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Brennan v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39391

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PETER BRENNAN,
Petitioner, Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

OCT 23 10 00

NO. 39391

PETITIONER - APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF



APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE TIMOTHY L. HANSEN
District Judge

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PRO SE PETER BRENNAN
PETITIONER - APPELLANT

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Wolff vs. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 (1974);

§§ 9:19 - 9:22 U.S.

Key vs. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083 (8th cir 1999);

Ciono vs. Selsky 238 F3d 223 (2d cir 2001);

Ayers vs. Ryan 152 F.3d 77 (2d cir 1998);

Colon vs Howard 215 F3d 227 (2d cir 2000);

Sanders vs. U.S. 373 U.S. 183 S. Ct 1068 10 Ed 2d 148 (1963);

Taylor vs. Rodriguez 238 F3d 188 (2d cir 2001);

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Thompson vs. Poul 547 F.3d 1055, 1055, 1058, 59 (9th cir 2008);

Moore vs. Zant 885 F2d 1497 (11th cir 1989);

Hemstreet vs. Greiner 367 F.3d 135 (2d cir 2004);

Barreto Barreto vs. U.S. 551 F.3d 95 (1st cir 2008);

U.S vs Miller 557 F supp 2d 487 (D. Del 2008);

Hibbert vs. U.S. 2009 WL 23 54 79 (S:D Miss 2009);

Davis vs U.S 417 U.S 333, 342 94 S.Ct. 2298 412 Ed2d 109 (1974)

Lowary vs. U.S 599 F 2d 218 221 (7th cir 1979);

Vaughan vs. Estelle 671 F2d 152, 153 (5th cir 1982);

JONES vs Estelle, 722 F2d 159, 171, (5th cir 1983);

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Peter Brennan appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for Post Conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Brennan pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a minor. (R. PP. 3-4:32) The district court sentenced Brennan to a 25-year unified sentence with the first 10 years fixed. (R. PP. 32.) The district court denied Brennan's subsequent Rule 35 request for reduction of sentence. (R. PP. 32-33) Brennan did not appeal his underlying sentence or the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R. PP. 4-33)

Statement of the fact and course of Post Conviction Proceedings

Brennan filed a Pro se "Successive Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief" within one year of the court's order denying his Rule 35 motion but more than two years following the entry of the Amended Judgment of Conviction and Commitment" (R. PP. 3-15, 33) He claimed his counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion and at his sentencing (R. PP. 4-5).

The district court filed an order denying Brennan's request for appointment of counsel in the post conviction action and notice of intent to dismiss the petition. (R. PP. 31-35)

The court found Brennan's application for post conviction relief was untimely as it related to his underlying sentence and Brennan's Rule 35 motion did not extend the time for filing his petition under the facts presented. (R. PP. 33-34) It further found Brennan had failed to "assert facts sufficient to raise the assistance of counsel" (R. P. 34)

Brennan filed a response to the courts notice of intent to dismiss, asserting there was no time limit on a successive petition for Post Conviction relief, (R.P.36.) Brennan then conceded the district court "may be correct in denying appointment of counsel," but contended "the real issue here is a violation of the Petitioner's (sic) Fourteenth Amendment (sic) guaranteeing the petitioner his right to due Process (sic) (id)

The district court filed an order dismissing Brennan's pro se successive petition for Post Conviction relief as untimely finding Brennan had presented nothing in either his petition or response tending to show that his circumstances fall within those situations where the equitable tolling doctrine would apply" (R.P.42)

Brennan timely appeals from the order dismissing his petition. (R.P.P.44-48)

ISSUE

Brennan states the issues on appeal as:

1. Did the District Court issue an order to waive attorney client privilege allow Mr [] Brennan to present his factual support to his allegation/claims?
2. Did the District Court error in not issue (sic) an order to waive attorney client privilege?
3. Did the District Court error (sic) in dismissing Mr [] Brennan's successive petition for Post Conviction relief?
4. Did the District Court error in not granting the States motion for scheduling order waiver of attorney client privilege and response to motion for appointed counsel?

ARGUMENT

Mr. Brennan, argues that the District Court failed to consider the State's motion for Scheduling order waiver of attorney client Privilege to allow Mr Brennan to Present his factual support to his allegation / claims Mr Brennan insist that the District court would have Prevent a violation of his fourteenth Amendment the to due Process Because in Mr Brennan's petition for Post conviction relief he alleged that his attorney Mr. John Sutton did not inform him that his Rule 35 was denied Mr Brennan's also alleged the he was informed in Person by Mr John Sutton on January 7th 2011 That his Rule 35 was denied and that Mr John Sutton failed to inform him that he didn't file his Post conviction Petition The District court didnt give Mr Brennan a genuine opportunity to Present his factual support claims by not Issuing an Order to waive attorney client privilege A Claim of ineffective assistance of Counsel may properly be brought under the Post conviction Procedure act. Murray v. State 121 Idaho 918, 924 25 828 P.2d 1323 1329-30 (Ct App 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of Counsel Claim the defendant must show that the attorney's Performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced the deficiency. Strickland vs. Washington see U.S. v. ATKINS 250 F3d 1203 (8th Cir 2001).

The District court is required to make findings of fact and rule on unresolved objections to the Presentence report.

Here are the two important supreme Court case govern due Process rights for Prisoners:

In the first case wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539 (1974) the Supreme Court found that when prisoners lose good time credits because of a disciplinary offense, they are entitled to: (1) written notice of the disciplinary violation; (2) the right to call witnesses at their hearing (3) a written statement of the reasons for being found guilty and (5) a fair and impartial decision maker in the hearing.

The second important Supreme Court case Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) however, sharply limits the holding of Wolff and sets higher standard that you have to meet in order to show that you have a liberty interest. "If you don't have a liberty interest, then the Prison doesn't have to provide you with any process at all. Any prisoner alleging a violation of due process should first read Sandin. In Sandin, a prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation for 30 days and was not allowed to have witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. But the court in Sandin found that unless the punishment an inmate receives is an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Then there is no right to the five procedures laid out above, taken from Wolff. "Atypical" means that the way you were treated has to be much different than the way most prisoners are treated. "Significant hardship" means that treatment must be really awful not just uncomfortable or annoying.

This means that if you want to argue that you should have been given the rights laid out in Wolff, you must show that your punishment was extremely harsh. Frequently, short periods of solitary confinement, "keeplock" or loss of privileges will not be considered harsh enough to create a liberty interest for example in Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir 1999) the court found that 24 hours in shackles was not severe enough to violate due process. On the other hand, the second circuit has found that 305 days in solitary confinement in one case, and 762 days in another, were severe enough to create a liberty interest.

You can read Ciano v. Selsky 238 F.3d 223 (2d Cir 2001) and Colon v Howard 215 F.3d 227 (2d Cir 2000) to get sense of how to make this type of claim.

Although Sandin changed the law in important ways the Supreme Court did not say they were overruling Wolff. This means that when you can show that there is a liberty interest" at stake (much harder to prove under Sandin) the right guaranteed by Wolff still apply. In other words, if a decision by prison officials results in conditions that are severe enough to meet the significant and atypical" standard, the prison must give the inmate procedures like hearing and a chance to present evidence.

Courts have found due process violations when prisoners are disciplined without the chance to get witness testimony have a hearing or present evidence. Courts have also found due process violations when punishment is based on vague claims of gang affiliation. Some cases in which these types of claims were successfully made are: Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77 (2d Cir 1998); Taylor v. Rodriguez 238 F.3d 188 (2d Cir 2001) and Hatch v. District of Columbia 188 F.3d 846 (DC Cir 1999). On the other hand, it is also true the court will not require the prison to call witnesses when calling additional witnesses would be unnecessary or irrelevant. Kalwasinski v. Morse 201 F.3d 103 (2d Cir 1999).

The facts in Mr Brennan's case here are much like those in Walff v. McDannell 418 U.S. 539 (1974) U.S. Supreme Court.

Mr. Brennan argues that it is clear here that the District Court error in not issuing an order to waive attorney-client privilege to give Mr Brennan a genuine opportunity to present his factual support to his claim in the open court.

The district court held that Mr Brennan's post conviction petition was barred by the statute of limitations but Mr Brennan still insists that this case fail on the merits and that this court must hold only that the claims fail on the merits and any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul 547 F.3d 1055, 1055-1058, 59 (9th Cir 2008) and therefore decline to express any view as to whether Mr Brennan's claims are barred by the statute of limitation the court must hold only that the claim fail on the merits.

Because most prison inmates like Mr Brennan lack legal counsel and have little hope of obtaining professional assistance, a great many petitions for collateral relief are filed by inmates themselves. These pro se pleadings are usually poorly drawn, substituting for specific factual allegations an endless legal argument buttressed by citation to an equally endless string of irrelevant cases. Consequently they often fail to present claims well or in proper form or pass over issues altogether and in the main they receive short shrift in the courts. The result is that attorneys may come into cases after their inmate

clients have already unsuccessfully sought relief on their own. The following sections address the extent to which prior post conviction petitions may affect subsequent proceedings. Specifically, the questions are two: the consideration a federal court will give to a subsequent application presenting the same ground relied upon unsuccessfully in a prior petition that presents a new ground that was not but could have been included in an earlier application for relief.

Hemstreet v. Greiner 387 F.3d 135 (2d Cir 2004) Judgment vacated on reconsideration on other grounds 378 F.3d 265 (2d Cir 2004).

Barreto-Borretto v. U.S. 551 F.3d 95 (1st Cir 2008).

U.S. v. Miller 557 F Supp. 2d 487 (D. Del 2008)

Hibbert v. U.S. 2009 WL 235479 (S.D. Miss 2009).

The proper treatment of post conviction petitions challenging federal or state convictions that raise claims that were or should have been presented on direct review of the original criminal judgment is a matter different from yet related to the problems treated in this and following section. In that context, a federal petitioner's failure to raise such claims before the appellate court is viewed as a procedural default, which may foreclose later collateral review - according to the standards established by the relevant decisions. See Ch 6; § 7:25. At the same time the standards for cutting off claims because of procedural default

blur into those considered here for rejecting successive petitions for collateral relief. The court has made it clear that the issues are essentially the same in each instance. See Davis v. U.S. 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S. Ct. 2298 41 L. Ed 2d 109 (1974) (applying the standard for appraising successive 2255 motion in a

Case in which the prior treatment of the movant's case was on direct review rather than in an earlier application for 2255 relief)

See § 2:18 Nor, in all fairness can it be seriously proposed the statutes force successive applications for relief on the theory that in cases in which the petitioner failed to appeal from a prior unfavorable judgment a federal court's willingness to entertain a subsequent application raising the same claim would effectively extend the time limit for seeking direct review. See Lawary v. U.S. 599 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir 1979) (Collecting cases adopting such a rationale but failing to apply it in the case at bar).

also see Vaughan v. Estelle, 671 F.2d 152, 153. (5th Cir 1982) reiterating that dismissal for "abuse" of Post Conviction remedies is of "rare and extraordinary application" But see Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 171 (5th Cir 1983) (Williams J. dissenting)

(arguing that the majority had departed from Vaughan and adopted a much less sympathetic approach). see Moore v. Zavitt 885 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir 1989) (applying "new law" exception to abuse of writ issue and holding that under objective standard reasonably competent counsel should have anticipated in November of 1978 extension of Miranda to sentencing phase of bifurcated capital proceeding based on Supreme Court's recognition by that time of applicability of some constitutional protections during sentencing proceeding likewise court held that in 1978 counsel on first habeas petition should have reasonably anticipated extension of constitutional right of confrontation into context of capital sentencing proceeding and as such, initial habeas petition.

Faret v. Whitley 965 F.2d 18 (5th Cir 1992) (if state asserts that petition is abuse of writ then District Court is obliged to address this issue before it reaches merits of case). Sanders v. U.S. 373 U.S. 183 S.Ct. 1068 10. Ed 2d 148 (1963) see § 2:7

see §§ 9:19, -9:22.

The district court error for failing to consider the State's motion for scheduling order waiver of attorney client Privilege to allow Mr Brennan to present his factual support to his allegation /claim Mr Brennan insist that this case fail on the merits and that this court must hold only that the Claims fail on the merits and any basis supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

For those reasons set forth this brief the Petitioner /Appellant Peter Brennan respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district courts order of October 8 2011 and remand this case for further proceeding on his fourteenth Amendment right to due process of the united states constitution and also to allow the district court to conduct an inquiry on Mr Brennan's concern.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^{19th} day of October 2012, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be placed in the united states mail Postage prepaid addressed to:

To The Clerk of the Supreme Court
Mr STEPHEN W. KENYON
P.O. Box 83720
Boise IDAHO 83720-0101

TO NICOLE L. SCHAFER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL Criminal
Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
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
AFFIDAVIT AND PROOF OF SERVICE

Comes Now Peter, Brennan, the appellant in the foregoing matter as captioned and certifies under penalty of Perjury and for false swearing in an official Proceeding that all matters herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, experience belief and recall. The appellant / Petitioner further affirms I have served by first class mail Party / parties listed below the certificate of mailing by placing these matters in the hands of prison authorities for that purpose in accordance with Hovstol vs. Lock 487 U.S. 266 108 S. Ct 2379 (1988). Holding a Prisoner's Pro se Papers subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of October 2012.

Peter, Brennan,
Appellant Petitioner Pro se

Sworn and Subscribed this 19th day October 2012.

James G. Quinn
NOTARY FOR IDAHO



COMMISSION EXPIRES 9-10-2013