Alban allegedly engaged in UPIL, represented that Manuel was a lawyer, took money for services they did not perform, and made mistakes when they did perform. According to the complaint, the couple filed at least 600 immigration applications, over half of which were denied or rejected for failure to include proper documentation or pay the required processing fee. To make matters worse, the Albans purportedly destroyed files so that consumers with pending appeals were unable to obtain copies of their applications.

On June 1, 2011, the FTC obtained an ex parte TRO against the Albans and their business. The judge issued the TRO ex parte out of fear that the Albans would otherwise hide assets and destroy documents and evidence. The TRO prevented further UPIL by prohibiting the Albans from providing immigration services; facilitated prosecution of the Albans by granting federal agents immediate access to their business premises, and; facilitated economic recovery by freezing their assets. Federal agents, under the supervision of a monitor, entered the Albans’ workplace, seized electronic devices and copied their business and client records, and preserved original documents for return to the clients.

The FTC obtained a similar TRO to shut down a multi-state fraudulent enterprise. The complaint alleged that while this enterprise did not use the term “notario,” it played on

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234. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (giving the three notario situations).
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id.
239. The FTC made a Rule 65 showings of the tendency of similarly situated defendants to destroy evidence and established that these defendants already made suspiciously large withdrawals from bank accounts. See Memorandum Supporting FTC’s Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Appointing Temporary Receiver, Freezing Assets, and Granting Other Equitable Relief at 2, 28, FTC v. Immigration Servs., No. 311-cv-00055 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter FTC Memo]. This is more crucial in immigration cases because immigration service providers often have in their possession the only original copies of crucial documents. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
240. This includes prohibition on opening safe deposit boxes, commercial mailboxes, storage facilities, or even mail addressed to them. FTC Memo, supra note 239, at 9.
241. The monitor was appointed in the TRO, essentially as a logistical supervisor.
the same immigrant desires to obtain legal status.\textsuperscript{243} Seven individuals doing business under various names and in corporations, organized under the laws of various states, ran operations in three different states primarily using the internet, and held themselves out as authorized and qualified to provide immigration services.\textsuperscript{244} In reality, however, none of them were attorneys or accredited representatives.\textsuperscript{245} They filed papers without allowing the clients to see the papers, resulting in errors in form selection and factual accuracy.\textsuperscript{246} The individuals affixed seals and graphics depicting the American bald eagle, the flag of the United States, or the Statue of Liberty on their materials to trick people into believing that they were affiliated with the federal government.\textsuperscript{247} The URL names for their websites were confusing, including addresses with the phrases “uscic-ins.us” or “usgovernmenthelpline.”\textsuperscript{248} Phones were answered “immigration center,” and consumers were transferred to a live person identifying him or herself as “agent,” “immigration officer,” or “caseworker.”\textsuperscript{249} The individuals charged fees ranging from $200 to $2500.\textsuperscript{250} Many customers believed that their fees were being paid to the United States government to process documents.\textsuperscript{251} Moreover, the individuals used standard slick business tactics, such as failing to be clear about actual costs, double charging, and refusing to give refunds.\textsuperscript{252}

The Colorado and Missouri Attorneys General took criminal action against these individuals, but they simply moved on to Nevada.\textsuperscript{253} On January 26, 2011, after talking to many victims of these scams, the FTC stepped in.\textsuperscript{254} The individuals’ businesses were shut down,\textsuperscript{255} and the State of Nevada simultaneously filed criminal charges.\textsuperscript{256} Eventually the

\textsuperscript{243} See Complaint Against Immigration Ctr., supra note 143, at 6-12 (describing defendants’ business practices). Final judgment was stipulated and a permanent injunction and other equitable relief was entered on Dec. 27, 2011. See Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief as to Defendants Immigration Center, Charles Doucette, and Deborah Stilson at 2, FTC v. Immigration Ctr., No. 3:11-CV-00055-LRH (D. Nev. Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Stipulated Final Judgment].

\textsuperscript{244} Complaint Against Immigration Ctr., supra note 143, at 3-7 (listing defendants and describing their business practices).

\textsuperscript{245} Id. at 3-6 (providing descriptions of each defendant).

\textsuperscript{246} See id. at 10 (explaining that defendants often filed papers before consumers could review them).

\textsuperscript{247} Id. at 9.

\textsuperscript{248} Id.

\textsuperscript{249} Id.

\textsuperscript{250} Id. at 10.

\textsuperscript{251} Id. at 11 (explaining that defendants charged the same amount for their purported services as the U.S. government actually charges to process a given form).

\textsuperscript{252} FTC Memo, supra note 239, at 12.

\textsuperscript{253} Id. at 2.


\textsuperscript{255} Id. at 5-6.

federal matter was settled, resulting in the return of clients’ original documents and a judgment in the millions, suspended upon the surrender of certain assets and compliance with the settlement order.

These prosecutions were part of a concerted and collaborative effort among several federal and state agencies and attorneys general as well as the Better Business Bureau to combat immigration services scams. Legitimate immigration service providers also joined in on their efforts. For example, it was Catholic Charities who tipped off the FTC about the Albans. This effort outlines the three pillars of fighting notario fraud: enforcement, education, and collaboration.

III. Stopping Specific Notarios From Engaging in Improper Practices

The first part of this article addressed how to help restore victims of UPIL to their rightful legal and financial positions. But, these restoration attempts are nearly always inadequate. It would be better if the victims had not been victims in the first place, and there were no harms to remedy. The next three parts of this article discuss prevention of UPIL. We begin narrowly in Part IV by cataloguing attempts to prevent known notarios from repeating their behavior. Parts V and VI will discuss broader, systemic approaches.

A discussion of prevention should begin with vocabulary. Prevention, deterrence, and punishment are closely related, but not identical, terms. To prevent something is to keep it from happening. Whereas “prevention” is a general term, “deterrence” bespeaks a more psychological approach to prevention. The Latin root is terrere, or “to frighten.” Deterrence means discouraging and preventing behavior through fear of consequences or unpleasantness. Punishment relates to deterrence. The linguistic root of punishment is the same as

258. See Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 5-6 (setting forth monetary judgments).
259. Catholic Charities was also instrumental in getting legal representation for Enciso-Lopez in his small claims case against notarios Monteagudo. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. Defendants went so far as to write the pope in an effort to get Catholic Charities to back off of the case. Telephone Interview with Mike J. Gonring, supra note 226.
260. See FTC Combats Immigration Services Scams, supra note 256 (discussing the FTC’s actions against the Albans).
262. The etymology of word speaks to this: prae venire means acting before something comes. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1960 (2d ed. 1950).
263. Id. at 711.
for the words “penalty” and “pain.” To punish is to correct and discipline by afflicting with pain, loss, and suffering. It is the opposite of rewarding. Black’s Law Dictionary distinguishes among “deterrent punishment,” with the purpose of deterring like-minded others from committing crimes by making an example of the offender; “preventative punishment,” which “prevents a repetition of wrongdoing by disabling the offender,” and; “retributive punishment,” which is intended “to satisfy the community’s retaliatory sense of indignation that is provoked by injustice.” All of these concepts play a role in preventing notarios, or would-be notarios, from plying their trade.

While acknowledging the deterrent effect of the monetary awards discussed in Part III, we now look at more direct preventive measures, civil and criminal, taken against identified, specific notarios. Some of these measures are punitive. Others are exemplary, intended to deter others besides the defendant. And, still others are preventive, without necessarily being punitive.

A. Injunctions

An injunction is the most obvious preventive legal action, designed to avert reoccurrence of misconduct by people who have been identified as notarios. Federal and state courts routinely issue orders against provision of unauthorized, illegal, or fraudulent services, thereby protecting not only the private litigant or the named complainant in government actions, but also the general public and all future victims. The beauty of injunctions is that they can both be tailored exactly to the improper practices used by the given notario and include general prohibitions. This section details the purposes served by injunctions, sets out some basic best practices for drafting an injunction, and surveys the law of contempt.

264. Id. at 2013.
265. Id. at 743. The first definition of the verb “discipline” is “to teach.” Id. The second and third definitions involve chastisement or suffering, and the fourth invokes control and strict governance. Id.
266. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1247-48 (7th ed. 1999).
Injunctions may be issued as remedies for most all of the causes of action identified in this article.\textsuperscript{268} Unless otherwise noted, the explanations that follow apply to all of the claims described.\textsuperscript{269} Similarly, the ensuing discussion applies to both preliminary injunctions sought before trial\textsuperscript{270} and permanent injunctions sought as a remedy after liability has been established.

Injunctions are used primarily to prevent future harms.\textsuperscript{271} They may do so by issuing direct orders to parties or other actors to cease and desist from illegal or unlawful practices. But, they can and should go one step further, and educate the defendant by detailing and explaining what practices are illegal and, by omission, what practices are legal.\textsuperscript{272} The well-drafted injunction precludes the defendant from future assertions that he “did not know” he was doing anything wrong.\textsuperscript{273}

Preliminary injunctions can assist in building the case against, and collecting a judgment from, the defendant by ordering an accounting of profits, production of documents, freezing of funds, keeping of records, and similar measures.\textsuperscript{274} Preliminary injunctions can give a tactical advantage to plaintiffs or prosecutors because, for the injunction to issue, a court must determine that the party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on the merits. The judge’s very decision to issue the order is a harbinger of disaster for the defendant, which may lead to a quicker settlement. Additionally, the preliminary order often cuts off a significant income stream to the defendants, which may pressure them to proceed with settlement.

The efficacy of injunctions lies in their flexibility and ability to address exactly what is needed in the specific case before the court. The trial court has broad discretion to do “com-

\begin{itemize}
  \item Injunctions may be teamed with the other preventive and compensatory measures outlined in this article.\textsuperscript{268}
  \item The phrase “cease and desist order” is commonly used when the government is seeking to enjoin acts prohibited by statute.\textsuperscript{269}
  \item Preliminary injunctions remain in force only until final judgment. The terms of these orders may be revisited at the discretion of the trial court.\textsuperscript{270}
  \item Some injunctions are also reparative, used to help restore plaintiffs to their rightful positions. Injunctions need not be onerous. The National Consumer Law Center writes, “In theory, judges should enjoin future conduct even if they are unwilling to order a company to pay for past conduct that was not clearly deceptive.” UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 139, §13.6.1. Case law highlights that injunctions should not be punitive, but rather should be aimed at prevention of reoccurrence of the bad action. See, e.g., Agronic Corp. of Am. v. deBough, 585 P.2d 821, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (“The purpose of an injunction is not to punish a wrongdoer for past actions but to protect a party from present or future wrongful acts.”).\textsuperscript{271}
  \item See, e.g., The Fla. Bar v. Fuentes, 190 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1966) (granting an injunction against a notario long before any anti-notario laws were on the books); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 448 (Ind. 2005) (granting an injunction against a notario).\textsuperscript{272}
  \item The injunction demonstrates to the defendant that this court is watching him and has power over him. Even a scoff-law will squirm and think again before risking disobedience.\textsuperscript{273}
  \item See generally Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243 (serving as an excellent example of a detailed injunction).\textsuperscript{274}
\end{itemize}
plete" justice by the injunction, and the court's equitable powers are especially broad when the public interest is involved.\textsuperscript{275}

The main limits on the courts' discretion in issuing injunctions come from centuries of equitable precedent.\textsuperscript{276} The injunction should address only relevant matters, with relevance limited by the scope of the underlying crimes, torts, or other legal violations that, along with the facts at hand, make the injunction ripe.\textsuperscript{277} Also, the injunction must not inflict "undue hardship" on a defendant. Certainly it will inflict some hardship, or what feels like hardship, to the defendant deprived of a moneymaking scheme. The question is, what hardship is "undue"? Generally, it is improper to prohibit people from running a legitimate business. The good injunction carves away the illegitimate practice while leaving intact the defendant's ability to utilize his training and experience.\textsuperscript{278} If, for example, a notario ran a true notary service, a translation service, and a legitimate travel business, the injunction should not touch those legal endeavors.

The recent injunction in \textit{Avila v. State} went too far in restraining two Texan notarios. The injunction restrained the Avilas from destroying written materials related to their business; removing funds or property from the jurisdiction; giving advice about immigration; selecting or preparing immigration forms; soliciting or accepting compensation for providing immigration or legal services; and holding themselves out as legitimate providers of immigration services.\textsuperscript{279} However, the appellate court deleted from the trial court's order a prohibition on spending or transferring any money, securities, or property.\textsuperscript{280} The court explained, "Rendering the Avilas unable to pay their bills does not further [the purpose of the UDAP act]. Additionally, some of their money has been earned through legitimate business activi-

\textsuperscript{275} State v. Shattuck, 747 A.2d 174, 180-81 (Me. 2000).

\textsuperscript{276} The argument that the injunction should not issue because an adequate remedy at law exists is usually not successful in the fraud and deceptive practices context. \textit{See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. NOS Commc'ns, Inc.}, 84 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Nev. 2004) (holding that the district court erred in declining to issue an injunction); \textit{Avila v. State,} 252 S.W.3d 632, 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) ("When it is determined that a statute is being violated, it is within the province of the district court to restrain it."); \textit{State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,} 553 P.2d 423,434 (Wash. 1976) ("The decision to grant or deny equitable relief is within the discretion of the trial court.").

\textsuperscript{277} Mootness is seldom an issue in fraud or UDAP cases because of the obvious ability of the defendant to set up shop in a new place. \textit{See Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.}, 510 P.2d at 238 ("Mootness exists in the issuance of injunctions only where events make it absolutely clear the behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."). Voluntary cessation of activities is weak, at best, as an argument against issuance of an injunction, especially when the cessation occurs after the commencement of litigation. \textit{See id.} ("Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case because there is still a likelihood of the illegal conduct recurring.").

\textsuperscript{278} \textit{See State ex rel. Stovall v. Martinez,} 996 P.2d 371, 375-76 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the injunction narrowly tailored to prevent future KCPA violations and the unauthorized practice of law but not so narrow as to disallow the defendant from continuing to use his training and experience).

\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Avila,} 252 S.W.3d at 648.

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{Id.} at 648 (modifying the overly broad injunction).
ties. The Avilas should have access to money made in a manner that does no harm to the public."

On the other hand, if an entire business is deceptive, fraudulent, or otherwise illegal, the courts may prohibit them from operating. An alternative tack is to suspend a business from operating until it complies with the law. Under Washington’s anti-notario law, for example, an immigration service must comply with the code by not falling into any number of the prohibited practices it sets forth that pertain to offering assistance in immigration matters. Yet another approach would require defendants to deliver a copy of the injunction to any people with whom they enter into business with for the next five years.

Most injunctions begin with an umbrella prohibition, a general order to cease and desist from violation of the statute. More specific provisions are then added because, to be enforceable, the injunction must be sufficiently specific that the defendant knows what is allowed and what is not. Then, additional provisions can require affirmative acts on the defendant’s part. For example, at least one court has required a seller to include warning labels on hazardous goods to correct a public perception that the product was safe. By analogy, if a notario creates a public perception that he provides legitimate services when he actually does not, he may be ordered to disabuse the public of that understanding. If he fraudulently creates his reputation, he can be required to dismantle it.

In a case outside but similar to the immigration context, a California man listed his services in the phone book as “legal aid” and suggested that people consult with him if they could not afford an attorney. He targeted poor people being evicted from their mobile homes as potential clients. He did not claim to be a lawyer but did say he had an attorney...

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281. Id.
285. See Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 10 (ordering defendants to provide a copy of the injunction to a number of individuals for the following five years).
287. See, e.g., Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 11-12 (ordering defendants to keep their names, business names, and contact information on file with the FTC for twenty years).
290. Id.
on staff, even though he did not.  A court found he practiced law without a license, violated consumer protection statutes, and acted with fraud, oppression or malice. The court issued an injunction, which was upheld on appeal, that prohibited the use of “Legal Services,” “Legal Aid Services,” “legal,” and symbols of the scales of justice on his advertising. He was ordered to provide copies of the injunction to any employees of his businesses and make compliance reports to plaintiffs’ counsel. The court further ordered him to advertise the injunction in various newspapers in the communities where he operated, shoulder the cost of those quarter-page advertisements, and report to plaintiff’s counsel the names of all persons who responded to the advertisements.

Contempt is the remedy for the remedy; that is, it is the reparative and punitive mechanism used when injunctions have been violated. Consumer protection statutes may set their own penalties for violations of injunctions issued in accord with the statute. Violations of injunctions may also result in forfeiture of a corporate franchise, which would deter the business notario and strayer in particular. When a court finds a defendant in contempt of a court order, it enforces not only the law but also its own power to make orders. Courts do not make light of flagrant contumacy. Even the scoff-law fraudster notario may still be sobered by the power of contempt.

291. Id. at 751-52.
292. Id. at 749.
293. Id. at 754.
294. Id. at 759.
295. Id. at 760. This final provision was added because a former employee testified that the company received 60-200 calls per day, and the trial court found it possible that “thousands” of victims might be located by the advertisements. Id. Defendant had destroyed business records, so there was no other practical way to determine his victims’ identities. Id.
296. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 7-610 (2013) (discussing contempt); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.21.030 (discussing remedial sanctions for contempt of court). There are three types of contempt. The first is compensatory, essentially a determination of what civil damages were caused by the contempt. These damages are paid to the original plaintiff in a civil action, the victim who sought the injunction. Second, civil coercive contempt is used to force a defendant to comply with the court orders. This usually takes the form of fines paid to the state and could potentially include jail time. Finally, criminal contempt is possible as well, resulting in fines paid to the state, or incarceration. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 823 A.2d 509, 511-12 (D.C. 2003) (finding in criminal contempt a disbarred lawyer who continued to hold herself out as a lawyer).
297. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 48-615 (providing for a fine of up to $10,000 per violation and possible civil penalties); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.47(e) (providing for a penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $50,000); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.140 (authorizing a penalty of up to $25,000).
B. Civil Penalties Paid to the Government for Violation of Federal FTC Act and State UDAP Statutes

Knowing violations of the federal FTC Act give rise to “civil penalties” paid to the government. The government must prove that defendant had “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances” that his or her acts were unfair or deceptive. The FTC may collect $10,000 per violation. Most state UDAP statutes have similar provisions, many of which make the penalty collectable even without proof of willfulness, knowledge of, or actual harm to a consumer. In some states, the penalties are expressly designated to fund the attorney general’s consumer protection efforts.

These civil penalties are justifiable because restitution and compensation may not reflect the gravity of the defendant’s bad conduct. The rationales behind imposing these penalties include recovery for damage to the public, disgorgement, disincentivizing the behavior, and punishment. The judge determines the amount assessed, with the maximum set by statute. Factors taken into account include the number of violations, the number of people damaged, the nature and extent of the public injury, and the detrimental effect of particular violations. The wealth of the defendant is also relevant.

301. Id.
302. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-606 (authorizing civil penalties of “up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) (allowing for penalties of up to $2,000 per violation and not to exceed $10,000); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.140 (providing for civil penalties up to $100,000 for a person or $500,000 for a corporation); State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 436-47 (Wash. 1976) (giving that penalties in Washington are assessed by each violation, not each customer harmed). These civil penalties paid to the state are distinct from treble damages that are paid to consumers in consumer actions. See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing monetary relief); supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing punitive damages).
304. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-606(f)(5) (“All penalties, costs and fees recovered by the attorney general shall be remitted to the consumer protection fund which is hereby created in the state treasury.”).
305. State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wash. 1999) (“[T]he gravity of [defendant’s] violations is not limited just to the actual damages inflicted.”). 306. There is a compensatory aspect to these penalties, but they are discussed as “prevention” rather than compensation because they are paid to the state, not the victims. Punishment is certainly the primary goal. May Dep’t Stores Co., 849 P.2d at 809 (“[T]he civil penalty award goes to [Colorado’s] general fund, and thus, its purpose is not to make an injured party whole, but rather it is solely intended to punish the wrongdoer for its illegal acts.”).
308. See Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475-482 (describing factors to consider when assessing a penalty).
309. Id. at 480.
Penalties may be assessed against each individual perpetrator, as well as against the corporation for which the perpetrator works. Penalties may be assessed for each violation, even if practiced upon the same customer. These civil penalties can be thousands of dollars; a leading case from California involving the unauthorized practice of law, among other things, assessed $2,543,000 in civil penalties. Large as these amounts may be, they are defined as civil, and the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

C. Federal and State Crimes

1. Federal Crimes

The federal FTC Act is not a criminal statute, nor are most state UDAP laws. Some federal crimes may be implicated in the activities of notarios, including prohibitions against inappropriate interstate wire transfers, use of the federal postal service, use of government seals, and conspiracy.

When fraudster notarios resort to crimes like forgery, they wade into even deeper water. For example, a Floridian notario couple that ran a business called “Welcome to

310. See State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 439 (Wash. 1976) (“If a corporate officer participates in the conduct, or with knowledge approves of the conduct, then the officer, as well as the corporation, is liable for the penalties.”).
311. Id. at 436.
312. Id. at 436 n.12.
313. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 48-606(e) (allowing up to $5000 for a civil penalty); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.140 (allowing up to $100,000 for a civil penalty).
316. This is in contrast to RICO, which contemplates expressly criminal penalties including fines and incarceration.
318. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (providing a punishment of up to 15 years in jail for falsifying a government identification or other authentication feature). In the Immigration Services case discussed above, one count was brought for misuse of the United States seal. See supra Part II; Two Plead Guilty in Scheme to Defraud Consumers Seeking Immigration Services, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-civ-1041.html (describing fraud involving immigration forms).
America, Inc.” aggregated $4.5 million in fees charged for UPIL.319 They were ultimately found to have defrauded not only their clients but also the state government, which had issued drivers’ licenses based on the estimated 3,200 false immigration documents the couple had forged.320 In 2011, the Department of Justice investigated and prosecuted dozens of cases, obtaining “sentences up to eight years in prison and restitution of over $1.8 million.”321

2. State Crimes

Classic state criminal law is available as well, assuming the notario has the requisite mens rea. Criminal liability has the practical advantage of possibly triggering the victims’ restitution statutes previously described. It also is a powerful deterrent and social declaration that a practice is socially and morally unacceptable.

Most obvious are the crimes of theft and larceny,322 which can be a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the amount of money stolen.323 In particular, notaries are often guilty of theft on the theory of fraud committed by false pretenses or trick. In most states, the penalty for felony theft is incarceration for a period ranging between one and twenty years.324

Notarios commit the crimes of fraud or false pretenses if they intentionally hold themselves out as something they are not.325 Some statutes use the phrase “designedly” instead of “knowingly”—did the wrongdoer designedly use false pretenses to obtain property from another.326 That adverb catches the crime of the notario—by design he or she creates and capitalizes on the confusion and insecurity of immigrants, so that immigrants think they are taking responsible, correct, legal steps while actually falling into a premeditated trap.


320. Musgrave, supra note 319.


322. Larceny is committed when one person takes another’s property without his consent. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 19(a) (5th ed. 2010), False pretenses and larceny by trick are committed when the wrongdoer obtains the property from the owner by telling him lies. Id. The Model Penal Code “provides for an ambitious plan of consolidation of [these and other] smaller separate crimes into one larger crime called ‘theft.’” Id. § 19.8(d).

323. See id. § 19.4(b) (giving that the dollar amounts needed to escalate the crime into a felony is from $50 to $2000); KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIG. LEGAL RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT FRAUD: LAWS & RESOURCES 14-15 (2000) (noting that crimes against multiple victims may need to be aggregated to bring the value of the property taken into felony range); Langford, supra note 6, at 116, 130 (discussing these criminal issues in the notario context).


325. LAFAVE, supra note 322, § 19.7.

326. Id. §19.7(f)(1).
Other notario practices may lead to the commission of separate crimes like forgery, submission of false papers, extortion and assault. In many states, unauthorized practice of law is a misdemeanor and in some even a felony. In various states, making false or misleading statements when preparing immigration matters is a crime in and of itself. Many notario offices involve more than one person, opening the door for charges of conspiracy and aiding and abetting.

IV. Federal and State Regulation of Immigration Practice

In addition to remedial and deterrent measures, strong regulation of immigration practice—laws that define its scope, identify who is authorized to provide representation, and establish enforceable sanctions against violators—can play an important role in the battle against UPIL. The INA, the federal statute governing immigration, and its implementing regulations include rules that specifically govern immigration practice nationwide. Every state has its own statutes, which generally prohibit and punish the unauthorized practice of law and regulate notaries. Several states also have statutes that specifically prohibit UPIL. Because the federal government occupies the field of immigration law, state statutes regarding UPIL may be preempted; however, state rules which complement rather than conflict with federal rules potentially provide additional safeguards against UPIL. Conversely, state laws that are inconsistent with federal regulation create confusion and may foster UPIL rather than curtail it.

A. Federal Law

1. What Does Immigration Practice Mean?

The federal regulation scheme is conceptually simple in its precise definition of both the categories of individuals who may practice immigration law as well as the scope, nature, and circumstances under which non-attorneys may lawfully provide immigration services. The problem with the federal framework is that it comprises more than a dozen provisions scattered throughout the INA and its regulations, which must be read together to understand
it properly. Of course, most immigration consumers do not know how to locate the relevant provisions and are not trained in statutory and regulatory construction. In other words, federal law on UPIL is relatively clear for those who know how to find and interpret it, but confusing for those who do not.

Federal regulation defines “immigration practice” broadly as “the act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in person or through the preparation or filing of any brief or other document, paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before or with DHS, or any immigration judge, or the Board.” 331 Unless the context dictates otherwise, “case” is defined as

any proceeding arising under any immigration or naturalization law, Executive Order, or Presidential proclamation, or preparation for or incidental to such proceeding, including preliminary steps by any private person or corporation preliminary to the filing of the application or petition which any proceeding under the jurisdiction of [federal immigration agencies] is initiated. 332

The INA permits “service consisting solely of assistance in the completion of blank spaces on [government immigration] forms” if provided for free or at nominal cost and if the service provider “does not hold himself out as qualified in legal matters or in immigration and naturalization procedure.” 333 The term “representation” includes practice and preparation as described above. 334

These rules are useful in combating UPIL for at least two reasons. First, the definition of immigration practice is relatively precise and theoretically puts the public, including potential immigration practitioners and consumers, on notice as to what is permitted and what is not. Second, the definition is broad in that it encompasses not only acts performed in person at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) or DHS, but also work undertaken in preparing immigration applications and related documents, in filing them, or in conducting post-filing tasks. This definition prohibits the kind of activities in which notarios frequently engage, such as preparing documents which require formal training in immigration law and providing legal consultation or advice. Essentially, a licensed attorney or other federally authorized provider of immigration services must perform all work related to matters arising under immigration law.

331. 8 C.F.R. §1001.1(i) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1.2 (defining “practice”).
332. Id. §1001.1(g) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1.2. Similarly, the term “preparation, constituting practice, means the study of the facts of a case and the applicable laws, combined with the giving of advice and auxiliary activities, including the incidental preparation of [immigration-related] papers . . . .” Id. § 1001.1(k); see also id. § 1.2 (defining “preparation”).
333. Id. § 1001.1(k) (emphasis added); see also id. §1.2 (explaining what type of service is permitted).
334. Id. § 1001.1(m); see also id. § 1.2 (defining “representation”).
2. Who May Lawfully Practice Immigration Law?

Federal law limits immigration representation to six categories of individuals: (1) attorneys in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state;\textsuperscript{335} (2) specially accredited representatives acting as employees of “recognized agencies” authorized by the federal government to provide immigration assistance;\textsuperscript{336} (3) supervised, unpaid students enrolled in a law school clinic, with the consent of both the client and the adjudicator;\textsuperscript{337} (4) unpaid, supervised law graduates, again with the permission of the client and the adjudicator;\textsuperscript{338} (5) unpaid “reputable” non-attorneys of “good moral character” who have a pre-existing relationship with and the consent of the individual entitled to representation, and the adjudicator’s approval;\textsuperscript{339} and (6) unpaid, “reputable” individuals of “good moral character” who have no pre-existing relationship with person entitled to representation, if the adjudicator determines that adequate representation would not otherwise be available.\textsuperscript{340} Representatives must file a signed notice of appearance in every immigration matter and demonstrate that they fall within one of the prescribed categories.\textsuperscript{341}

\textit{a. Recognized Agency}\textsuperscript{342}

To become a “recognized agency” authorized by the government to represent individuals in immigration matters, a non-profit organization must file an application with the BIA which demonstrates that the agency is established in the United States, will not charge more than a nominal fee for immigration services, and “has at its disposal adequate knowledge, information, and experience” in immigration law.\textsuperscript{343} The BIA has held that “nominal,” although not defined as a specific dollar amount, typically means “a very small quantity” and is determined on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{344} The knowledge, information, and experience requirement is typically met if the organization proves that it is associated with an attorney competent in immigration law who can provide legal assistance and support to agency em-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{335} \textit{id.} § 1292.1(a)(1); see also \textit{id.} §1001.1(f) (defining “attorney”).
  \item \textsuperscript{336} \textit{id.} § 1292.1(a)(4).
  \item \textsuperscript{337} \textit{id.} § 1292.1(a)(2).
  \item \textsuperscript{338} \textit{id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{339} \textit{id.} § 1292.1(a)(3) (providing a non-exhaustive list of such individuals, including a relative, neighbor, clergyman, business associate or personal friend).
  \item \textsuperscript{340} \textit{id.} Categories 5 and 6 are particularly susceptible to abuse because they provide virtually no concrete guidance as to how an adjudicator should evaluate the identity of such individuals, whether they are qualified to provide competent—or even helpful—assistance, or how to evaluate with any degree of uniformity, the circumstances under which adjudicators should allow such representation.
  \item \textsuperscript{341} \textit{id.} § 1292.1(f).
  \item \textsuperscript{343} 8 C.F.R. §1292.2(a).
  \item \textsuperscript{344} Matter of American Paralegal Academy, Inc., 19 I. & N. Dec. 386, 387 (BIA 1986).
\end{itemize}
ployees, and has access to relevant legal materials, training, and practice updates. The BIA may order the withdrawal of an agency’s recognition for failing to maintain these qualifications.

b. Federally Accredited Representatives Employed by a Recognized Agency

A recognized agency may apply to the BIA for one or more non-attorney employees to become an “accredited representative,” permitted to practice before USCIS alone (partial accreditation) or before USCIS, immigration court, and the BIA (full accreditation). The accreditation application must describe the nature and extent of the work to be performed by proposed representatives, designate the category of accreditation sought, document their experience and knowledge of immigration law, and include letters of recommendation regarding their skills, ability, and good moral character.

Applications for accreditation must also show that the proposed representative is in regular contact with an expert immigration lawyer. Accredited representatives cannot receive personal remuneration and only retain accreditation while working for the same BIA-recognized non-profit organization under whose auspices they originally obtained the accreditation. In other words, accredited representatives cannot practice immigration law as private individuals, and their accreditation is not portable.

The BIA investigates and assesses whether the proposed representative meets the qualifications for the requested designation and issues a decision. Accreditation is valid for three years. An application for renewed accreditation must be affirmatively and timely filed, but accreditation remains valid until the Board makes a renewal decision. Applications for renewal must meet standards similar to those for initial accreditation.

3. Oversight and Discipline of Immigration Practitioners

The Board of Immigration Appeals bears primary responsibility for overseeing conduct by attorneys and non-attorneys authorized by regulation to provide legal assistance.

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346. 8 C.F.R. §1292.2(d).
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Matter of EAC, supra note 322, at 561-562 (analyzing application for accreditation).
349. See id. at 558-59 (describing the requirement of adequate knowledge and expertise).
350. 8 C.F.R. §1292.1(a).
351. Id. §1292.2(d).
352. Id.
353. Id.
in immigration matters. Although the Board may discipline immigration practitioners who assist unauthorized practice of law, it has no jurisdiction to discipline individuals, such as notarios, who are not covered by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1001.1(f) or 1292. Accordingly, discipline and sanction of those not authorized to practice immigration law are left to miscellaneous state and federal agencies such as the FTC, consumer fraud offices, bar associations, and notary boards, and to the civil and criminal courts, if an appropriate cause of action is filed by a government agency or an aggrieved individual.

The BIA publishes an online roster of recognized organizations and individual accredited representatives that is updated on a weekly basis. Additionally, the BIA publishes a list of currently and previously sanctioned immigration practitioners. Attorneys, accredited representatives, and others authorized to appear in immigration matters under 8 C.F.R. § 1292 may be sanctioned for misconduct. Disciplinary sanctions include disbarment, suspension, and censure. Numerous grounds for sanction exist, including assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, and, in the case of accredited representatives, law clinic students or law graduates, for receiving remuneration from a client.


Prescribed requirements for recognition and accreditation standards provide some degree of quality control among non-attorney immigration practitioners. Compliance with these requirements potentially yields increased access to competent representation in immigration matters, and theoretically decreases reliance on notarios and others engaged in UPIL. Accredited representatives and recognized agencies, however, are arguably subject to

354. Id. §§ 1003.1(d)(5) (describing power of the BIA to discipline attorneys and representatives), 1003.101-106 (providing the same), 1292.3 (providing the same); see also Matter of Gadda, 23 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649-50 (BIA 2003) (describing the BIA's authority to impose sanctions). Rules governing BIA complaints against are found at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.101; 1003.102(h), (k); 1003.103(c); 1003.104(a)(1), (b); 1003.105; 1003.106; 1003.107; 1292.3.
355. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.102(m) (providing that a person may be sanctioned for unauthorized practice of law).
356. See discussion supra Parts II, III (regarding remedies that individuals may pursue and regulation of notarios).
359. 8 C.F.R. §1003.101(b).
360. Id. § 1003.101(a).
361. Id. §1003.102.
362. Id. §1003.102(m).
363. Id. §§ 1003.102(a)(2), (3).
less scrutiny than attorneys who face regular review and possible discipline by both the BIA and state bar associations.

Applicants for initial accreditation and renewal of accreditation must satisfy broad criteria, such as demonstrated knowledge of and experience in immigration law as well as ongoing access to or supervision by a licensed attorney. Applicants for renewal must demonstrate that during the period since their previous BIA approval, they have kept abreast of developments in immigration law and practice and have been engaged in ongoing immigration training. Critics argue, however, that the requirements are vague and lack uniformity, as written and as applied, and are not always strictly enforced. To improve the system, Professor Careen Shannon and Emily Unger recommend amendments to federal regulation of accredited representatives. Both propose that the BIA develop and administer a competency exam, based on a standardized curriculum, to test applicants’ knowledge of immigration law and professional ethics, and require completion of specified additional training for reaccreditation. Unger also suggests that the BIA “post each applicant’s name, license number, accreditation status, sanction history, and photo on its website,” and “require accredited representatives to conspicuously display their name, license number, and the BIA web address in their office and . . . include this information on all contracts and receipts.” She points out these additional requirements “would allow consumers to check the status of a representative, prevent consultants from falsely claiming representation, and give consumers an easier mechanism to report abuses.” The virtue of these proposals is that they would provide uniformity in evaluating accreditation applications, enhance sound immigration law training of accredited representatives, offer consumers a relatively simple way to verify whether an individual is properly accredited, and facilitate the reporting of alleged abuses. Implementation of such proposals would also be cost-effective, requiring little or no additional cost to accreditation applicants or to the U.S. government, and has the potential to reduce the systemic costs involved in poor or fraudulent representation.

In sum, current federal regulation of immigration law practice must be fortified and should include measures such as those suggested above. As proposals for capacity-building initiatives become a reality, federal regulation of immigration practice will require amendments carefully tailored to balance the need for a larger pool of representatives with

364. See id. § 1292.2(d) (describing requirements for recognition).
367. Id. at 446 (suggesting changes to improve oversight of immigration practitioners); To License or Not to License, supra note 173, at 485 (discussing what can be done at the federal level to oversee the competency of immigration practitioners).
368. To License or Not to License, supra note 173, at 485.
369. Unger, supra note 366, at 447.
370. Id. at 448. Unger also suggests a campaign to educate immigrant communities about accreditation. Id.
the risk that expanded categories of individuals and organizations permitted to practice immigration law will create new opportunities for fraud.

B. State Regulation of Immigration Practitioners

Each state has its own rules for regulating the practice of law. States’ approaches to UPIL vary significantly from one another—and often from federal law—and typically do not apply outside the borders of each state.

In the context of UPIL, state rules fall into four general categories: (1) statutes that forbid the unauthorized practice of law generally, do not specifically address UPIL, and do not conflict with federal regulations; (2) statutes that forbid the unauthorized practice of law generally, do not specifically regulate UPIL, and do not conflict with federal rules; (3) statutes that specifically regulate immigration law practice and do not conflict with federal regulations; and (4) statutes that specifically regulate immigration law practice and do conflict with federal regulation.

1. Examples of State Regulation

a. Idaho

Idaho’s broad unauthorized practice of law statute forbids non-attorneys from providing any kind of legal assistance, thereby implicitly prohibiting the unauthorized practice of immigration law. Idaho’s blanket proscription has the virtue of simplicity: only licensed attorneys can practice law, including immigration law. Idaho courts have clarified that “the practice of law” includes not only the performance of legal services in matters pending in court but also “legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not [pending] in a court.”

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371. See Idaho Code Ann. §3-420 (forbidding individuals who have not been admitted or licensed to practice law in Idaho, or whose right or license to practice has been terminated, from practicing, acting, or holding themselves out as lawyers). A conviction for unlawful practice of law may result in a $500.00 fine, imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both, as well as a finding of being in contempt of court. Id. §§ 3-420, 3-104. Persons who have been admitted to practice law shall also be subject to suspension. Id. § 3-420; see also Idaho Bar Comm’n Rule 804 (1998) (authorizing the Idaho State Bar Counsel to investigate complaints of unauthorized practice of law, issue cease and desist letters, and maintain permanent records related to unauthorized practice of law).

372. See Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 879 P.2d 1124 (Idaho 1994) (holding that a self-proclaimed “public adjuster” who helped evaluate, investigate and settle civil claims had engaged in the unlawful practice of law); Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 335 P.2d 62, 64 (Idaho 1959) (holding that an individual who provided legal advice and drafted pleadings and a proposed order for filing in court had engaged in unlawful practice of law); State v. Wees, 58 P.3d 103, 106-07 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002) (finding Wees guilty of unauthorized practice of law because he interviewed and advised customers on legal issues, and helped them draft documents to file in state court).
Accordingly, Idaho precedent interprets “unauthorized practice of law” in a manner largely consistent with federal immigration law.\textsuperscript{373}

The Idaho statute, however, is inconsistent with federal rules that govern immigration law practice. Federal law affirmatively permits non-attorney representatives, accredited by the BIA and employed by BIA-recognized agencies, as well as attorneys in good standing in the bar of any state in the United States to represent individuals in immigration matters.\textsuperscript{374} Despite the state statute’s facial inconsistency with federal provisions, Idaho has generally respected federal rules governing immigration representation. Still, for the sake of clarity, the state should consider amending its unauthorized practice of law statute to include an explicit provision incorporating or referencing the federal rules on immigration practice.

\textbf{b. Washington}

Prompted by years of experience litigating against Washington state notarios, the Washington Attorney General’s Office, working with community-based organizations such as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, proposed a bill to eliminate statutory loopholes facilitating notario fraud and to strengthen penalties against offenders.\textsuperscript{375} The bill, eventually enacted as the Immigration Services Fraud Prevention Act of 2011,\textsuperscript{376} states, in relevant part, that “persons, other than those licensed to practice law in this state or otherwise permitted to practice law or represent others under federal law in an immigration matter, are prohibited from engaging in [immigration practice] . . .”\textsuperscript{377} The virtue of this language is its consistency with federal immigration law. The language could also serve as a model for an amendment to Idaho’s unauthorized practice of law statute to bring it into line with federal rules regarding immigration practitioners. The Washington amendments also eliminate the term “immigration assistant” from the previously existing legislation and provide harsher penalties for violators.\textsuperscript{378}

2. State Regulation of Notaries Public

State notary boards govern notaries. Some notarios are true renegades, who are not licensed notaries, rendering notary boards virtually helpless to punish them directly. Other

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{373} See supra Part IV.A (discussing federal law).
\item \textsuperscript{374} 8 C.F.R. § 1292.
\item \textsuperscript{376} WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.154.010 (2011) (describing the state legislature’s findings).
\item \textsuperscript{377} Id. § 19.154.060.
\item \textsuperscript{378} Id.; see also id. § 19.154.090(2) (describing penalties that may be imposed).
\end{itemize}
notarios are actual state notaries who overstep their power and commit UPIL. Licensing sanctions against them can be fairly effective. As Abrams and Fulghum observe, "[B]ecause the notary commission is often the ‘seal’ of legitimacy that notarios use as a pretense to present to practice law, taking away that symbol of authority is an effective way to shut them down." Some notary laws specifically address notario deception in the immigration context, including whether or not notaries may use Spanish translations of the phrase “notary public.” Violations of such provisions sometimes carry criminal penalties and serve as the basis for injunctions. Those states that forbid the use of the word “notario” by notaries advertising their services have effectively decided that its use is per se deceptive. A flat ban on using the term allows little room for interpretive ambiguities, so violations are more readily provable. The proscription has the added benefit of preventing harm committed by notarios not directly in front of the court.

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND EFFECTIVE REPORTING MECHANISMS

Immigration consumers who are educated about the dangers of UPIL are more likely to avoid it. Ideally, an education campaign not only underscores the potentially adverse consequences of hiring a notario, it also teaches how to identify and report suspected UPIL for investigation and possible legal action; whether affordable and competent representation


380. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-367(A) (2000) (providing that any notary public who advertises in a language other than English shall post a notice in that language “I am not an attorney and cannot give legal advice about immigration or other legal matters”); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-42-2-2 (prohibiting notaries from taking acknowledgement of persons that do not understand English). Violation is a class six felony and results in permanent revocation of the notary’s commission. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-367(B). This law demonstrates the difficulty of the problem—a true scoundrel, not even a notary, would not be covered.

381. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-109-102 (2005) (making it unlawful for a person to advertise services using the terms “notario,” “notario publico” or other similar terms unless they meet the definition provided for by law); CAL. GOV. CODE § 8219.5 (1976) (giving requirements for advertising in languages other than English and the posting of notices related to legal advice and fees); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-55-110.3 (2004) (describing advertisement of services, the unauthorized practice of law and prohibited conduct); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2AA (2005) (prohibiting the phrase “poder notarial”); IND. CODE § 33-42-2-10; (2007) (covering fraudulent advertising and misrepresentation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-121 (2006) (giving requirements for notaries advertising in foreign languages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 960 (2006) (discussing advertisement of services); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 55.291 (2006) (setting forth requirements for the advertisement of services); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 64.105.03 (2004) (discussing notaries public, unauthorized practice of law and prohibited behavior); NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.085 (2005) (covering advertisements in a language other than English if the notary public is not an attorney); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-12A-15 (2003) (covering the unauthorized practice of law); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49 § 6 (2003) (discussing the provision of legal advice); TEX. GOV. CODE § 406.017 (2001) (covering representation as an attorney); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 137.01 (2013) (covering notaries).

382. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-5-3.7 (2013) (providing that the notario publico designation is a Class A misdemeanor in Indiana).
by lawyers or federally accredited representatives is locally available, and; about potential immigration, civil and criminal remedies.

A. Non-governmental and Community-Based Organizations

Until relatively recently, efforts to educate immigrant communities about notario fraud were mainly localized and relied on non-governmental community based groups. During the last half-dozen years, however, non-governmental organizations with a national reach, such as the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) and the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), have created resources to combat UPIL through broader, more coordinated public education initiatives and to assist community-based groups that work with immigrants. Education materials prepared by ILRC and CLINIC teach immigrants about adverse consequences of notario fraud and how to identify, avoid, and report UPIL. They include posters, cartoon booklets, talking points and PowerPoint presentations, and suggestions for skits and role-playing—particularly popular and effective in communities where immigrants may not be literate. The organizations’ resources are free, simple to understand, accurate, and easy to adapt to the needs of specific audiences. Materials are available in multiple languages, including English, Spanish, Haitian Creole, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, Serbian, Croatian, Tagalog, Farsi, and Urdu.

B. Professional Organizations

Professional organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) have become involved in educating their members as well as immigration consumers about how to identify, report, and take action against UPIL. In just the last year, AILA has undertaken an ambitious program of

anti-notario education, which includes the development and nationwide dissemination of multi-media public service announcements (PSAs) at no charge for use in immigrant communities.\textsuperscript{387} AILA also assists groups with press contacts and instructions for how to place PSAs.\textsuperscript{388}

State and local bar associations have also stepped up to the plate. The New York State Bar Association and the New York City Bar Association, in particular, have undertaken comprehensive education of its members and the broader public. Prompted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert Katzmann’s Study Group on Immigrant Representation\textsuperscript{389} and drawing on the expertise of the New York City Legal Aid Society, New York State Legal Services Corporation, and numerous other organizations, both bar associations have conducted and published studies, presented results in public venues, and made specific recommendations for action.\textsuperscript{390}

C. Federal Government Agencies

Since 2009, three federal agencies—the FTC, USCIS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—have implemented education and capacity-building initiatives.\textsuperscript{391} Based in part on information obtained during such collaborative efforts, the FTC and DOJ, along with state Attorney General offices, have filed legal complaints against notarios, sometimes rooted in evidence provided by USCIS and the Department of Homeland Security’s HSI. USCIS, the FTC, and DOJ have launched aggressive campaigns highlighting the problem of UPIL and suggesting ways to report it, including informational websites, flyers, and tweets.\textsuperscript{392}
Governments of other countries have also begun to educate their citizens living in the United States about UPIL. Consular officials in some states have forged relationships with United States and state government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs) and attorneys on anti-notario efforts aimed at identifying local notarios, teaching how to report fraud, and providing information on legitimate service providers.393 For instance, Mexico’s Secretary of Exterior Relations (SRE) and the Center of Information about the Realities of Migration (CIAM) recently issued a Spanish language flyer warning immigrants to be wary of notarios who try to persuade consumers that the U.S. Congress has already enacted comprehensive immigration reform and who promise to secure green cards for a price.394 The flyer includes the web address of a USCIS Spanish language website with immigration law updates and information about how to denounce immigration fraud.395 Additionally, the flyer includes a CIAM phone number that Mexican nationals can call with inquiries about immigration law and notario abuse in the United States.396

D. State Governments

State governments are increasingly active in educating immigration consumers about notario fraud.397 Some State Attorney General (AG) offices, typically through their consumer fraud divisions, have not only developed educational resources about UPIL for immigrants, they have additionally begun to serve as conduits for accepting notario fraud complaints and funneling them to the appropriate state or federal agency for follow-up action.

E. Collaboration Between the Private and Public Sectors

Collaboration among federal and state governmental agencies, national and local non-governmental groups, and professional organizations are particularly welcome developments. Coordinated approaches not only raise community awareness of UPIL, they maxi-

393. In Boise, Idaho, for example, the Mexican consulate has collaborated with federal and state authorities, CBOs, and private attorneys in anti-UPIL initiatives. See infra notes 401-06 and accompanying text.
395. Id.
396. Id.
mize the potential for increased reporting, enforcement activity, successful court action, and capacity-building. In Washington state, for example, public and private cooperation not only resulted in successful civil prosecution but also the development of legislation that more effectively addresses notario fraud than its predecessor statutes.

Some public-private partnerships are geared toward attorneys, while others reach out to community groups that work with immigrants. “Reaching Victims of Notario Fraud,” produced and presented by several national and local non-government actors—the Immigration Advocates Network (IAN), ILRC, the ABA, the law office of Abrams and Abrams, and the FTC is an excellent example of a collaboration aimed at both audiences.

Other initiatives are designed to communicate information directly to immigrant consumers. For instance, in Idaho, Catholic Charities of Idaho, USCIS, pro bono attorneys, the Idaho Legal Action Network, and local radio stations work together on programs that explain how to identify common signs of UPIL, the dangers of relying on notario, and how to report suspected abuse.

In 2012, in Boise, Idaho, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and USCIS hosted several meetings that brought together diverse public and private actors engaged in anti-notario work. In addition to the U.S. Attorney and USCIS, participants included representatives of federal and state agencies—the FTC, HSI, and the Office of the Idaho Attorney General—and non-state actors—the University of Idaho Immigration Law Clinic, representatives of the Idaho Bar Association’s Office of Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Volunteer Lawyers Program, Idaho refugee resettlement agencies, community-based and religious organizations with immigrant constituencies, and members of the private bar. Representatives of the Mexican Consulate in Boise also attended.

The meetings had three purposes: (1) to better understand the scope of each participant’s work in combating notario fraud; (2) to share concerns and observations about specific instances of suspected UPIL, and; (3) to provide a foundation for future exchange of information and reporting about suspected UPIL, collaboration in pursuing legal actions.

398. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 34, at 56 (discussing the successes of these efforts).
401. Meeting Agenda, Office of the U.S. Attorney for Idaho (Jan. 25, 2012) (on file with authors); Letter of Invitation to Participate in UPIL Outreach Meetings from Robert Mather, USCIS Denver District Director to author (Aug. 16, 2012) (on file with authors).
402. Id.
403. Id.
against alleged notarios, and development of coordinated education and capacity-building initiatives. The meetings prompted subsequent presentations by USCIS, the U.S. Attorney for Idaho, the Idaho Deputy Attorney General for Consumer Fraud, HSI, and non-governmental experts at a variety of venues in immigrant communities. A primary objective of these presentations was to familiarize immigration consumers not only with the dangers of UPIL but also to build constructive relationships among consumers, advocates, and representatives of government agencies that are critical to successful anti-notario efforts. In the last two years, successful governmental and non-governmental face-to-face initiatives have occurred with greater frequency throughout the United States.

F. The Need to Strengthen Links Between Anti-Notario Education and Effective Procedures to Report and Follow-Up Suspected Fraud

Although collaborative government and non-government initiatives to educate immigration consumers and advocates about the dangers of UPIL have made great strides, more attention must be paid to the attendant need to develop simple and effective guidance about procedures for reporting, monitoring, and assisting victims with potential legal recourse.

Currently, no uniform method exists to file, process or track individual notario complaints or to share information among government and non-governmental actors. In a welcome development, however, the FTC's Consumer Sentinel Network, which accepts consumer complaints, including allegations of notario fraud, recently expanded its roster of registered agencies and the ability of those agencies to search reports more easily across a greater number of databases. Member agencies are restricted to government entities including many international, foreign, federal, state, and local government agencies. Current members include ICE, the EOIR's immigration courts, the U.S. Postal Service, consumer fraud and law enforcement offices in numerous states and localities, several foreign law enforcement agencies, and other entities active in addressing notario fraud. Although the Sentinel Network neither resolves nor necessarily tracks individual cases, it can now rely on

404. Id. Since these meetings, anecdotal evidence suggests a rise in reporting of notario activity to government agencies by immigrants and their attorneys and by CBOs.
406. See COHEN, supra note 34, at 63-64.
409. Organization Registration, supra note 408.
government agencies to detect patterns of UPIL reports, thus facilitating investigation and prosecution.

The Sentinel Network appears to have no mechanism to provide follow-up and assistance directly to most individuals or any publicly available protocols for monitoring particular notarios, even those who have been found liable for fraud.

Reporting mechanisms are now increasingly available to individual immigration consumers through multiple federal and state agencies, and information about how and where to file complaints has been integrated into most public education campaigns. For example, in addition to the FTC, USCIS, the EOIR, states attorney general, the ABA, and state and local bar associations and nongovernmental networks have developed websites with instructions about how to report allegations of notario fraud. Some government and non-government agencies have also started to cross-reference offices that accept UPIL complaints. Cross-linking among public and private sectors is useful because it can facilitate information sharing among different entities active in anti-notario work and expands the possibility that a victim will actually receive assistance.

The recently published Notario Fraud Manual provides excellent practical guidance for reporting. The Manual includes model templates for gathering information from alleged victims and examples of well-drafted UPIL complaints. Importantly, the Manual also discusses how to generally assist victims, to understand the positive aspects of filing a complaint as well as its shortcomings, and, specifically, to help individual immigration consumers assess the potential pros and cons of reporting.410

Recent efforts notwithstanding, the bottom line is that mechanisms for reporting, tracking, and resolving cases of suspected notario fraud are piecemeal and thus are not as useful as they could be. The absence of regularized follow up and resolution also minimizes the incentives for reporting fraud. As a practical matter, education about UPIL will be primarily preventive in nature until more regularized, coordinated, and transparent procedures for reporting and tracking complaints and providing direct assistance to victims are developed.

410. See Notorio Fraud Remedies, supra note 78, at 13-25, 75-90, App. I.A, III (discussing information gathering, complaints and referrals).
VI. Capacity Building

Chief among the reasons for the persistence of UPIL is the scarcity of affordable and competent legal representation in immigration matters. The INA provides a right to immigration counsel but only at no cost to the federal government. Accordingly, efforts to increase the availability of quality counsel focus on building capacity in the private sector. Non-governmental organizations play a central role in capacity building, and, increasingly, federal and state agencies provide training for pro bono attorneys and accredited representatives to facilitate free immigration representation. Capacity-building initiatives typically fall into one or more of the following categories: formation of volunteer attorney networks at local, state, and federal levels; development of pro bono programs by the federal courts and the BIA to expand appellate representation of immigrants; creation of law school clinics; and building and strengthening federally recognized non-profit organizations and increasing the number and quality of their accredited representatives. The ABA, AILA, and private attorneys have also recently established pro bono training and opportunities for attorneys interested in helping immigration consumers defrauded by UPIL.

A. Volunteer Attorney Networks Organized by Non-Profit and Professional Groups

Since at least the 1980s, non-profit and professional organizations such as the ABA, AILA, and state and local bar associations have become increasingly active in establishing or supporting programs that focus on training and coordinating pro bono and low-cost attorneys to represent financially-eligible immigrants in various kinds of cases. Some of the earliest initiatives emphasized representation of individuals in deportation proceedings who were seeking asylum because of political repression and civil war in their home countries. Recent efforts also include representation of undocumented survivors of domestic violence and other statutorily enumerated crimes, unaccompanied minors, and detainees.

Pro bono immigration work can be beneficial for private attorneys and firms for several reasons. First, immigration cases often provide lawyers with the opportunity to develop important lawyering skills. They typically require client interviews and preparation, working with expert witnesses in diverse fields, motion and brief writing practice, and significant courtroom experience. In addition, as more states move toward mandatory or aspirational pro bono requirements, attorneys have a greater incentive to take on volunteer representation of immigrants. Asylum applicants and victims of domestic violence, crime, and traffick-

ing who may qualify for legal status under the INA as well as individuals whose removal would result in family separation are typically seen as the most sympathetic clients. Particularly in an anti-immigrant political environment, private attorneys and firms that might otherwise be hesitant to handle immigration cases may be more willing to provide representation to individuals likely eligible for these forms of relief. Many lawyers also find that providing legal assistance to some of the most vulnerable individuals who would not otherwise have representation is uniquely rewarding. Further, attorneys interested in other cultures, languages, and parts of the world often enjoy pro bono representation of immigrants.

Models for pro bono immigration networks vary but typically have the following features: (1) a strategy for recruiting volunteer lawyers; (2) intake and screening of potential pro bono clients according to case type, level of difficulty, and income conducted by experienced attorneys or accredited representatives; (3) a foundational training program and regular follow-up trainings in particular skills or substantive areas of law; (4) matching of attorneys with no previous practice in immigration law with more experienced mentor attorneys who can help oversee the progress of the case, provide assistance with preparation tasks, and sometimes, serve as second-chair.

Volunteer attorney networks operate in most states, although some groups are very small. Most are limited with respect to both the kinds of cases they accept and their geographic reach. In Idaho, for example, a group of attorneys, students, faculty, community-based and religious organizations, Idaho Legal Aid Services, the Boise Mexican consulate and the Idaho State Bar Volunteer Lawyer Program (IVLP), concerned with the dearth of competent, affordable representation in removal proceedings came together in 2009 to develop a pro bono program that held its first training and accepted its first cases in January 2010.413 Because Idaho is largely rural and its capital, Boise, has the largest concentration of attorneys as well as the state’s only immigration court, representation is largely limited to immigrants residing in the greater Boise area.414 The Idaho network typically accepts cases involving removal proceedings in which individuals have relatively straightforward claims for relief based on cancellation of removal, asylum, family-based adjustment of status, and the Violence Against Women Act.415

414. One of the authors helped establish a pro bono program in New York City during the late 1980s and Idaho’s volunteer network, and can state with confidence that the hurdles for creating organized pro bono representation in a rural region with little public transportation or major highways are more daunting in every respect. Lawyers’ offices are far-flung, attorneys often have to drive long distances to attend trainings and immigration court hearings, and clients frequently live in isolated areas without access to transportation. Attorneys in rural areas are typically solo practitioners or belong to very small law offices. Rural lawyers also often have little financial cushion or the time required to take on deportation cases, which are usually time-consuming.
415. See French, supra note 413, at 33-34.
While the Idaho effort is relatively recent, volunteer attorney initiatives to represent immigrants have been in existence in other areas, especially urban areas, for much longer. In New York and San Francisco, for example, such pro bono networks date back to the early 1980s. New York recently announced ambitious new programs, to be implemented through public and private partnerships, which will provide additional representation to immigrants in removal proceedings, especially to detainees and those living outside of metropolitan areas.  

1. Pro Bono Programs Created by the Federal Courts of Appeal: The Ninth Circuit Example

A number of federal courts have created pro bono programs designed to increase appellate representation for low-income or indigent individuals in a variety of matters, including immigration. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has one of the most ambitious pro bono programs. It was established in 1993 to provide “pro bono counsel to pro se parties with meritorious or complex appeals, to provide a valuable learning experience to young attorneys and law students, and to assist the court in processing pro se civil appeals more equitably and efficiently.” During the last decade, immigration matters have become an increasingly large part of the pro bono docket.

Cases are pre-screened by court staff attorneys. Those selected for the program typically “present[] issues of first impression or some complexity or otherwise warranting further briefing and oral argument.” The court’s pro bono staff works with members of the bar association and law school clinics to recruit qualified volunteers to handle the cases chosen for the program. Attorneys who participate in the program gain valuable appellate experience, including a guaranteed oral argument.

The Ninth Circuit pro bono program has created a win-win situation: it helps expand quality representation for indigent individuals, provides attorneys and law clinic students with an unparalleled opportunity to hone their appellate skills, and helps manage the court’s burgeoning pro se caseload. The need for the program is particularly evident in immigration matters. As of 2005, immigration cases comprised approximately 48% of the Ninth Circuit’s

418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 5-6.
421. Id.
docket, which, evidence suggests, has remained roughly consistent since then. Recognizing the complexity of most immigration appeals, the Ninth Circuit facilitates more effective pro bono representation by publishing a comprehensive outline, which synthesizes precedent decisions in procedural and substantive areas of immigration law, and has developed an arrangement with staff attorneys at the ILRC to mentor pro bono attorneys representing immigrant petitioners for review.

2. The BIA

Established in 2001, the BIA Pro Bono Project initially focused on increasing pro bono representation for pro se detainees who sought BIA review of immigration judge decisions or wanted to respond to an ICE appeal. The project’s scope was later expanded to increase pro bono representation for non-detainees. The project matches selected unrepresented appellants with volunteer lawyers, with the goal that attorney involvement in writing an appeal brief will provide higher quality appeals and, thus, facilitate “a smoother and more effective case review by the Board.” It relies on a BIA Pro Bono Program Coordinator “who spends about 10% of his work year on the project,” and an office paralegal who “devotes approximately 30% of her time to the project,” thus avoiding interference with their assigned responsibilities. Volunteer and contract attorneys from the private bar, including lawyers with CLINIC, AILA, and National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, help screen and review cases for placement with pro bono attorneys. Although a positive contribution to capacity-building efforts, the BIA program can assist just a small fraction of those who need help with appeals to the BIA.

B. Federally Recognized Programs and Accredited Representatives

Creating federally recognized programs with trained and accredited non-attorney representatives is an important piece of increasing competent free or low cost representation in immigration cases. CLINIC has been a major player in facilitating the growth of recognition and accreditation initiatives nationwide. In addition to providing immigration law train-

424. See id. at 4 (listing non-detained cases as one category the project now covers).
425. Id. at 2.
426. Id. at 3.
427. Id. at 3.
428. For example, from June 2003 through May 2004, the project screened 421 cases of which ninety-nine were selected to match with pro bono counsel. Id. at 22. Ninety lawyers indicated a desire to represent the pro se appellant and only forty-seven filed notices to appear as counsel of record. Id.
ing and support for recognition and accreditation in Catholic Charities offices across the country, CLINIC provides assistance to other community-based organizations seeking federal recognition and accreditation of qualified employees. Among other capacity building resources, CLINIC created an online "Toolkit for BIA Recognition and Accreditation," which provides a step-by-step guide for successfully applying for recognition and accreditation, self-directed e-learning courses, trainings, and webinars on the fundamentals of immigration law, and links to additional resources.\textsuperscript{429} CLINIC also publishes a comprehensive online manual entitled "Managing an Immigration Program: Steps for Creating and Increasing Legal Capacity."\textsuperscript{430} ILRC also offers excellent training resources, including 40-hour on-site courses for individuals seeking accreditation.\textsuperscript{431} Private and not-for-profit attorneys, the ABA, AILA, and state and local bar associations also offer trainings for individuals employed by recognized agencies who seek accreditation and provide supervision for already accredited representatives.

The Executive Office for Immigration Review publishes practical suggestions about the recognition and accreditation processes, including its "Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about the Recognition and Accreditation (R&A) Program" and publicly available power-point presentations.\textsuperscript{432} Finally, USCIS offers useful information about recognition and accreditation.\textsuperscript{433}

\section{Law School Clinics}

Most U.S. law schools run legal clinics which provide students the opportunity to represent clients in actual cases or other legal matters for indigent or low-income individuals and communities under the supervision of law professors who are licensed attorneys. Law clinics allow students to learn how to be attorneys through structured and intensive hands-on experience in applying theory and doctrine to facts that involve real clients, while also increasing access to justice for those most in need. Clinics aim to instill in students an appreciation of the importance of pro bono service. Approximately 115 of the country's law schools

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\item \textsuperscript{430} \textit{Starting a Legal Immigration Program}, \textit{supra} note 411.
\item \textsuperscript{431} \textit{BIA Accreditation}, \textsc{Immigr. Legal Res. Ctr.}, http://www.ilrc.org/info-on-immigration-law/bia-accreditation (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
\end{itemize}
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now offer immigration clinics.\textsuperscript{434} Most of these are live client clinics in which students represent immigrants in venues that include USCIS, immigration courts, the BIA, and the federal courts. Although these clinics meet only a tiny fraction of the need for representation in immigration matters, they have a multiplier effect because participants often go on to practice immigration law full- or part-time, take on pro bono immigration cases, clerk for judges who hear immigration-related matters, find employment in government agencies that require knowledge of immigration law, or become involved in capacity-building initiatives in other ways.\textsuperscript{435}

**Conclusion**

The notario problem has been likened to the arcade game “Whac-a-Mole,” in which “each time an adversary is ‘whacked’ it pops up again somewhere else.”\textsuperscript{436} In the UPIL context, subduing the mole requires sustained, collaborative action, strategic teamwork, and a variety of tools.

The approach we have outlined includes remedial, compensatory, preventive, and deterrent legal methods as well as broader advocacy techniques. We call for a more coherent process for reporting allegations of notario fraud, expanding and rationalizing opportunities for victims to obtain legal redress, and improving the regulation of immigration law practice. Equally important to an effective anti-notario strategy are targeted community education initiatives coupled with practical guidance for immigration consumers who seek not only to avoid scams but also to find remedies for harm already inflicted. Finally, an effective campaign against UPIL must include further development of capacity-building programs to meet the demand for competent immigration representation.

These measures are increasingly urgent in light of current immigration reform proposals, which are likely to contain opportunities for several million immigrants to apply for lawful immigration status—and therefore, an unparalleled opportunity for fraudsters to take advantage of immigration consumers. Through its explanation of existing strategies to combat UPIL, identification of their strengths and weaknesses, and recommendations for improvement, we hope that this article contributes to the fortification of anti-notario initiatives.


\textsuperscript{435} The Idaho Immigration Law Pro Bono Network, for example, got off the ground with the help of former University of Idaho Immigration Law Clinic interns. See French, supra note 413.
