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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WILLIAM SHAWN GOODSPEED, and SHELLEE BETH GOODSPEED,

Docket No. 38829-2011

Plaintiffs/Respondents

vs.

ROBERT D. SHIPPEN and JORJA D. SHIPPEN.

Defendants/Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Jefferson County, Case No. CV-09-15 Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, Presiding District Judge.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

Plaintiffs, Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed ("the Goodspeeds"), seek damages and rescission of contract against Defendants, Robert and Jorja Shippen ("the Shippens"), relating to the purchase and sale of a newly constructed home in Rigby, Idaho. The Goodspeeds allege, among other things, that the recurring sub-water issues in the basement breached the implied warranty of habitability. The Shippens knew of the sub-water problem prior to selling the residence and did not disclaim the implied warranty of habitability.

B. Course of Proceedings

Upon learning of the intrusion of sub-water in their newly purchased home and of the subwaters' recurring nature, the Goodspeeds sent notice to the Shippens under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act on September 26, 2008 and October 29, 2008 to allow the Shippens to remedy the sub-water issues. R. Exs. 7 and 8. The Shippens denied this request on November 18, 2008. R. Ex. 9. Accordingly, the Goodspeeds filed suit against the Shippens on January 6, 2009. R. Vol. I, pp. 2 - 9.

During the course of the proceedings, the trial court allowed three subsequent amendments to the Goodspeeds' complaint, with the Third Amended Complaint being the final complaint before the Court. R. Vol. III, p. 567a.

Plaintiffs filed a number of requested jury instructions with the trial court on December 28,

2010, among which was proposed Jury Instruction No. 34, which is the subject of this appeal:

INSTRUCTION NO. 34

Disclaiming a warranty requires a conspicuous provision (text in large, bold, or capital letters) which is clear and unambiguous, fully disclosing the consequences of its inclusion. This places a heavy burden on the builder to show the buyer has relinquished the protection afforded to the buyer by public policy and that the buyer has done so knowingly. By this approach, boilerplate clauses (ready made or form language), however worded, are rendered ineffective thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both parties. A knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied and should be obtained with difficulty.

> *Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin*, 113 Idaho 37, 45 - 47 (1987); *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Garner (2001) "Boilerplate", *Myers*, 114 Idaho 432, 437 (1988).

R. Vol. III, p. 721. As can be seen, the jury instruction was marked with a number of legal authorities on the topic of the proposed jury instruction. *Id.* A jury trial commenced on January 11, 2011 through January 14, 2011. After the evidence was presented. a jury instruction conference was held in chambers on January 14, 2011 to discuss the ramifications of this and other jury instructions. R. Vol. IV, p. 932. Thereafter, counsel was allowed time to preserve their proposed instruction for appeal, which Plaintiffs did as it relates to proposed instruction No. 34. The Court did not give Instruction No. 34 on the basis it had misunderstood from the evidence that the Goodspeeds had actual knowledge of this provision. R. Vol. IV, p. 931.

After the verdict was rendered, the Goodspeeds filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for Reconsideration on February 9, 2011 alleging that it was error for the Court to exclude Jury Instruction No. 34 on the basis, as asserted in the instructions and legal authority submitted therewith, that the disclaimer must not only be understood by the buyer but also that it be clear and conspicuous and not just mere boilerplate language. R. Vol. IV, pp. 863 - 865. Upon review of the record, the District Court recognized that Defendants' counsel had erroneously represented that paragraph 32 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement was specifically explained to and understood by the Goodspeeds. *Id.* at pp. 932 - 934. As such, the district court acted within its discretion and granted a new trial based on this mistake of fact and law. *Id.* at pp. 932-935.

The Shippens subsequently filed this appeal with the Court.

C. Statement of Facts

Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed are from Tennessee. Tr. p.8:14-15. They requested a job transfer and came to Idaho to move closer to family and settle down. Tr. p. 15:11-8, 224:10-20. They liked the Rigby, Idaho area because it offered them a place close to work, family, and outdoor recreational activities. Tr. pp. 8:16 - 9:12, 224:10-20. They wanted a house with enough room for the kids and for Shellee's father to come and live with them. *Id*.

In searching for homes, the Goodspeeds learned of sub-water (water that rises from the ground up due to farmer flood irrigation) in the Rigby area and notified their Realtor, Randy Stoor,

that they had no interest in looking at homes with these issues. Tr. p. 11:20-24; 12:17-23; 116:23 - 117:8. In their home search, the Goodspeeds came upon the Shippen house (319 N. 3709 E, Rigby, Idaho) located in Woodhaven Creek Estates subdivision. Its MLS listing read as follows:

PUBLIC INFO: [...] **THERE HAS BEEN CONCERN ABOUT SUB WATER IN JEFFERSON COUNTY, **HOWEVER THIS HOME HAS NOT HAD SUB ISSUES AND TO GIVE THE BUYER PIECE** [s.i.c] **OF MIND** BUILDER WILL INSTALL A LEACHING SYSTEM AROUND HOME AND PROVIDE 1 YEAR WARRANTY ON CONSTRUCTION**

PRIVATE INFO: There has been some concern about sub water in Jefferson County. This particular home has never had sub issues but to give the buyer peace of mind the builder is going to install a leaching system with a drainage field from the east side to the west side of the home to prevent the possibility of there every [s.i.c.] being any sub issues.

(Emphasis added. Capitalization in original). R. Ex. 1. Both of these sections were made available

to the Goodspeeds without any wrongdoing on the part of their realtor. Tr. pp. 115:7 - 117:16; R.

Ex. 49, Tr. p. 9:6-25. After doing a walkthrough of the house, the Goodspeeds submitted an offer

on the house on June 16, 2007. R. Ex. 3. The Shippens accepted the offer the next day. Id.

This offer was made on a standard real estate form commonly used by Idaho Realtors which

is referred to as Form RE-21. Id. See also Tr. pp. 13:20 - 14:2; 99:21-25; 117:24 - 118:10; 125:18-

25; R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 22:19 - 23:4 and 23:9-13. No evidence was presented that Section 32 of this

agreement stood out or was otherwise brought to the Goodspeed's attention.¹ In fact, the parties never discussed a disclaimer of warranties. Tr. P. 112:14-17; 119:3-9.

Instead, Mrs. Shippen testified she was not aware of anything in the contract that would notify the Goodspeeds the house would not be habitable. Tr. P. 262:8-14. The evidence showed the Goodspeeds intended the home as their primary residence and that it would be habitable. Tr. pp. 13:13-15; 14:15 - 15:6; 15:11-20; 21:12-20; 38:8-13; 41:18-23; 41:24 - 42:15; 104:5 - 105:6; 119:3-9; 225:22 - 226:17. The evidence also showed that the Shippens understood the Goodspeeds would inhabit the home and that the Shippens intended for the home to be habitable. R. Ex. 1, 138:16-23; 145:22 - 146:3; 191:22 - 192:10; 262:1-21.

The Goodspeeds, who are not attorneys and relying on the representations of the MLS listing, even sought to ensure the livability of the home by requesting a builder's warranty for a *minimum*

¹ During the trial, Defendants' counsel read Paragraph 32 to Mr. Goodspeed. Tr. 73:18 - 75:2. He also asked Mr. Goodspeed at trial what he thought some of the terms of that paragraph meant. Tr. 74:6-18. He also asked Mr. Goodspeed if he and his wife signed the agreement. Tr. 74:19-20, 75:21 - 76:11. Mr. Goodspeed was never asked whether he read this provision of the contract before signing it. Mr. Goodspeed was never asked whether his realtor drew his attention to this section or explained this section specifically to him. Instead, Mr. Goodspeed confirmed this was a form agreement and that he believed the home would still be habitable. Tr. p. 114:1-2; 99:21 - 100:4.

Without mentioning paragraph 32, Defendants' counsel did previously ask Mr. Goodspeed generally if his realtor explained the contract to him. Tr. 58: 8-10. However, no further testimony was presented regarding the scope of such explanation, so there can be no determination that paragraph 32 was actually called to the Goodspeeds's attention.

Additionally Defendants' counsel asked Mr. Stoor generally whether as part of his job as a realtor he "goes over" the purchase and sale agreement with his clients and whether he "tries" to explain all of the details. Tr. 126:4 - 10. But Defendants' counsel never asked Mr. Stoor whether he specifically reviewed paragraph 32 with the Goodspeeds in this case or explained it to them. Tr. 126:4 - 128:12. Instead, again, Defendants' counsel simply asked Mr. Stoor what he thought that provision meant and whether there were any particular addendums regarding the implied warranty of habitability. *Id.* Therefore, Defendants never established the Goodspeeds actually knew this provision existed or that this provision was anything more than a boilerplate contract.

of one year. R. Ex. 3, Section 4. They had no intention of disclaiming any warranty of habitability after a year of the purchase. Tr. p. 82:7-10.

Contrary to the Goodspeeds, Robert and Jorja Shippen are both from Jefferson County and have lived there almost their entire lives. Tr. pp. 136:18-24. Mr. Shippen has been in the home construction business for over forty (40) years. Tr. p. 137:20 - 138:5. They are very familiar with sub-water in the county and its causation. Tr. pp. 136:24 - 137:7; 179:23 - 180:1; 258:2-22. In fact, they were aware of sub-water problems in the Woodhaven Creek subdivision before they began to construct the residence. Tr. p. 180:2-5; 258:11-15.

Upon commencing construction in the spring of 2006, the Shippens had the home excavated. Mr. Shippen was involved with the inspections and progress of the home. Tr. p. 186:13-15; 259:22-24. He had a hole next to the foundation of the walkout basement dug even deeper so he could observe the subwater over the course of the construction. Tr. p. 187:14 - 188:14. As the construction continued, subwater began to rise. Tr. p. 188:15-19. He could see it. *Id*. The subwater flooded the basement during the final phases of construction in 2006. Tr. pp 188:20 - 190:1. When Mr. Shippen saw this, he told his wife and son. Tr. pp. 189:21-23; 260:5-8.

The Goodspeeds assert that the Shippens never told them of this flooding. Tr. pp. 20:11-19; 64:15-17; 65:23 - 66:4; 84:14-18; 87:8-21; 102:17-23; 112:5-8; 113: 16-20; 133:25 - 134:2; 226:18 - 227:3. Randy Stoor testified there were no discussions by the Shippens or their realtor about the house having subwater problems. Tr. pp. 117:17-20, 132:19-23. The Shippens never

amended the MLS listing to the house. R. Ex. 1, R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 10:1-17; 10:24-11:22; 117:17-20; 263:21-25. And so the Goodspeeds purchased the residence on or about July 3, 2007. R. Ex. 4.

After purchasing the house, the Goodspeeds immediately began improving the house, including the basement so the family could move in. Tr. p. 21:21-25. Within a few months of purchasing the home, they learned the house had previously flooded. Tr. pp. 22:16-21; 227:4-9. They were shocked and immediately confirmed their understanding of the MLS representations that the home had not had subwater and would not ever have subwater problems. Tr. pp. 22:23 - 23-3; 227:10-16. They contacted Mr. Shippen who told them not to worry about the 2006 flood because it was due to canal rupture. Tr. p. 23:4-24; 227:14-16.

Despite Mr. Shippen's verbal assurance, the home continued to have subwater problems. In September, 2007, the subwater flooded the grass and landscaping near the walkout basement and came within inches of intruding into the house. Tr. p. 23:25-25:10; 83:1-6; 227:25-228:16. The Goodspeeds added a second sub-pump/leaching system to keep the water away. Tr. p. 26:15 - 27:9. Mr. Goodspeed testified he was sure the problem was not from a broken sprinkler pipe because the well pump would be running all the time. Tr. 24:23 - 25:3. No evidence was presented that Mr. Goodspeed had clipped any pipes working on his property. Tr. pp. 1 - 293. Mr. Shippen assured the Goodspeeds subwater would not come into the house. Tr. p. 24:15-17.

In 2008, the Goodspeeds had the same problems occur, with subwater this time intruding through the cracks in the foundation and causing the basement water's lift station to turn on and run

continually. Tr. pp. 25:11-27:15; 83:7-9; 2293 - 230:6; 272:12 - 273:13. The subwater also soaked the carpet and floorboards. Tr. p. 26:4-8. Both sub-pumps/leaching systems were running in 2007 and 2008. Tr. p. 27:10-12. Mr. Goodspeed asked Mr. Shippen what could be done about this now obviously recurring problem, to which Mr. Shippen admitted nothing could be done to stop it. Tr. p. 27:13 - 28:10. The Goodspeeds were met with the same response in their attempts to comply with the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act, and subsequently filed suit on January 6, 2009. R. Ex. 7, 8, and 9.

Since suit was filed, the subwater problems have continued. In 2009, as is evidenced by the DVD and pictures introduced into evidence (R. Exs. 5a-f and 6), the subwater again sprung up in the yard and through the cracks in the foundation. *See also* Tr. pp. 33:19 - 24:14; 36:3 - 38:7; 83:13-15: 231:6 - 242:13. The subwater flooded the entire basement to the depth of a couple of inches and was seeped up by the sheetrock walls six inches high. *Id.* While not in evidence, the house again suffered sub-water problems in the summer of 2011, after the trial.

This recurring problem caused the Goodspeeds to stop finishing the basement in 2008, after the problem was revealed and a pattern of subwater flooding became apparent. Tr. p. 28:11-19. By that time, Shawn had already completed approximately eighty percent (80%) of the basement for his family. Tr. pp. 41:24 - 42:15 The basement covers one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) of the square footage of the house. *Id.* The basement contains virtually all of the mechanical devices that make the home habitable (such as the furnace, water heater, water pump, and water softener). Tr. at p. 38:8-13. As a result, the habitability of the home has been impeded on numerous occasions and the jury should have been instructed on the law as it relates to an adequate disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether the trial court abused its broad discretion by granting a new trial for not instructing the jury on the law regarding a disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial is examined for a manifest abuse of discretion. *Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center*, 135 Idaho 775, 780, 25 P.3d 88, 93 (2001).

"A district court may grant a new trial for an error in law, occurring at the trial." Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). The appellate court exercises free review over the correctness of jury instructions because it is a question of law. *Bailey v. Sanford*, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458, 464 (2004). If such an error in law occurs, "the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(7), *even though* the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence." *Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A.*, 142 Idaho 797, 800 - 801, 134 P.3d 648, 651 - 652

(2006) (emphasis added). A trial court has broad discretion in this ruling. *Sheridan*, 135 Idaho at 780, 25 P.3d at 93.

Thus, the sequence of [the appellate court's] inquiry is: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Id. The trial court has this broad discretion because it "is in a far better position to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of all the evidence."

Id. quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986).

So long as there is evidence presented at trial to support the instruction, the instruction should be given. *Id.* "A requested jury instruction must be given if it is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, *Bailey*, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464, but the determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to the discretion of the district court. *State v. Elison*, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P.3d 483, 489 (2001)." *Craig Johnson Const.*, 142 Idaho at 800 - 801, 134 P.3d at 651 - 652 (2006).

All of these elements have been met and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT JUDGE RECOGNIZED THE ISSUE OF A NEW TRIAL WAS ONE OF DISCRETION.

This Court is charged with primarily determining whether the District Judge recognized his

role as being one of discretion. Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 780, 25 P.3d at 93.

The Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, the District Judge in this case, recognized his role in granting a new trial as one of discretion: "The decision or grant to deny relief pursuant to a motion to reconsider is within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal." (Citations omitted). R. Vol. IV, pp. 924 - 925. Further the Court recognized:

On a motion for new trial, a trial court has broad discretion and may weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. [...]. Unlike the rule which applies to motions for directed verdict or j.n.o.v., a trial court may set aside the jury's verdict and grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a) even though there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. [...]A trial court is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Id. (Citations omitted). Where the District Judge recognized and perceived his role as one of discretion, this Court must next determine whether the District Judge acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion within the legal standards, and whether he reached his decision by an exercise of reason.

II. THE DISTRICT JUDGE ACTED WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF HIS DISCRETION AND CONSISTENTLY WITH THE LAWS REGARDING THE DISCLAIMER OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY.

For more than one hundred (100) years, the Supreme Court of Idaho has stated that the decision to grant a new trial is solely within the discretion of the trial judge and will not overturn that decision in the absence of an abuse of discretion. *Jacksa v. Gilbert*, 4 Idaho 738, 44 P. 555, 555 (1896) ("the action of the lower court will not be interfered with unless the record shows an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court"). In *Jacksa*, while the Court states the jury obviously ignored the jury instructions, it also recognized that the trial court is charged with "correctly stat[ing] the law applicable to the case." *Id.*

Further, the trial court has the discretion to instruct the jury on "any matter it believes necessary and appropriate to aid in resolution of the issues at hand." Idaho R. Civ. P. 51(a)(1).

The trial court in this case further correctly recognized:

A requested jury instruction must be given if it is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, *Bailey*, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464, but the determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to the discretion of the district court. *State v. Elison*, 135 Idaho 546, 552, 21 P.3d 483, 489 (2001). Clearly, a requested jury instruction need not be given if it is either [(1)] an erroneous statement of the law, [(2)] adequately covered by other instructions, or [(3)] not supported by the facts of the case. *State v. Eastman*, 122 Idaho 87, 89 831 P.2d 555, 557 (1992). Even so, when the instructions taken as a whole do not mislead or prejudice a party, an erroneous instruction does not constitute reversible error. *Bailey*, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464.

(R. Vol. IV, pp. 934 - 935) *citing Craig Johnson Const.*, 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651. (Enumeration added). The trial court also recognized (4) "[w]hen a jury verdict is rendered on the basis of incorrect instructions, the appropriate remedy is the granting of a new trial." *Walton v. Portlatch Corp.*, 116 Idaho 892, 897, 781 P.2d 229, 234 (1985). Respondents will address each of these four issues below.

In this case, Judge Anderson recognized that in instructing the jury on the law, there was a critical deficiency that may substantially affect the outcome of the underlying case, namely the failure to instruct on the disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability. Such a determination is within the discretion of the trial court. In an effort to educate the jury on the matter, Goodspeeds filed the following proposed jury instruction:

INSTRUCTION NO. 34

Disclaiming a warranty requires a conspicuous provision (text in large, bold, or capital letters) which is clear and unambiguous, fully disclosing the consequences of its inclusion. This places a heavy burden on the builder to show the buyer has relinquished the protection afforded to the buyer by public policy and that the buyer has done so knowingly. By this approach, boilerplate clauses (ready made or form language), however worded, are rendered ineffective thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both parties. A knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied and should be obtained with difficulty.

> *Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin*, 113 Idaho 37, 45 - 47 (1987); *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Garner (2001) "Boilerplate", *Myers*, 114 Idaho 432, 437 (1988).

R. Vol. III, p. 721.

A. <u>The Proposed Jury Instruction Is a Correct Statement of the Law.</u>

As will be discussed, the implied warranty of habitability rises as a matter of public policy and is only disclaimed with difficulty. An effective disclaimer must fully disclose the consequences of its inclusion, be conspicuous, and actually be the agreement of the parties.

1. The Rise of the Implied Warranty of Habitability.

The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically declared that public policy demands that the rules of *caveat emptor* do not apply to the purchase and sale of a new residence. *Bethlahmy v. Bechtel*, 91 Idaho 55, 67 - 68, 415 P.2d 698, 710 - 711 (1966). Instead, an implied warranty of habitability will be imputed against the builder-vendor² to protect the consumer. *Id.* This is an implied warranty of fitness that the house will be habitable. *Id.* To hold otherwise would be a "manifest denial of justice" where a buyer does not stand on equal ground to inspect the house as a builder who is daily engaged in the building and sale of houses. *Id.* Instead, public policy demands an implied warranty extend from the builder-vendor of the home:

² This warranty extends not only from the builder, but also from the seller/vendor, provided the seller/vendor of the new construction has "expertise in the construction business and exercised control over the construction of [the home], as would a builder developer, then the implied warranty would extend from [the Seller]." *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 48, 740 P.2d at 1033. In *Tusch*, the Court held that because the seller had extensive experience in the road construction industry and periodically stopped by the job site during construction the implied warranty would extend from the seller as well. *Id.* at 48 - 49. *See also Bethlahmy*, 91 Idaho at 67, 415 P.2d at 710 (holding a builder-vendor, bears liability for the warranty of habitability). In this case, Robert Shippen, the principle behind Marriott homes has been in the home construction business for more than 40 years. Tr. pp. 137:17 - 138:5. He was the individual on site inspecting the progress of the home. Tr. pp. 136:13 - 138:15; 147:6 - 9. When he learned of the sub-water, he notified his wife who was also very familiar with sub-water. Tr. pp. 258:15-22; 260:5-8.

The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary home buyer is not in a position to discover hidden defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to place reliance on the builder or developer who sells him a new home, the purchase of which in so many instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes in a lifetime. Courts will judicially protect the victims of shoddy workmanship. Consumer protection demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely on the skill of the builder and that the house is constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended use. The average purchaser is without adequate knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of the component parts of a residential structure.

Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 47, 740 P.2d 1022, 1032 (1987) citing Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo.1979).

The implied warranty of habitability extends to latent (concealed or dormant) defects which manifest themselves within a reasonable time. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 50. It extends to latent defects because "it is unrealistic to expect buyers to consult geotechnical and other experts about defects that are not even apparent."³ *Id.* at 47. The builder is the one who created the latent defect and the builder is in the better position to remedy and guard against such defects. *Id.*

If the habitability of the home is impaired, liability attaches to the builder-vendor of the residential property regardless of fault – a form of strict liability. *Id.* at 46 - 47; *Phillip L. Burner & Patrick J. O'Connell on Construction Law*, §9:72 (2002).

Notably, the habitability of the home need only be impaired for a breach of the implied warranty to arise. *Id*.

³ In this case, where the MLS mentioned sub-water issues were in the county, it specifically stated this house did not have sub-water issues and the Goodspeeds relied on that representation. The MLS listing was never altered.

2. The Boiler Plate Terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement Are Insufficient to Waive the Implied Warranty of Habitability

A disclaimer is strictly construed against the builder-vendor. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 45 - 46. This places a heavy burden on the builder-vendor to show the buyer has relinquished the protection afforded to the buyer by public policy and that the buyer has done so knowingly. *Id.* "By this approach, *boilerplate causes, however worded, are rendered ineffective* thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both parties." *Id. citing Crowder v. Vandendeale*, 564 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (Emphasis added). A knowing waiver of a warranty will not be readily implied and should be obtained with difficulty. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 46; *Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc.*, 114 Idaho 432, 437, 757 P.2d 695, 700 (Ct. App. 1988).

"Boiler plate" language is defined as "ready made" or "fixed or standardized contractual language" (i.e. form language). *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd Pocket Ed., Bryan A. Garner (2001) "Boilerplate". On the contrary, a term that is individually fashioned in an agreement is not boilerplate language. *Snyder v. Miniver*, 134 Idaho 585, 588, 6 P.3d 835, 838 (2000). In that case, the Court affirmed that a standard earnest money agreement sent through the purchasing agent's real estate agent was a "boilerplate" agreement where it was a pre-printed, generic form. *Id.* at 586 - 588. Even the Idaho District Court has recognized that clauses generally found in most real estate agreements are boilerplate clauses. *See Batchelor v. Payne*, 2009 WL 2929264, 2 - 3 (2009) (Holding a merger clause contained in a purchase and sale agreement was boilerplate language where

the same or similar language can be found in most all real estate purchase agreements). A boilerplate agreement can also be identified as a form contract that has spaces to insert various contract terms. *Tucek v. Huff*, 115 Idaho 905, 905, 771 P.2d 923, 923 (Ct. App. 1989).

Restated, it should be clear to both the seller and the buyer that a disclaimer was intended and accepted. If it is not clear or the disclaimer is found in mere boilerplate language, the disclaimer is construed against the builder-vendor.

In this case, the evidence was clear the alleged disclaimer was boilerplate language. Shawn Goodspeed, Randy Stoor (the Goodspeed's realtor), and even Dave Chappel (the Shippen's realtor) testified this was a form or boilerplate contract commonly used throughout Idaho. Shawn Goodspeed testified:

20	Q	Would you please turn to Exhibit Number 3? Do
21	you re	cognize this document?
22	А	Yes. It's the sales – purchase and sales
23	agreen	nent from the transaction.
24	Q	Okay. Did you write every word in that
25	purcha	se and sale agreement?
1	А	No. This is, as I understand, kind of a
2	cookie	e cutter form used for these types of documents.
[]		
21	Q	Was it your intent that the – let me ask
22	this: W	/as this – other than what we just talked about

- this: Was this other than what we just talked about
- 23 in Section 4, is this a pretty standard form contract?
- 24 A Yeah. I think it's just a form that's used
- by, you know, realtors every day.

Tr. pp. 13:20 - 14:2; 99:21-25 (Emphasis added). Randy Stoor confirmed this was a boilerplate

agreement:

.

24	Q Now if you would turn to Exhibit 3,
25	Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3. Do you recognize this document?
1	A Yeah, that's a standard purchase and sale
2	agreement we use. This is the offer that we made on
3	the property.
4	Q I'm sorry. You said that was a standard. Is
5	this a form that's filled out?
6	A It's a form that's printed by the state
7	association or provided, and we fill in the blanks.
8	Q Okay. So kind of a boilerplate type of
9	agreement?
10	A Right.

Tr. pp. 117:24 - 118:10. (Emphasis added). Even Shippens' counsel recognized the Purchase and

Sale Agreement was a form when inquiring of Randy Stoor:

18	Q And now this form that you used, it was
19	prepared by somebody from the realtors association, I
20	take it?
21	A Attorneys hired by the realtor association in
22	Boise.
23	Q And you're probably after this, what, 30 years
24	you are pretty much familiar with this form.
25	A Yes.

Tr. pp. 125:18 - 25. In fact, the Shippens' own realtor recognized this was a form or boilerplate

agreement:

- 19 Q. (BY MR. DUNN:) Is that a standard real
- 20 estate document?
- 21 A. **Yes.**
- 22 Q. I believe it's got a number on it that's
- 23 **fairly common in southeast Idaho.**
- 24 What is that number?

25	A. RE-21.
1	Q. And so in your experience, could you
2	tell the jury what's the purpose of Plaintiff's
3	Exhibit 3, which is the RE-21?
$[\ldots]$	
9	A. The purpose of the document is to
10	present an offer from a prospective buyer through a
11	Realtor to another Realtor who represents a
12	prospective seller in order to eventually consummate
13	a sale.

R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 22:19 - 23:4 and 23:9-13. (Emphasis added). Because the Purchase and Sale Agreement is a boilerplate, cookie cutter, standard form and for the reasons mentioned below, it should be rendered ineffective as a disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability.

3. The Alleged Disclaimer Is Not Conspicuous And Is Therefore Ineffective.

Disclaiming a warranty also requires a (1) conspicuous provision (text in large, bold, or capital letters) which is (2) clear and unambiguous, fully disclosing the consequences of its inclusion. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 45 - 46, 740 P.2d at 1030-1031; *Myers*, 114 Idaho at 437, 757 P.2d at 700. Thus, to disclaim the implied warranty of habitability, not only must the provision meet the clear language requirement, but it must also be conspicuous. Appellants only argue the language was clear, not that it was conspicuous.

The District Judge recognized a definition of "conspicuous" as it relates to commercial transactions under I.C. § 28-1-201:

(10) "Conspicuous," with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or

not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following:

(A) A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; an

(B) Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from the surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.

Idaho Code Ann. § 28-1-201(10) (West). This definition has been accepted in the case of Myers,

114 Idaho at 438, 757 P.2d at 701. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that because the language in the disclaimer contained large, bold, capital letters it was conspicuous. *Id.* While that case dealt with the sale of goods, interestingly it discussed the issue of conspicuous language in the context of disclaiming implied warranties such as the warranty of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose–two theories which in essence are the heart of the implied warranty of habitability and are the product of public policy just like the implied warranty of habitability.⁴ Further, that case acknowledges that "[t]he breadth of implied warranties is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code." ⁵ *Id.* at 437. Not insignificantly, even though the buyer had a chance to read the agreement

⁴ See Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho at 67 – 68, 415 P.2d at 710 – 711.

⁵ That case references Idaho Code § 28-2-316 Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.

In that statute, subsection 2 references language that would satisfy the language requirement of a disclaimer, but recognizes that language must still be conspicuous. Understandably then, there are two parts to a disclaimer of an implied warranty: (1) that the language to disclaim is sufficient, and (2) that it is conspicuous. Subsection 3 of this statute mentions that warranties may be excluded where the purchaser has an opportunity to inspect the goods. However, this Court has stated that buyers of real property are in no position to discover latent defects that may arise as it relates to the habitability of the property. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 47, 740 P.2d at 1032. Therefore, subsection 3 would not apply and the disclaimer must contain not only the right language, but also be conspicuous in nature.

in *Myers*, the Court emphasized that this disclaimer was "*not*" like the other print found in other parts of the document. *Id.* at 438 (emphasis in original). Thus, the language element alone is not enough–the way it is displayed also matters.⁶

While Defendants disavow the authority of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code to define the term "conspicuous", they are firm in their assertion that they are entitled to attorneys fees because the purchase and sale of a home is a commercial transaction. *See Appellant's Brief* at p. 36. That is, Defendants seek relief for attorneys fees under the allegation that a sale of a house is a commercial transaction, but will not defer to the Idaho Code regarding commercial transactions for a definition of conspicuous. Defendants justify this argument with the argument that a home is not a "good". *See Appellant's Brief* at pp. 28 - 29. However, Defendants fail to recognize that the term "conspicuous" is defined under the "General Provisions" of Chapter 1 of that title, not under Chapter 2, dealing with the sale of goods.

Regardless of whether the commercial code applies, while I.C. § 28-1-201(10) contains a very good definition of the term "conspicuous", it is not the only source of understanding for the term "conspicuous." For example, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term "conspicuous" as "obvious to the eye or mind", or "attracting attention". *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, "Conspicuous", <u>www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conspicuous</u> (last updated 2012). *Black's Law Dictionary* defines the term as "clearly visible or obvious". *Black's Law Dictionary*, 2nd Pocket

⁶ See prior footnote.

Ed., Bryan A. Garner (2001) "Conspicuous". Both of these common definitions are in line with the commercial transaction definition of "conspicuous." Text that mirrors the text around it is not obvious to the eye, nor does it attract attention. It is not clearly visible or obvious. Instead, it blends in and is inconspicuous. The typed language is made conspicuous by making it appear in **bold**, *italicized*, <u>underlined</u>, CAPITAL LETTERS, or <u>ALL OF THE ABOVE</u>. Effort must be made to have it stand out or it is not conspicuous.

Other states have recognized that there is more than just a language requirement for a provision to be conspicuous. For example, in *Schulze v. C &H Builders*, the Missouri Court of Appeals again recognized the holding in *Crowder v. Vandendeale*, *supra*, that "to prove a waiver [of the implied warranty of habitability], the seller must 'show [(1)] a conspicuous provision which [(2)] fully discloses the consequences of its inclusion' and [(3)] demonstrate that this agreement was 'in fact" reached; however "[a] knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied." 761 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. Ct. App 1988), *citing Crowder* 564 S.W. 2d at 881, n. 4. Even though the court in that case did not rule on whether the language was conspicuous or not, focusing instead on whether the agreement fully disclosed the consequences of its inclusion in light of conflicting provisions, it is clear that being conspicuous is more than a "full disclos[ure of] the consequences of its inclusion" as Appellants argue in their brief here. It must be a *conspicuous* provision that makes the disclosure. *Id.* It has to visibly set itself apart from the other language.

While the Court may expect such an interpretation from the "Show Me State" of Missouri,

this Court has already recognized the Missouri precedent in Tusch. Notably, this Court addressed

the issue of a boilerplate agreement and being conspicuous in tandem:

The majority of states permit a disclaimer of an implied warranty of habitability, but the disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous and such disclaimers are strictly construed against the builder-vendor. *Belt v. Spencer*, 41 Colo.App. 227, 585 P.2d 922, 925 (1978); *Bridges v. Ferrell*, 685 P.2d 409, 411 (Okla.Ct.App.1984); *Crowder v. Vandendeale*, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.1978) (en banc). *We agree with these courts and particularly with the Missouri Supreme Court:*

[O]ne seeking the benefit of such a disclaimer must not only show a [1] *conspicuous* provision which [2] fully discloses the consequences of its inclusion but also that [3] such was *in fact* the agreement reached. The heavy burden thus placed upon the builder is completely justified, for by his assertion of the disclaimer he is seeking to show that the buyer has relinquished protection afforded him by public policy. A knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied. *Crowder, supra*, at 881 n. 4 (emphasis in original).

The Court explains its approach: "By this approach, boilerplate clauses, *however worded*, are rendered ineffective, thereby affording the consumer the desired protection without denying enforcement of what is in fact the intention of both parties." *Id.*, at 881. *Accord Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., Inc.*, 76 Ill.2d 31, 27 Ill.Dec. 746, 751, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979).

Tusch, 113 Idaho at 45-46, 740 P.2d at 1030 - 1031 (Emphasis and enumeration added). While the

case in *Tusch* did not have a clause regarding a disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability,

the Court immediately continues its analysis after adopting the Missouri standard:

The disclaimers in the instant case fall woefully short of fulfilling these requirements. Because the implied warranty of habitability is

a creature of public policy, public policy dictates that it be waived only with difficulty. The party asserting that it has been waived bears the burden of proving that it has been knowingly waived. *Clearly,* when <u>no mention</u> is made of the implied warranty of habitability in a contract, and the contract contains only general language stating there are no warranties other than those contained within its four corners, any purported waiver of the implied warranty of habitability is ineffective.

Because we find that the implied warranty of habitability has not been disclaimed, we proceed to the next topic.

Id. (Emphasis added). The Court therefore did not analyze whether the language in the *Tusch* agreement was "conspicuous" because quite simply, the language in that agreement did not exist. However, that does not change this Court's adoption of the standard analyzing whether the implied warranty of habitability has been disclaimed. In doing so, the Court sought to ensure as a matter of public policy the implied warranty of habitability is obtained with difficulty. In essence, this adopted standard contains an ever beloved three part test:

1. <u>The disclaimer provision must fully disclose the</u> consequences of its inclusion;

2. <u>The disclaimer provision must be conspicuous</u>, AND

3. <u>The disclaimer provision must in fact be the agreement</u> reached.

In analyzing these three prongs, it is noteworthy that *Tusch* has recognized as a matter of public policy that such a disclaimer will be construed against the vendor, not against the drafter. *Id.* at 45. In this case, the alleged disclaimer fails at least two of the three prongs. It must only fail one to be rendered ineffective.

i. <u>The Disclaimer of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Is Not</u> Conspicuous And Is Mere Boilerplate Language.

The alleged disclaimer in this case states:

32. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This agreement contains the entire Agreement of the parties respecting the matters herein set forth and supercedes all prior Agreements between the parties respecting such matters. No warranties, including, without limitation, any warranty of habitability, agreements, or representations not expressly set forth herein shall be binding on either party.

R. Ex. 3. Notably, Section 32 does not expressly mention "the implied warranty of habitability". It does not even mention the work "implied". But even if the language contained in this provision is deemed sufficient, it is still not conspicuous. No evidence refuted the boilerplate nature of this agreement. There are no blanks filled in relating to a disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability.⁷ *See* R. Ex. 3. As is readily observed, there are no large letters disclaiming the warranty. Further, upon examination of Exhibit 3, this Court will also note that provision 32 is *identical* in format to all thirty-six (36) sections of this agreement. It blends in. It does not stand out. It is not obvious. It does not attract attention. It is not in **bold**, *italic*, or CAPITAL letters to set it apart from the rest of the agreement. It is not in any way *CONSPICUOUS*. Not only must the language exist, however worded, it must also be conspicuous. Therefore, the implied warranty of habitability was not effectively disclaimed.

⁷ While there was some discussion regarding the scope of the "standard Builder's Warranty" the testimony bifurcates the two warranties such that they should not be construed together. Tr. p. 82:1-14.

ii. <u>The Disclaimer Provision Contained in the Boilerplate</u> <u>Agreement Was Not The Agreement Reached.</u>

It is clear from the record all parties intended the residence to be habitable. Because the warranty is implied, the Court may look beyond the four corners of the document to make this determination. "An implied warranty arises as a matter of law so it is not barred by the parole evidence rule." *Standard Brand, Inc. v. Consolidated Badger Co-op*, 89 F. Supp. 5, 9 (E.D. Wis. 1950). *See also Valley Refrigeration Co. v. Lange Co.*, 242 Wis. 466, 471, 8 N.W.2d 294, 297 (1943) (The parole evidence rule does not apply to implied warranties "because the warranty is created by law and not by the parties' agreement."). Further, this Court recognized in *Tusch* that one of the issues as to whether a warranty was disclaimed was whether the disclaimer was in fact the agreement reached. *Tusch*, 113 Idaho at 46. If the Court is to determine whether the parties actually intended to reach the terms of the written agreement, it must necessarily analyze parole evidence.

Here, it is clear everyone expected the residence to be habitable. Mr. Shippen made a representation that the house would be habitable that was never retracted.

1	Q. Okay. If you look at Plaintiff's
2	Exhibit Number 3 – Number 1, excuse me, in the
3	public information section, if you look about
4	two-thirds of the way through that section, there's
5	some asterisk language there where it says: there
6	has been.
7	A. Uh-huh
8	Q. Coud you read into the record what that
9	says?
10	A. There has been concern about subwater in
11	Lefference Country houses this has a here with a low

11 Jefferson County; however, this home has not had sub

- 12 issues, and to give buyer peace of mind excuse
- 13 me builder will install leaching system around
- 14 the home and provide a one-year warranty on

15 construction.

- 16 Q. Okay. And then would you also read that
- 17 private info section.
- [...]

24 25 1 2 3 4	has nev peace o leachir	There has been some concern about ter in Jefferson County. This particular home wer had sub issues, but to give the buyer of mind, the builder is going to install a ng system with a drainage field from the east the west side of the home to prevent the
5	possib	ility of there ever being any sub issues.
6	Q.	Okay. Now, would you classify yourself
7	as a sp	ecialist or a home inspector?
8	A.	No.
9	Q.	Okay. So the only information that you
10	use is i	nformation given to you; is that correct?
11	A.	Yup. That's my assessment and
12	inform	ation given me.
13	Q.	Okay. And you obtained that information
14	in the l	MLS listings from conversations that you had
15		obert Shippen, correct?
16	A.	Correct.
17	Q.	Okay. Was that language that you just
18	read in	the MLS listing, was that ever removed from
19	the MI	S listing?
20	A.	Was it removed?
21	Q.	Yes.

A. I don't believe so, no.

Testimony of Dave Chappel, R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 10:1-17; 10:24 - 11:22. Randy Stoor also confirmed

the no sub-water language was never removed from the MLS listing. Tr. p. 117:21 - 23. The

Goodspeeds relied on the MLS representation, understanding the home had not and would never

have sub issues, thus rendering the entire house habitable:

5	Q Were there other things that gave you peace of
6	mind about purchasing this property in addition to
7	this language here was there other information in the
8	MLS listing that gave you peace of mind?
9	A Yeah, the installation of the pump was, to me
10	just that. Wasn't needed but to ensure peace of mind.
10	· ·
	That's the way it was conveyed to me by Mr. Shippen.
12	It was just going above and beyond to add additional
13	security so there wouldn't be something to worry
14	about.
15	Q He had mentioned – Mr. Dunn had mentioned
16	that there were – he had mentioned that information
17	about public information. Was there anything in the
18	private information that gave you peace of mind?
19	A Is it okay if I look at it again?
20	Q I'm sorry. You can't $-$ I think you have it
21	there.
22	THE COURT: Exhibit Number 1.
23	THE WITNESS: Yeah, where it says this
24	particular home has never had subissues, but to give
25	the buyer peace of mind, the builder is going to
1	install a leaching system with a drainage field from
2	the east side to the west side to prevent the
3	possibility of there ever being any subwater issues.
4	Q So is it your testimony that you had
5	peace of mind from that statement?
6	A Yes.
~	** ****

Testimony of Shawn Goodspeed, Tr. pp. 104:5 - 105:6. (Emphasis added). It was the Goodspeed's

intent to reside in the house as their primary residence. Mr. Goodspeed testified:

- 13 Q. Did you intend to inhabit this home as your
- 14 primary residence?

15 A. Yes. $[\ldots]$ 11 When you purchased the property, Q. 12 did you expect the home to be habitable? 13 A. Of course, it's a brand new home. 14 Q. So did you expect it to continue to be habitable? 15 16 Yeah. I expected to have my family live in A. 17 this home for years, if not generations. 18 Q. Did you epect the workmanship of the home to 19 be covered as well? 20 Yes. A.

Tr. pp. 13:13 - 15; 15:11 - 20. Randy Stoor also confirmed that he understood the Goodspeeds

intended to inhabit the house. Tr. p. 119:3 - 9. If anything, the Goodspeeds were looking to protect

themselves to have the house be habitable any way they knew how:

15	Q. You mentioned that you tried to take steps to
16	protect yourself, as well?
17	A. Yeah, this is where we requested a one year
18	<i>minimum</i> warranty.
19	Q. Okay. So you understood then, Mr. Goodspeed,
20	that there had been a representation that the home had
21	not had subissues and this was installed to just add
22	another layer of protection?
23	A. Yeah, the MLS listing tells us there's never
24	been any flood subwater issues and that it also insures
25	us peace of mind that there won't be any. And then in
1	addition, in Section 4 of this agreement, is where we
2	mentioned builder provides a standard builder warranty
3	for a minimum of one year.
4	Q. Okay. Did you expect the MLS representations
5	to be included in that warranty?
6	A. Of course.

Testimony of Shawn Goodspeed, Tr. pp. 14:15 - 15:6. (Emphasis added). Shellee Goodspeed also

testified of her intent to inhabit the home.

22	Q Okay, and did this MLS listing give you peace
23	of mind about purchasing this property?
24	A Yes, it did.
25	Q Okay, why was that?
1	A Well, it stated in there that were no subwater
2	issues and that there wouldn't be any subwater issues.
3	Q Would you please read there in that exhibit
4	where that's found?
5	A It's under the private info and it's also
6	under the public info.
7	Q Okay, so it's found in two places.
8	A Yes.
9	Q Okay. And you relied on these
10	representations?
11	A Absolutely. Why would somebody put in an MLS
12	listing that the property had never flooded if, indeed
13	it hadn't been flooded? Why would they put that in
14	there.
15	Q You intended to inhabit this house as your
16	primary residence?
17	A Of course, I did.

Tr. pp. 225:22 - 226:17 (Emphasis added). Shellee Goodspeed also testified she was looking for a place to have her father live in the basement of the home and allow rooms in the basement for kids to live in while the kids attended college. Tr. p. 224:13-20.

The Goodspeeds were not reluctant about the habitability of the house. They immediately began landscaping the yard. *Tr.* pp. 21:12 - 20; 41:18 - 23. They immediately finished the driveway. *Id.* And, perhaps most significantly, they immediately began finishing their basement. Tr. p. 41:18

-23. The basement constitutes half of the living space in the house, and the Goodspeeds finished eighty percent (80%) of the basement with the intent of inhabiting the basement before learning of the recurring subwater problem. Tr. pp. 41:24 - 42:15. The basement contains the furnace, the water heater, the pump and water softener. Tr. at p. 38:8-13. They only stopped improving the basement when they realized there was a sub-water problem and that it was recurring–both of which they learned after the purchase of the house. Tr. pp. 22:16 - 23:3; 41:24 - 42:15; 79:22 - 80:15.

Maybe even more revealing is the Shippen's testimony regarding their understanding of the purpose of the residence and the effect of subwater. Mr. Shippen testified:

- 16 Q Do you believe a general contractor should be
- 17 aware of subwater issues?
- 18 A Yes.
- 19 Q And is that because subwater impedes the
- 20 livability of a home?
- 21 A Well, yes. There's a lot of factors involved.
- 22 Q So, yes?
- A Yes, uh-huh.
- $[\ldots]$
- 22 Q Okay. You understood that the Goodspeeds would
- 23 be inhabiting the house as their primary residence?
- A Yes.
- 25 Q Okay. Was there anything in the contract
- 1 you're aware of that should have notified the
- 2 Goodspeeds that the house was not of quality
- 3 construction?
- 4 A It was of quality construction.
- 5 Q Is your answer, no, then?
- 6 A Read the question once more.
- 7 Q Sure is there anything in the contract you're

- 8 aware of that should have notified the Goodspeeds that
- 9 the house was not of quality construction?
- 10 A No.

Tr. pp. 138:16 - 23; 191:22 - 192:10

Further evidence that the parties did not agree on the disclaimer is the fact the parties in communicating through their Realtors never discussed a disclaimer of warranties. Randy Stoor testified:

3	Q.	Okay. And did you have any indication from
4	Shawr	and Shellee Goodspeed that they did not intend to
5	inhabi	t this house?
6	A.	No.
7	Q.	Okay. Did you and Dave Chapple ever discuss a
8	disclai	mer of warranties as it related to this house?
9	A.	No.

Tr. p. 112:14-17; 119:3 - 9. Jorja Shippen testified there was nothing giving the Goodspeeds notice

that the home would not be habitable:

1	sure you've seen that talks about the seller is going
2	to provide a standard builder's warranty. Is that
3	correct?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. You understood that that warranty would likely
6	cover workmanship on the property.
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Okay. And is there anything that you're aware
9	of in this contract that would notify the Goodspeeds
10	that this home would [not] be habitable?
11	A. No.
12	Q. And you understand that they intended to
13	inhabit this home as their primary residence.
14	A. Yes.

- 15 Q. You're familiar with what an MLS listing is;
- 16 correct?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. And you understand that that is a listing that
- 19 is published to the public to showcase a property; is
- 20 this that correct?
- 21 A. Yes.

Tr. p. 262:1 - 21. Additionally, if the Shippens were not concerned with whether they would be liable for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, they would not have installed the leaching system.

It is clear from the evidence that Section 32 was never bargained for-it was just sitting there inconspicuously in the form agreement commonly referred to by Realtors all over the State of Idaho as form RE-21. There was no evidence that it was specifically explained to or brought to the attention of the Goodspeeds.

Because the language was not bargained for and was instead inconspicuous, boilerplate language, Judge Anderson correctly recognized that the jury should be instructed on the standard for the disclaimer of an implied warranty and that the failure to do so was a failure to instruct the jury on the applicable law.

As a result, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.

B. The Proposed Jury Instruction Was Not Covered by Other Jury Instructions.

A jury instruction may be given if it is not addressed by other jury instructions. *Craig Johnson Const., L.L.C.*, 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651. However, it is apparent from the record

that the jury instructions actually given to the jury do nothing to instruct the jury regarding the disclaimer of a warranty. Jury Instructions 15 through 21 address the breach of an express warranty. Nothing in these instructions address the disclaimer of a warranty. Jury Instructions 22 and 23 are the only instructions regarding the implied warranty of habitability. These instructions only discuss the rise of the implied warranty and damages related thereto. They do not address the critical requirements for the disclaimer of this implied warranty. For this reason, Respondents submitted their Proposed Jury Instruction No. 34. *See* R. Vol. III, p. 721.

Even if this Court were to construe that some language in Jury Instructions 15 through 21 may somehow be instructive to the jury on the disclaimer of a warranty, as explained above, as a matter of public policy for consumer protection, the standard for disclaiming an implied warranty of habitability is different than other disclaimers and should be treated independently and fully explained to the jury.

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court where the omitted jury instruction was not covered by other instructions.

C. The Proposed Jury Instruction Was Supported by the Facts of the Case.

A proposed jury instruction must be supported by the facts of the case. *Craig Johnson Const.*, 142 Idaho at 800, 134 P.3d at 651. In the interest of not repeating the arguments and evidence already presented at length, Respondents will briefly outline the facts that support the need for Proposed Jury Instruction No. 34:

- The Purchase and Sale Agreement was a boilerplate agreement. Tr. pp. 13:20 14:2; 99:21-25; 117:24 118:10; 125:18-25; R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 22:19 23:4 and 23:9-13; R. Vol. IV p. 933.
- Provision 32 did not expressly state that an "implied" warranty or the "implied warranty of habitability" is disclaimed. R. Ex. 3, p. 7.
- Provision 32 was not conspicuous, but instead is identical in format to all the prior and following provisions of the agreement. R. Ex. 3.
- While the Goodspeeds signed the agreement and reviewed it with their realtor, no evidence exists that provision 32 was specifically brought to the Goodspeeds' attention. Tr. pp. 73:18 76:11; 126:4 128:12.
- The parties never discussed a disclaimer in the contract. Tr. pp. 112:14-17; 119:3-9; 262:8-11.
- The Goodspeeds intended to inhabit the house. Tr. pp. 13:13-15; 14:15 15:6; 15:11-20; 21:12-20; 38:8-13; 41:18-23; 41:24 42:15; 104:5 105:6; 119:3-9; 225:22 226:17.
- The Shippens intended for the Goodspeeds to inhabit the house. R. Ex. 1, 138:16-23; 191:22 192:10; 262:1 21.
- The Shippens represented in the MLS the home would be protected against sub-water to giver the buyer peace of mind and the MLS was never amended to imply otherwise. R. Ex. 1, R. Ex. 49 Tr. pp. 10:1-17; 10:24-11:22; 117:17-20; 263:21-25.
- The Goodspeeds were not told of the flooding until after the fact of purchase. Tr. pp. 20:11-19; 64:15-17; 65:23 66:4; 84:14-18; 87:8-21; 102:17-23; 112:5-8; 113: 16-20; 133:25 134:2; 226:18 227:3.⁸

⁸ Robert Shippen disputes this point, claiming he notified the Goodspeeds of the sub-water during one of the walkthroughs. Notably this standard does not require the facts to be undisputed, simply that there be facts to support the instruction. The jury is charged with weighing the evidence ultimately deciding the outcome. Regardless, this does not change the fact the jury should have been given the proper instruction on the law to analyze whether in light of the evidence the implied warranty of habitability was disclaimed. The trial judge has broad discretion in making this determination.

- The habitability of the house was impaired by the intrusion of water. R. Exs. 5a-f (Photographs), R. Ex. 6 (DVD), Tr. R. pp. 23:25 28:25; 33:19 35:14; 36:3 38:13; 83:1-15; 227:25 242:14;
- The Goodspeeds stopped improving the home because of the impediment to its habitability. Tr. p. 42:16-22.
- The implied warranty of habitability was not simply a one year warranty. Tr. p. 82:1-14.

As shown in summary here and above, where facts support the issues raised by the law contained in the jury instruction, it should have been presented for the jury to consider in deliberations. Failure to instruct the jury on the law regarding the disclaimer in this case was prejudicial to the Goodspeeds. Judge Anderson correctly recognized this and correctly granted a new trial. This Court should therefore affirm the action of the trial court.

D. <u>Where the Proposed Jury Instruction Was Correct Statement of the Law, it</u> Was Error to Exclude it and a New Trial is Appropriate.

A requested jury instruction must be given if it is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence. *Bailey*, 139 Idaho at 750, 86 P.3d at 464. The trial court also recognized "[w]hen a jury verdict is rendered on the basis of incorrect instructions, the appropriate remedy is the granting of a new trial." *Walton*, 116 Idaho at 897, 781 P.2d at 294. Respondents hereby reincorporate their argument presented in Section II (A) (1 - 3) of this memorandum in support of the fact that proposed Jury Instruction No. 34 is in fact a correct statement of the law in the State of Idaho. To disclaim a warranty, not only must a disclaimer exist, but it must also be conspicuous to the buyer, not just mere boilerplate language, and that the disclaimer must in fact be the agreement of the parties. This

disclaimer must be obtained with difficultly and be construed against the builder. Accordingly, the jury instruction should have been given and a new trial is appropriate.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT REACHED ITS DECISION BY AN EXERCISE OF REASON.

The final element that this Court must evaluate under the standard of review is that of whether the District Judge reached his decision through an exercise of reason. *Sheridan*, 135 Idaho at 780, 25 P.3d at 93. Given the foregoing explanation, and in light of the law and facts, Judge Anderson did not merely hold that a new trial was necessary without further analysis. Instead he held, after considering all the facts and having considered the applicable law, that the alleged disclaimer was a boilerplate, inconspicuous disclaimer where "it is not in bold face type, large text, or capital letters. There are no symbols or other marks that set it apart from the surrounding text. And, it appears among other boilerplate at the end of the Agreement." R. Vol. IV, p. 933. The court further reasoned:

[I]t is possible the jury determined the implied warranty of habitability was not breached because it had been disclaimed by Goodspeeds. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed on how to determine if the implied warranty of habitability had been waived. [...]. This Court cannot rule out the possibility that the proposed jury instruction may have provided needed guidance to the jury regarding the existence and/or waiver of the implied warranty of habitability. Failure to give the instruction may have been prejudicial to Goodspeeds.

Id. Therefore, the trial judge recognized under *Walton*, *supra* that the failure to properly instruct the jury was grounds for a new trial and correctly granted a new trial. His decision should be affirmed.

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL

I. APPELLANTS' REQUESTS FOR FEES SHOULD BE DENIED.

A. The Request for Costs Attorneys Fees at the Trial Level Was Properly Denied.

The issue of attorneys fees below is improperly before this Court. Appellants' request for attorneys fees at the trial level below fails to recognize the trial court's decision as it relates to granting a new trial regarding the warranty of habitability. While Appellants point to law and contract provisions allegedly allowing attorneys fees and costs to the prevailing party, Appellants fail to recognize they have not prevailed.

Further, the agreement states that it relates to "legal action[s] or proceeding[s] which are <u>in</u> <u>any way</u> connected with the Agreement." R. Ex. "3". Appellants themselves argue the contract disclaims any implied warranties. Appellants would therefore have to concede that the contractual issues have not been resolved.

Further the prevailing party determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(A) and (B). "Where [...] there are claims [...], the mere fact that a party is successful in asserting or defeating a single claim does not mandate an award of fees to the prevailing party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates an award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail **'in the action.'**" *Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp.*, 106 Idaho 687, 693, 682 P.2d 640, 646 (Ct. App. 1984). *Citing* Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(B). So just because a party prevails on one, three, or even seven of the claims in the action, that party may still not be considered the prevailing party.

Judge Anderson correctly used his sound discretion in recognizing this principle:

Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial on one of the numerous causes of action that were originally tried. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs could obtain the relief they seek-and ultimately become the prevailing party--if they successfully prove a breach of the warranty of habitability. Accordingly, it would be premature for this Court to issue a decision either granting or denying Defendants' motion for attorneys fees and costs.

R. Vol. IV, p. 957.

Appellants cite to *Johnson v. McPhee* as authority that this Court has the authority to grant fees under 12-120(3) provided the party prevails on the commercial transaction. *Johnson v. McPhee*, 147 Idaho 455, 470, 210 P.3d 563, 578 (Ct. App. 2009). That case did not involve an implied warranty of habitability and dealt instead with separate claims of negligence and a commercial transaction related to a real estate agent's representation of a developer. *Id.* However, if the purchase and sale of a personal residence is recognized as a commercial transaction, surely the warranties, express or implied, that stream from the purchase would also be part of the commercial transaction. Therefore, where Respondents may still ultimately prevail at trial on the warranty of habitability, an award of fees is improper on appeal. Because Appellants are not the prevailing party below, their request for fees and costs should be denied.

B. <u>Appellants' Request for Costs and Attorneys Fees on Appeal Should Also Be</u> <u>Denied.</u>

An award of fees is improper on appeal where the appellants do not prevail. See Idaho Code

§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 40 and 41. Given the trial court's broad discretion and the record that supports the trial court's decision, AppelIants should not prevail in this action.

Regarding I.C. § 12-121, any request for fees must be brought pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(1) which states: "attorneys fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court *only* when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." *See also Sammis v. MagneTek. Inc.*, 130 Idaho 342, 354, 941 P.2d 314, 326 (1997) (denying a request for fees where the position on the appeal was not unreasonable or frivolous). For the aforementioned reasons contained in this Response, Respondents' arguments are well reasoned and based upon well established principals of law.

Regarding I.A.R. 40, again, Appellants must prevail to be granted their costs.

Furthermore, the standard for the award of attorneys fees pursuant to I.A.R. 40 is the same or similar to that of I.C. § 12-121: "an award of attorneys fees on appeal may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party when this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." *Beale v. Speck*, 127 Idaho 521, 539, 903 P.2d 110, 128 (1995). Again, for the aforementioned reasons, Respondents defenses are well reasoned and supported by the aforementioned authorities. Appellants should be denied their requests for costs and fees.

II. RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE GRANTED THEIR FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

Respondents request their attorneys fees and costs in responding to this appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d) and (e), and I.A.R. 40 and 41.

Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, costs are allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the court. *Beale*, 127 Idaho at 539, 903 P.2d at 128.

As it relates to attorneys fees, the Shippens' appeal has been brought frivolously, unreasonably, and/or without foundation. *See Beale, supra*. Further, Respondents are entitled to an award of attorneys fees where appellants request the appellate court to do no more than second guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. *Blaser v. Cameron*, 121 Idaho 1012, 1018, 829 P.2d 1361, 1367 (1991).

In this case, Appellants' position is contrary to the clear legal authority presented above. The plain appearance of Section 32 is obviously inconspicuous, where it matches all the other language in the contract. Plaintiffs have only addressed the content of the warranty (which incidentally does not expressly disclaim the implied warranty of habitability) but fail to address how the language itself is conspicuous or was actually the intent and agreement of the parties. The authority above clearly suggests that conspicuous means more than just including the disclaimer language. The clear evidence before this Court shows that the language was a boilerplate agreement used by real estate agents all over the State of Idaho. Appellants further misrepresent to this Court that Section 32 specifically was brought to the Goodspeed's attention or explained to the Goodspeeds. Judge

Anderson recognized this misrepresentation of fact and granted a new trial. Appellants instead ask this Court to exercise its discretion and stand in the place of the trial court. Accordingly, this Court should likewise deny this appeal and grant Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs in defending this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents, Shawn and Shellee Goodspeed, respectfully request this Court deny this appeal and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial, consistent with the trial court's memorandum decision. Respondents further request their attorneys fees and costs in responding to this appeal. Respectfully submitted this / A day of March, 2012.

NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.

WESTÓN S. DAVIS, ESQ.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this 12 day of March, 2012, by hand delivery or mailing, with the necessary postage affixed thereto.

Robin Dunn (I.S.B. No. 2903) DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC P.O. Box 277 477 Pleasant County Lane Rigby, Idaho 83442	Mailing [] Hand Delivery [] Fax 208.745.8106 [] Overnight Mail [] Courthouse Box
	WESTON S. DAVIS, ESQ.

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PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "1"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "1"

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CO-LIST OFFICE:

Listing Office: Win Star Really (#:3046) Office Phone: (208) 529-8888

CO-LIST AGENT:

Listing Agent: Dave Chapple (#:8240) Agent Phone: (208) 351-9951 Agent Email: chapple21@holmail.com

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PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "3"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "3"

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RE-21 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. READ THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATTACHMENTS. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, CONSULT YOUR ATTORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING.

DATE June 16, 2007
Office Phone # 208-529-8888 Fax #
Phone # 208-351-9951
Office Phone # 208-529-4663 Fax # 208-523-0202
alestate-eastidaho.com Phone # 208-589-4162
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	(B). ITEMS SI	ECIFICALLY	EXCLUDE	D IN THIS SALE NO	2ne		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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RE-ZI RESIDENTEL PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT PAGE 1 of 5 JULY 2008 FORDOM

PROPERTY ADDRESS: 319 N. 3709 E., Rigby, ID 83442

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9. INSPECTION:

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8. INSPECTION: (A). BUYER chooses to have inspection ind to have inspection. If BUYER chooses not to have inspection skip section 9C. BUYER shall have the right to conduct inspections, lawestlyations, tests, surveys and other studies at BUYER's expense. BUYER shall, within <u>7</u> business day(s) of acceptance, complete these inspections and give to SELLER within holice of disapproved of items. BUYER is strongly advised to exercise

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trade rights and to make BUYER'S own added on or provessionals with appropriate qualifications to conduct inspections of the entire property.
(B), FHA INSPECTION REQUIREMENT, Napplicable: "For Your Protection: Get a Home Inspection", HUD 92564-CN must be signed an or before association of this agreement.
(C). SATISFACTION/REMOVAL OF INSPECTION CONTINGENCIES; 1), If BUYER does not within the abiet time period specified give to SELLER written notice of disapproved items. BUYER shall conclusively be deemed to have: (a) completed at inspections, investigations, review of applicable documents and disclosures; (b) elected to proceed with the transaction and (c) secured all liability, responsibility and expense for repairs or corrections other than for bans which SELLER has otherwise agreed in writing forepair or correct.
2). If BUYER does within the strict time period specified give to SELLER written notice of desepproved items, BUYER shell provide to SELLER periods a settlen(s) of written inspection reports, SELLER shall havebusiness day(s) in which to respect to written. The SELLER, at their coller, may correct the items as specified by the BUYERS in their latter or may elect not to do so. If the SELLER agrees to correct the items extended in the BUYERS before with the transaction and proceed to closing. This will remove the BUYER's latter, contingency.
3). If the SELLER electe not to correct the disapproved items, or does not respond in writing within the sufficiency specified, then the BUYER(5) have the option of either continuing the transaction without the SELLER being responsible for correcting these deficiencies or giving the SELLER written notice within business days that they will not continue with the Vénsection and will receive their Eernest Money back.
4). If BUYER does not give such written notice of cancellation within the strict time periods specified, BUYER shall conclusively be deemed to have elected to proceed with the transaction without repairs or corrections other than for items which SELLER has otherwise agreed in writing to repair or correct. SELLER shall make the property available for all inspections. BUYER shall keep the property free and clear of lients; indemnify and hold SELLER handling to correct. Setter shall be under a strict the property and to start of the property free and clear of lients; indemnify and hold SELLER handlings from all liability, claims, damages and costs; and repair any damages ensuing from the inspections. No inspections may be made by any governmental building or zoning inspector or government employee without the prior consent of SELLER unless required by local law.
10. LEAD PAINT DISCLOSURE: The subject property bit is the interval of the not defined as "Target Housing" regarding lead-based paint or lead-based paint hazards. If yas, BUYER hareby acknowledges the following: (a) BUYER has been provided an EPA approved lead-based paint hazard information pamphiel. "Protect Year Femily From Lead in Your Home". (b) receipt of SELLER'S Disclosure of Information and Acknowledgenet Fore and have been provided with all records, test reports or other information, if any, releted to the presence of lead-based paint intervals on said property. (c) that this contract is contingent upon BUYERS right to have the property tested for feed-based paint hazards on said property. (c) that this contract is contingency will terminate, (d) that BUYER hereby waives does not wrave this right, (a) that if test results show unacceptable amounts of test-based paint and remines. BUYER hereby while another subject to the option of the SELLER (to be given in writing) to elect to remove live lead-based paint and correct the problem which must be accomplished before closing. (f) that if the contract is contract.
11. SQUARE FOOTAGE VERIFICATION: BUYER IS AWARE THAT ANY REFERENCE TO THE SQUARE FOOTAGE OF THE REAL PROPERTY OR IMPROVEMENTS IS APPROXIMATE. IF SQUARE FOOTAGE IS MATERIAL TO THE BUYER, IT MUST BE VERIFIED DURING THE INSPECTION PERIOD.
12. SELLER'S PROPERTY DISCLOSURE FORM: Il required by Title 55. Chapter 25 lidaho Coda SELLER shall within tan (10) days after execution of bits Agreement provide to BUYER "SELLER'S Property Disclosure Form" or object acceptable form. BUYER has received the "SELLER'S Property Disclosure Form" or other acceptable form price to signing this Agreement: 🗌 Yee 🔀 No. 🗌 No.
13. COVENANTS, CUNDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (CC& R'S): BUYER is responsible to obtain and raview a copy of the CC& R's fill applicable). BUYER has reviewed CC& R's. Yes R ho
14. SUBDIVISION HOMEOWHER'S ASSOCIATION; BUYER is aware that membership in a Home Owner's Association may be required and BUYER agrees to abide by the Articles of Incorporation, By-Lewis and rules and regulations of the Association. BUYER is further aware that the Property may be subject to essessments levied by the Association described to full in the Dectaration of Covenants. Conditions and Restrictions, BUYER has reviewed Homeowner's Association Documents: Yes No X N/A Association feesibutes are \$
15. "NOT APPLICABLE DEFINED:" The letters "rula." "N/A," "rula.," and "N.A." as used herein are abbreviations of the term "not applicable." Where this agreement verse the term "not applicable" or en abbreviation linered, it shall be evidence that the parties have contemptated certain facts or conditions and have determined that such tacts or conditions and have determined that such tacts or conditions and have determined that such tacts or conditions do not apply to the agreement or transaction herein.
BUYER'S WEDDE (1/2/) CDELS (-1) BOD SELLER'S WELLER'S WELLER'S WELLER'S WEDDE (1/2/0) The torn is prived and disproved by the base dataset and the top REAL TORSE, the This torn has been designed for and a prived of the top and the are manifered at the are manifered at the provided of the area and top and to

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R5-21 RESERVING PURCHASE AND SALE ASKEDICHT PAGE 4 of 6 201 Y, 2008 FENTION PROPERTY ADDRESS: 319 N. 3709 E. Rigby, ID 83442

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14. COSTS PAID BY: Costs in Edition to trace listed below may be incurred by BUYER and SELLER induse atherwise agreed hardin, or provided by 226 725 70

BUYER or SELLER has the option to pay any lander required repair costs to excess of this amount, 728

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					Eagle Policy (Extended)		$\geq \leq$		

7.0 17. OCCUPANCY: BUYER dose down not blend to occupy property as BUYER'S primary rasidance. 211 24

18. FENAL WALK THROUCH: The SELLER grants BUYER and any representative of BUYER reasonable access to conduct a final walk zn through inspection of the premiers approximately 3 calendar day(s) prior to closs of ecorore, NOT AS A CONTINGENCY OF THE SALE, but 224 **3**3 for purposes of satisfying BUYER that any repairs agreed to in writing by BUYER and SELLER have been completed and premises are in 714 recentarity the same condition as on acceptance date of this contract. SELLER shak make promises available for the final wait through and agrees to accept the responsibility and expense for making sure all the utilities are lunced in for the weak through except for phone and cable, if 70 DUYER doos not conduct a final walk through, DUYER specifically releases the SELLER and Broker(s) of any tability 206

240 19. RISK OF LOSS: Prior to cloping of (big spie, all rick of loss abali remain with SELLER. In addition, abouid the previous be metadually 241 342 damaged by fire or other destructive cause prior to closing, this equipment shall be void at the option of the BUYER.

20 20 CL DESTAGE On or before the closing date. BUYER and SELLER she'l deposit with the closing agency at funds and instruments recessery to ш complete the transaction. Cloging means the dels on which all downweaks are wilner recerted or accepted by an escrow speni and the sale 245

complete the iransaction. Groding means the cell on answer on them (Dete) July 2 2007 proceeds are available to SELLER. The closing their be no later them (Dete) July 2 2007 The parties agree that the CLOSING AGENCY for this transaction shall be First American Title 24

localed at Clark Street, Rigby, ID 63442 247 248 248

21. POSSESSION: BUYER shall be entitled to possession of upon closing or update _______ thre ________ A.H. ____. Property taxes and water assessments (using the last available assessment as a basis), rents, interest and reservery, liens, encumbrances or obligations assumed and usines shall be pro-maid at of <u>Day of closing/nacconfing</u>______. 250 31 23 53

24 22. SALES PRICE INFORMATION: SELLER and BUYER hereby grant permission to the brokers and either party to this Agreement, to disclose 255 tale data from his banaccion, including setting price and property stations to the local Association / Board of REALTORS®, multiple sating arrive, its members, its members' prospects, approvers and other protectional users of reel estate sates date. The parties to this Agreement acknowledge that 24 227 sales price information compiled as a result of this Agreement may be provided to the County Assessor Office by other party or by other pany's Broker. 200

23. FACSIMILE TRANSMISSEDN: Facelinite or electronic transmission of any signed original document, and tetramistion of any signed facetimite 29 or electronic transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original. At the request of other porty or the Closing Agency, the parties will confirm lactivite and electronic transmitted signatures by signing an original document.

BUYER'S INE LOSA & LA --X) Date 6-16-07 107) Dete SELLER'S Initials (X of ROL TORON, Inc. This force has been exclusioned for and a provided only for use by real and 10 OCH BERRY 14-10 and provided and an Approximation of REAL TORCES, USE OF LEAVE STICLE PERSON FOR FORCHARTED. Comprise their December 2014 FEAL TORON ST. C. All fight second. This cars by printed and disable

RE 21 RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE AND SALE ADREELENT PADE 4 of & U.Y. 2004 EDDON

n 	17 07 03:52p	Robert D Shippen	SHIPPEN	208-745-8241	p.7
		HUSE AND SALE NORGEMENT PI 85: 319 N. 3709 E.,			B# 24051188
			ictude like other, when appropriate	riale.	
	25 BUSINESS D	AYS & HOURS A busin	ear dev is berein defined as	Monday through Friday, 8:00 A.M. Io	5:00 P.M. In the local lime zone
	where the subject r	aal property is physically i	localed. A besinees day shal	N not include any Saturday or Sunday.	nor shall a business day include
				573-108. The line is which any ext required in the list day a	
		· · ·		be the next subsequent business day.	
	28. SEVERABILIT	Y: In the case that any or	te or mora of the provisions (contained in this Agreement, or any app	fication thereof, shall be investid.
	llegal or unordercer			r of the remaining provisions shall not in	
	thareby,				
				n or legal action of proceedings which at sling party reasonable costs and altorney	
	fees on append.	and pany silon on ellering	· · ·	Build baily resounded correlation	La recar including koor coars sup
		IVER defaults in the cod	formation of this Autosment 1	SELLER has the option of: (1) accepting	the Foreau Monay as Ilouidated
,	damages or (2) punt	uing any other lawful right r	and/or remody to which SELLI	ER may be enlitled. If SELLER elects to	proceed under (1), SELLER shall
				d said bolder shell psy from the Earne on, including, without limitation, the cost	
	appralasi, cradit repo	nt faes, inspection tees an	d allorney's lees; and said ho	ider shall pay any belance of the Earnes	Money, one-half to SELLER and
				R'S Broker shall not exceed the Broker's cept the Eurnest Monay as liquidated da	-
	n eviaulaxe boc doa	smedy, and such shall not	be considered a penalty or to	rfaiture. If SELLER alocis to procood un	der (2), the holder of the Earnest
				half of SEULER and BUYER related to t credit report foos, inspection fees and ac	
1	•	be hold pending resolution		nmale the same as herein agreed, BUYE	P'S Formari Money ((enon)) shtil
I				aucrow fees, appraisals, credit report fees	
	and allomey's fees,	If any. This shall not be co	unaldered as a walver by BUY	ER of any paner lawful right or remody b	o which BUYER may be entitled.
				ny lemination of link contract, BUYER an	
				roker or closing agency, unless mutual w y sheal not be required to take any action	
ł	al Broker's or closing	agency's option and sole (discretion, may interpleted all p	rarties and deposit any montes of things ,	
J	establion and shall	recover court costs and read	sonable allomey's lees.		
				s. Executing an agreement in counterpa	
		poliner constitute one and		igteament signed in counterperte la de	anen 10 na su neĝnist, sun su
	4 DEDDSCENTA	ாவு வைபற்களில்.	Check one (1) hox in Section	1 and one (1) box in section 2 below to or	adium that in this transaction. And
			up(s) with the BUYER(S) and 8		
ŗ	Section 1:				
		olorage working with the	BUYER(S) is acting as an Al	GENT for the BUYER(S).	
				AITED DUAL AGENT for the BUYER(8),	without an ASSIGNED AGENT.
				関ITED DUAL AGENT for the EUYER(\$)	and has an ASSIGNED AGENT
	*	sobly on behalf of the Bl okerase working with the	BUYER(S) is solicy as a NO	NAGENT for the BUYER(S)	
Ş	bection 2:				
			SELLER(S) is acting as an A		
	B. The b	okerage working with the	SELLER(5) is acting as a Li	AITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S)	, without an ASSIGNED AGENT.
		okerage working with the solely on behalf of the SE		NITED DUAL AGENT for the SELLER(S)	and has an ASSIGNED AGENT
		-	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	DNAGENT for the SELLER(S).	
					- 16- 18- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1- 1-
h	es connected to the min	fornitip coalimed above. In ad	dillon, each party confirms that the	sncy Disclosure Brochure adopted or approved by brokerage's agency office policy was made avail	table for Inspection and review. EACH
	ARTY UNDERSTANDS DEPRESENTATION			oroxerage linless there is a broned w	RITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY
	(4 . Co / 6	-16-67		som chaten
- 2	WYER'S INTER'S (and dealer used by the school as service	tion of REAL TOROW by The Lover Land	SELLER'S Indials (X	tale protectionals who are members of the
•	HIGH LINE AND A LINE A		BY ANY OTHER FERBOU IS PROMIS	ITER. Deamphi Hohe Association of REALTORSE. In:	All nghis tase wod.
	NOR H LAMACINE H	HASE AND SALE A GREEMENT PA	OF 5 HE LULY 2005 EDITION	~	

n 	17 07 03:52p Robert D Shippen SHIPPEN	208-745-6241 p.8
	ا المراجع ا	ERITOH
	PROPERTY ADDRESS: 319 N. 3709 E., Rigby, ID 834	442 103: 24051188
		itra Agreement of the perties respecting the gatters barged set forth and supersedes all No warranties, including, without limitation, any warrantly of habitability, agreements or n either party.
	33. THE IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT.	
	34. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY: If BUYER or SELLER is apreament on its behalf warrants his or her awhentry to do so and	is a corporation, permarship, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this to bind BUYER or SELLER,
	35. ACCEPTANCE: BUYER'S offer is made subject to the acce in which property is located) <u>$B'DD$</u> A.M. A P.M. If SI Memory shall be refunded to BUYER on demand.	pplance of SELLER on or before (Date) <u>06/16/2007</u> at (Local Time ELLER does not accept this Agreement within the time specified, the online Spinest
	36. BUYER'S SIGNATURES:	·
		city number of BUYER addendum(s) attached.)
	BUYER Signature Vale. A	BUYER (Print Nama) William S. Goodspeed
	Deto 6-16-07 TEno 1:45 DAME F.M.	Phone # 865-556-7234, 80% #
	Autoreurs 913 Oak Haven Rd,	City Knoxyille State TN Zd 37932
	E-Mail Address	Fax #
		ar fan 197 e 199
	BUYERSIgnature Alle Sod DOOM	BUYER (Print Namo) Shellee B. Goodspeed
	Data 6-16-54100 1:45 DAM GPM	Phone #C @# #
	Address	City5taleDp
	E-Mail Address	Fas S
	37. SELLER'S SIGNATURES	
	Un this data, I/W 6 hereby approve and accept the transaction the part of the SELLER,	n set forth in the above Agreement and agree to carry out all the terms thercef on
	SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHED COUNTER OFFER	· · · ·
	SIGNATURE(S) SUBJECT TO ATTACHED ADDENDATH(B) #	
	A MA	1+ DCL
	SELLER Signature	SELLER (Print Name) Jog Fri fr Migger
	DELO 6/17/07 THE 3. 35 DAM 2P.M.	Phone # 313-6341
	Address 516N3950 E Rig. 67	City Algory State ID TO EP442
I	E-Hall Address _ Shippen canst Qualco. &	24 Fax 2 745-8341
-	₩₩ <u>₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩</u>	₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩
	SELLER Signatura	SELLER (Print Name)
į		Phone #Cell #
,	Address	CityStateZip
	E-Noni Address	Fizz #
	CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION # (If applicable)	
	This is a priced and suscepted by the tipho Association of REALTORSE, Inc. This is	en has beel designed for and is previded enty for use by rook adata protectionals who are members of the
	Hadowi Armonian i FEALTORS Copyright Idaha Arean bi	SELUSE BY ANY OTHER PERSON IS PROFORMED. Son of PEALTURISE, bo, All rights received.
	RE-21 RESDENTIAL PURCHASE AND SALE AS REEMENT PARE & OT \$ 2117, 2008 F	S/N: PCE5-06387

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17 07 03:52p	Robert D Shippen SH			208-745-8241 8) 552-9805	p.9 ج 1
May 24 07		C DUFFIN A Alexander Clark Submers Freme P	02] National Phase Sec		P · ·
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91-11 AQU(\$710-51 1	iy shifted your local local				
R	RE-11 ADDENDL	JM #	······································	(1,2,3, etc.)	E
1.7 , L(1+, 1)	Date: 6	17 - 0.7			20, 25, 000 · ·
THIS IS A LEGAL	LY BINDING CONTRACT, READ FI CONSULT YOUR	HE ENTITE DOGUMENT INC	CLUDING ANY ATT. OUNTANT BEFORI	ACHMENTS, IF YOU HAI ESIGNING	E ANY QUESTIONS,
"Addendiin" meai	IDUM to the Purchase and Sale whit the information below is add previously agreement (such as r	ed material for the apreomer	nt (such av lists ord		the form is being used
		6-16-07		11.4 24	051188
ADDRESS: 3	SALE AGREEMENT DATED:	E. Rigb		93442	Les Alaa
	l'iliam 5. Garal		Tellee B.	Godspeer	
	Boh Shippen				
The undersigned	anics hereby agree as fullows:				
Silers	acceptance is 3	to be externa	lest to	6/18/200	~
at 11:0			to all	other terms	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
			[
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To the extent the t	erns of Dis ADDENDUM madily	y of conflict with any provis	sions of the Purch	abe and Sale Agreemer	
Addenduins or Co Arldendums or C	unter Offers, these terms shall punter Offers not modified by	control. All other lenns o y this ADDENDUM shall	of the Putchase	and Sale Agreement i	neluding all erler
Addenduins or Co Arldendums or C	emis of this ADDENDUM modily unter Offers, these terms shall punter Offers not modified by eminted if year to the alorement	control. All other lenns o y this ADDENDUM shall	of the Putchase	and Safe Agreement i c. Upon its execution b	neluding all prior y holh parties, this
Addenduins or Co Arldendums or C	unter Offers, these terms shall punter Offers not modified by	control. All other lenns o y this ADDENDUM shall	of the Putchase	and Safe Agreement i c. Upon its execution b	neluding all prior y holh parties, this
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Addendiuns er Co Arldendums or C agreisment is prade BUYER:	unter Offers, these terms shall punter Offers not modified by	control. All other lenns o y this ADDENDUM shall	of the Putchase	and Safe Agreement i c. Upon its execution b	neluding all prior y holh parties, this
Addendikins er Co Arlderidums or C agreisment is tradf BUYER:	unter Offers, these terms shall punter Offers not modified by	control. All other lenns o y this ADDENDUM shall	of the Putchase	and Sale Agreement is c. Upon its execution b Date: $6 - 18$ Date: $6 - 14$	neluding all prior y holh parties, this

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RE-11 ADDENDUM # ONE

(1,2,3, etc.)



Date: July 2, 2007

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. READ THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT INCLUDING ANY ATTACHMENTS. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION CONSULT YOUR ATTORNEY AND/OR ACCOUNTANT BEFORE SIGNING. This is an ADDENDUM to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

2 3 1	("Addendum" means that the information below is added material for the agreement (such as lists or descriptions) a to change, correct or revise the agreement (such as modification, addition or deletion of a term)).	and/or r	neans the form is being us
5	PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT DATED:	ID #_	24051188
6	ADDRESS: 319 N. 3709 E., Rigby, ID 83442		
7	BUYER(S): William S. Goodspeed & Shellee B. Goodspeed		×*
8	SELLER(S): Robert Shippen Construction		
9 10 11	The undersigned parties hereby agree as follows:		
12	1. Buyers & Sellers acknowledge that the correct Address for this property is:		
13	3709 E. 319 N., Rigby, ID 83442 and hereby amend the purchase & sale agreeme	ent	
14	(the address used had the street number swapped with the house number)		
15			
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22			
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To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the Purchase and Sale Agreement including all prior 32 33 Addendums or Counter Offers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement including all prior Addendums or Counter Offers not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. Upon its execution by both parties, thi 34 agreement is made an integral part of the aforementioned Agreement. 35

38 BUYER: 37 38 BUYER: SELLER: 39 40 SELLER:

Date: Date: Date: 2 \geq Ô Date: /

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
RE-11 ADDENDUM JULY, 2006 EDITION PAGE 1 OF 1	
Company: Coldwell Banker Eagle Rock	s/N:PCF5-06387
Provided by: Randy Stoor	Printed using Software from Professional Computer Forms Co. y. 7/06

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5"


PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5A"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5A"




PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5B"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5B"




PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5C"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5C"




PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5D"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5D"



PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5E"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5E"



PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5F"

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT "5F"

