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IN THE SUPREME COURT	OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
BIG WOOD RANCH, LLC,)	Supreme Court Docket No. 41265
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,)	-
Appellant,)	Blaine County Case No. CV 2010-842
v.)	
WATER USERS' ASSOCIATION OF) THE BROADFORD SLOUGH AND) ROCKWELL BYPASS LATERAL)	
DITCHES, INC.,	
) Defendant/Counterclaimant,)	
Respondent.)	
Appeal from the District Co	ENT'S BRIEF urt of the Fifth Judicial District n and for Blaine County
Honorable Robert J. Elge	e, District Judge, Presiding
Gary D. Slette ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC P.O. Box 1906 Twin Falls, ID 83303-1906 Attorneys for Respondent	Richard C. Boardman / Erika E. Malmen PERKINS COIE, LLP 1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 500 Boise, ID 83702-5391 Attorneys for Appellant
	FILED - COP APR - 9 2014 Supreme CourtCourt of Appe

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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

The Respondent, Water Users' Association of the Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc. ("Association"), is incorporated in Idaho for purposes of delivering its members' water rights from the Big Wood River. The Association maintains the diversion works and ditches of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass, and charges assessments for those functions pursuant to statutory provisions of the Idaho Code. When the Appellant, Big Wood Ranch, LLC ("BWR"), failed to pay its assessment, the Association commenced a small claims action seeking to recover the amounts claimed to be due and owing by BWR. BWR thereafter filed a declaratory judgment action seeking the court's determination that the Association was not validly formed under the statute, and was therefore not entitled to impose assessments. The Association counterclaimed for declaratory relief relative to the validity of its formation, and the recovery of its unpaid assessments.

B. The Course of the Proceedings.

The Association generally agrees with BWR's recitation of the proceedings in this matter with the following noted exceptions and observations. This matter actually commenced with BWR's Motion to Transfer and Consolidate Small Claims Case as a result of a magistrate case that had been commenced by the Association. R., Vol. 1, pp. 16-20.

With regard to the statement that the trial was conducted "on November 13, 2012, December 18, 2012, and January 4, 2013," trial certainly commenced on November 13, 2012, albeit with the proclaimed "awkward situation" of BWR's failure to attend the trial it demanded despite having been expressly advised by its counsel of the trial date. Tr., p. 13, LL. 23-25. The sole and managing member of BWR, Marc Richards, was in Hawaii. Tr., p. 14, L. 11.

The trial was continued until December 18, 2012, but Mr. Richards failed to appear in court for a second time because he was again in Hawaii. Tr., p. 253, LL. 14-25; p. 254, LL. 1-25; p. 255, LL. 1-22. As a result of Mr. Richards' failure to appear for the trial a second time, the court ordered him to pay the Association's costs and attorney fees for time involved in preparation and travel. Tr., p. 263, LL. 2-12. The trial finally concluded on January 4, 2013, when Mr. Richards decided he would participate.

Following the trial, the court granted judgment to the Association for delinquent assessments in the amount of \$9,500, together with a statutory penalty of ten percent (10%) added to each such delinquent assessment, together with interest on the total amount due at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1304. R., Vol. 2, pp. 404-05. An Amended Judgment was subsequently entered in which the Association was awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of \$2,209.19, and attorney fees in the amount of \$67,075 pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1307. R., Vol. 2, pp. 437-38.

C. Statement of the Facts.

The Association was formed pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-1301, *et seq.* Articles of Incorporation of the Association were filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May 3, 2002. The Bylaws of the Association had previously been adopted on April 16, 2002, after notice had been provided to the owners of water rights on the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass. A list of those original individuals who formed the Association is attached as Exhibit "D" to the

Affidavit of Marc Reinemann. R., Vol. 1, pp. 128-9. BWR has admitted in its discovery responses that the Rockwell Bypass is a man-made ditch. (See Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Gary D. Slette. R., Vol. 1, p. 64.) The Rockwell Bypass was constructed as a result of a judicial decree for purposes of "saving" water. (See Irvin E. Rockwell v. Mans Coffin decree dated August 25, 1949, and recorded in Book 12 of Judgments, page 115, Blaine County, Idaho, attached to the Affidavit of Gary D. Slette as Exhibit "B" [hereinafter the "Rockwell Decree"]. R., Vol. 1, pp. 67-81.) The water rights delivered by the Association are first diverted out of the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough ditch. That water is subsequently diverted out of that ditch approximately a half mile downstream at the Rockwell Bypass headgate. (See Affidavit of District 37 Watermaster Kevin Lakey at R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 7; see also Affidavit of Brian Brockette at R., Vol. 1, p. 132 at ¶ 6. With regard to the half mile separation between the river and the Rockwell Bypass headgate, see Tr., p. 56, LL. 1-8 and Tr., p. 244, LL. 2-8, LL. 12-14.) There is no disagreement that the Rockwell Bypass is a man-made ditch and that the surface irrigation water that flows therein is first diverted out of the river and through a headgate on the Broadford Slough. See Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 18-19 at fn. 7. BWR's surface water rights are diverted out of the Rockwell Bypass.

In 2006, BWR purchased its property on Broadford Road near Bellevue, Idaho. See Deposition of Marc Richards. R., Vol. 1, p. 328 at ¶ 6, LL. 20-23. Marc Richards is the sole member and managing member of BWR. *Id.* at ¶ 7, LL. 1-5. BWR's property was previously owned by Jann Wenner ("Wenner"). *Id.* at p. 10, LL. 22-23. Wenner was one of the original members of the Association as identified on Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Marc Reinemann. R., Vol. 1, p. 128-9. Wenner had paid the Association's invoices for water delivery when he owned the property. R., Vol. 2, p. 394 at ¶ 9. The total acreage that BWR purchased from Wenner is 117 acres. *Id.* at p. 39, LL. 23-25 and p. 40, L. 1. BWR paid Five Million Dollars (\$5,000,000) for its property. *Id.* at p. 40, LL. 17-18. Richards purchased the \$5,000,000 property sight unseen, and admitted that he never inspected the property prior to its purchase. *Id.* at p. 14, LL. 21-23. Richards further admitted that he did nothing with regard to analyzing the water rights on the property or the delivery system prior to that purchase. *Id.* at p. 15, LL. 19-25; p. 16, LL. 1-2. *See also* Tr., p. 306, LL. 17-25; p. 307, LL. 1-4; and p. 311, LL. 3-8. In the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the trial in this matter, the court stated the following in Finding of Fact No. 10:

Marc Richards ("Richards") is the sole member and the managing member of Big Wood Ranch. Big Wood Ranch purchased its property and water rights from Wenner for Five Million Dollars (\$5,000,000) in 2006, sight unseen. The Purchase and Sale Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 40) contained a provision expressly advising Big Wood Ranch to seek advice regarding the validity, quality and quantity of any water right acquired with the real estate it purchased. It also provided that, "Buyer must verify same during the inspection period." Neither Plaintiff nor Richards ever researched or verified any issues pertaining to the property's water rights, or their means of conveyance or delivery, prior to the time that Big Wood Ranch purchased the property.

R., Vol. 2, p. 394.

Because Jann Wenner lived in New York, Wenner had authorized Robert "Archie" Bouttier, another original Association member, to irrigate and farm the property for him. R., Vol. 2, pp. 393-94 at ¶ 8. After BWR purchased the property, Marc Richards met with Bouttier and advised him to continue doing what he had been doing for Wenner with regard to the property. R., Vol. 2, p. 394 at \P 11. As a result of the active irrigation and grazing of the property, Marc Richards personally claimed an agricultural tax exemption from Blaine County based on irrigated farming and grazing. R., Vol. 2, p. 399 at \P 23. When the Association sent invoices to BWR for charges related to the delivery of BWR's irrigation water, BWR refused to pay the same.

The focus of BWR's Complaint and arguments to the district court centered on the allegation that the Broadford Slough was a natural stream, and that, therefore, the Association had not been validly formed for purposes of providing delivery of irrigation water rights as a lateral ditch water users' association. The Association disagreed with BWR's contention which led to the trial that was conducted in this case.

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2	II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
3	1. Should the Association be awarded its costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant
4	to Idaho Code §§ 42-1307, 12-120(1), 12-120(3), 12-121, and I.A.R. Rules 40 and 41?
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1	III. ARGUMENT
2	A. The Association was validly formed for purposes of maintaining the water delivery
4	
5	system of its members.
	In his Affidavit, Marc Reinemann, the secretary-treasurer of the Association, described
6 7	the operation of the water delivery system as follows:
8	12. The Association operates the Rockwell Bypass ditch
9	and the Broadford Slough ditch as a single unified lateral ditch system for the water users whose water is transported by those
10	ditches. All of the irrigation waters are diverted at one point on the Broadford Slough where the Rockwell Bypass headgate is located,
11	and such water is transported in ditches for delivery to the respective places of use as identified in water rights.
12	
13	Stipulation to Augment Record dated March 17, 2014, Exh. A at ¶ 12. The water for all of the
14	water users in the Association is diverted out of the Big Wood River into a ditch known as the
15	Broadford Slough and then subsequently diverted into the Rockwell Bypass. In referring to
16	Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 41 at the trial, he described the ditch that comes off the Big Wood River
17	which is controlled by the Broadford Slough headgate. Tr., p. 55, LL. 1-23. According to Brian
18	Brockette, the Association's lateral ditch manager, the Broadford Slough headgate is 250-300
19	yards below the point where the water is diverted out of the Big Wood River. Tr., p. 243, LL. 9-
20	16. From the point where water is taken out of the river, the Rockwell Bypass headgate is
21	located approximately one-half mile down the Broadford Slough channel. Tr., p. 56, LL. 1-8.
22	Brockette concurred with the estimated ditch length between the Big Wood River and the
23	
24	Rockwell Bypass headgate. Tr., p. 244, LL. 2-8. The water is then conveyed down the Rockwell
25	Bypass and distributed to the water right holders' respective premises.
26	

As specifically found by the district court, the channels of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass were subject to silt accumulation, downed trees and beaver dams. R., Vol. 2, p. 395 at ¶ 14. In order to facilitate irrigation water diversion into the slough ditch, it was necessary to do work within the stream channel of the Big Wood River. This was because of the sand and gravel accretions and river debris that accumulated at the entrance to the ditch that leads to the headgate on the Broadford Slough. Id. The court found, after hearing the relevant testimony, that without such maintenance activities being performed by the Association, the members' water rights would be incapable of being diverted, conveyed or delivered in periods of low river flow during the irrigation season. Id. Dr. Charles E. Brockway stated in his Affidavit that man-made flow obstructions and beaver dams impeded flow in the Broadford Slough which prevented authorized diversions of irrigation rights. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at ¶ 6. Brian Brockette, the Association's lateral ditch manager, attested to the work that was required to be accomplished. An example of the debris that caused problems for the Association can be found in his Affidavit. R., Vol. 1, pp. 134-135. An example of the work that had to be done in the channel of the Big Wood River is also attached to his Affidavit. R., Vol. 1, pp. 136-139.

Robert "Archie" Bouttier testified that prior to the formation of the Association, he owned a backhoe, and that if there was a beaver dam blocking a ditch, he would respond to a phone call and remove the beaver dam. Tr., p. 152, LL. 1-4. However, that informal approach to the provision of system maintenance proved to be insufficient. Marc Reinemann, the secretary/treasurer of the Association, testified that a majority of the work that is required to be done by the Association annually occurs above the Rockwell Bypass headgate in the Broadford

Slough ditch. Tr., p. 79, LL. 2-6. Reinemann testified that Brian Brockette had been employed by the Association as the lateral ditch manager. Tr., p. 87, LL. 18-24. He described the duties of Brockette as being responsible to make certain that both the Rockwell Bypass and the Broadford Slough were capable of conveying water in response to calls from water users to turn in their water. Tr., p. 88, LL. 11-23. In addition to doing repairs and debris removal from the channels, he was also responsible for removal of beavers that created problems for water delivery. Tr., p. 88, LL. 24-25; p. 89, LL. 1-12. Reinemann also testified that Brockette had been appointed a Deputy Watermaster for District 37 to allow him authority to go on property belonging to others where the Broadford Slough passed, but where those individuals were not water right holders. Tr., p. 90, LL. 15-24. Reinemann testified that if the work that related to the Association's expenditures above the Rockwell Bypass headgate wasn't performed, there would be no water flow into the Rockwell Bypass. Tr., p. 107, LL. 18-25; p. 108, LL. 1-3. He further testified that if beaver dams plugged the Broadford Slough above the bypass, flooding would occur. Tr., p. 108, LL. 4-7.

Kevin Lakey, the District 37 Watermaster, testified that neither the IDWR nor Water District 37 had any responsibility for delivering irrigation water below the Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass headgates. Tr., p. 190, LL. 2-15. He testified that Water District No. 37 did not pay Brockette anything for his role as a Deputy Watermaster. Tr., p. 198, LL. 22-24. Brian Brockette had been appointed as a Deputy Watermaster to prevent claims of trespass. Tr., p. 205, LL. 21-24. Brian Brockette confirmed that his appointment as a Deputy Watermaster was to prevent claims of trespassing by non-members of the Association. Tr., p. 232, LL. 1-7. The need for the Association's formation was apparent, because without an organized effort, the ability to deliver water was going to be severely impacted. As observed by Dr. Brockway, the water users on the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass had become increasingly concerned about the creation of aesthetic ponds and other flow obstructions that had prevented water users from obtaining their decreed diversion rates. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at \P 6. The informal arrangement whereby Robert Bouttier had previously used his backhoe to remove a beaver dam or an obstruction of one sort or another was no longer a viable long-term solution. As the court observed in its findings, someone had to perform the routine and regular maintenance of work within the stream channel of the Big Wood River in accordance with Idaho Code § 42-3806. R., Vol. 2, p. 395 at \P 14. It was apparent that something needed to be done, and the group of water users identified by Mr. Reinemann in his Affidavit banded together to form the Association.

B. Idaho Code § 42-1301.

BWR's main contention is that the court erred when it concluded that the Broadford Slough was a "canal", i.e., not a natural watercourse, for purposes of meeting the statutory requirements of Idaho Code § 42-1301. In parsing the words of the statute, BWR contends that the characterization of the slough's channel as a "canal" meant that it was not a "lateral" or a "ditch." The district court expressly found that the terms "ditch" and "canal" are synonymous with one another. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ¶ 20. At trial, the Association observed that numerous Idaho statutes group ditches, canals or other conduits into a single category. *See, e.g.,* Idaho Code \S 42-1102, 42-1104, 42-1106, 42-1108, 42-1201, 42-1202, and 42-1203. The

Association argued that BWR's argument over the terminology was a distinction without a difference for purposes of compliance with Idaho Code § 42-1301.

C. The issue of Broadford Slough not being a natural stream was already decided in

the Rockwell Decree.

The characterization of the Broadford Slough as not being a natural channel appears to

have been addressed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the Rockwell

Decree in 1949. In those Findings, District Judge Glennon stated:

VIII

That from the time said waters were first put to beneficial use by the plaintiff herein, the same have been **diverted from Big Wood River through canals and ditches leading from said Big Wood River** to the lands described in paragraphs IV and V hereof, and were diverted from said river by and through the defendant Watermaster and at the special request of the plaintiff herein, and that the defendant, on his own behalf and the appropriators of the waters of Big Wood River have recognized plaintiff's right in and to the waters hereinbefore set forth, and the right of Plaintiff's use thereof, and have consented and acquiesced therein.

(Emphasis added). *Id.* at VIII. The only way the water identified in the Rockwell Decree gets to its place of use is by a diversion out of the river "through canals and ditches leading from said Big Wood River." The diversion of water from the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough is consistent with the observations of long-time Bellevue area residents who attested to the prior existence of a wooden headgate structure on the Big Wood River in the 1950's at the point where the Broadford Slough ditch begins. Because the issue was already decided in the Rockwell Decree, the court's judgment in favor of the Association on this issue was appropriate.

D. The evidence in the record supported the district court's grant of summary judgment.

The Association contends that the evidence it submitted in the form of various Affidavits substantiated that the Broadford Slough is not a natural stream, and that the Association had been validly formed to conduct its activities as a water delivery organization. *See* R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-171. Assuming, *arguendo*, that the Broadford Slough was a natural stream at some unknown time in history, the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in *Dayley v. City of Burley*, 96 Idaho 101, 524 P.2d 1073 (1974) is instructive on the issue asserted by BWR in this action. In *Dayley, supra*, the City of Burley sought to discharge surface waters into Goose Creek. The Court noted that while Goose Creek was formerly a natural stream, a dam had been constructed across the stream near Oakley. The Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Goose Creek channel had been so altered so as to have lost its character as a natural channel. The same is true in the instant case.

According to the Affidavit of Ed Cameron, the point at which water was diverted out of the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough in the 1950's was regulated by a wooden headgate that he personally observed. R., Vol. 1, p. 143 at ¶ 4. Some time in the 1950's or 1960's, a flood event occurred that destroyed the wooden headgate. *Id.* Thereafter, the Army Corps of Engineers constructed a levee across the banks of the Big Wood River and installed a new headgate. *Id.* at ¶ 5. *See also*, Affidavit of Kevin Lakey which evidenced the existence of a lockable and controllable headgate on the ditch. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 5.

The Affidavit of long-time Bellevue resident, Leroy Lewis, attested to the fact that the slough was previously dried up during the winter months to prevent flooding in the Broadford area. R., Vol. 1, p. 109 at ¶ 5. He had personally observed the old original headgate, and he knew

the Broadford Slough was controlled by that headgate because no water was allowed to flow down the Broadford Slough ditch during the winter. *Id.*

The Affidavit of Lee Peterson, the former Water Master for Water Districts 37 and 37M, acknowledged the existence of a lockable headgate, and the IDWR's posture that the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass were regarded as ditches used for the delivery of water rights. R., Vol. 1, p. 106 at \P 5. Although work within the ditch system had to be undertaken from time to time to keep water flowing to permit delivery of the water rights, Peterson attested to the fact that he was unaware that any stream channel alteration permits had ever been sought or required from the IDWR for such purposes. *Id.* at \P 6.

The Affidavit of Terry Blau presents more compelling evidence that the upper sections of the Broadford Slough above the Rockwell Bypass was not regarded as natural streams. R., Vol. 1, pp. 82-84. Mr. Blau was employed by the IDWR for 35 years, and he administered the Stream Channel Protection Program. *Id.* at \P 2. He administered that program for the IDWR on natural channels in Blaine County. *Id.* at \P 2. He attested to his familiarity with both the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass, and the lockable headgate device for the Broadford Slough. *Id.* at \P 3. Importantly, Mr. Blau further attested to the fact that during his 35-year employment with the IDWR, the area of the Broadford Slough where water was diverted out of the Big Wood River was not considered to be a natural stream. *Id.* at \P 5.

The Affidavit of Kevin Lakey attests to his current role as the Water Master for Districts 37 and 37M in Blaine County. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at \P 3. In that capacity, he was familiar with water right administration on the Big Wood River, the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell

Bypass. From a review of the IDWR records, he was able to ascertain that the Army Corps of Engineers constructed a levee on the Big Wood River at the point where the Broadford Slough ditch had its origin. *Id.* at \P 5. He was also aware that a lockable and controllable headgate was installed to regulate irrigation diversions. *Id.* Paragraph 7 of his Affidavit reads as follows:

7. During the irrigation season, all irrigation water rights that are delivered through the Bypass are diverted from the River, and the volume of such rights is controlled by means of the headgate on the Slough. Another headgate is located immediately below the Slough headgate, and serves as the diversion point for the Bypass. An irrigation check structure is located immediately adjacent to the Bypass headgate as shown in the photograph attached hereto as Exhibit "A". During the irrigation season, boards are placed in that structure so that no flow is allowed to go down the Slough, and all water diverted out of the River must flow down the Bypass for water right delivery.

Id. The photograph attached as Exhibit "A" to his Affidavit depicts conditions as they exist during the entire irrigation season when no water is permitted to run down the Broadford Slough ditch, with all water diverted out of the Big Wood River necessarily flowing down the Rockwell Bypass for delivery to Association members. R., Vol. 1, p. 117. Mr. Lakey attested to the substantial amount of work that has been done and the improvements that have been made by the Association on both the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass ditches. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 8. Mr. Lakey acknowledged that the Association's role in managing the delivery of water rights on the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass had made administration of those water rights much simpler for the IDWR. *Id.* at ¶ 9.

Dr. Charles Brockway attested to the formation of the Association for the purpose of addressing flow obstructions such as man-made ponds that were preventing senior water right users from obtaining their decreed water rights. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at \P 6. Beaver dams also impeded the flow of water in the Broadford Slough which prevented authorized diversions. *Id.*

Brian Brockette is the lateral manager for the Association and is a duly appointed Deputy Water Master for the IDWR. In his Affidavit, Mr. Brockette attested to the significant work that has been done by the Association in maintaining the ditches of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass to facilitate water right delivery. R., Vol. 1, p. 132 at ¶ 4. Numerous photographs he took are attached to his Affidavit, and he detailed what those photographs represent. Additionally, he attached an exhibit to his Affidavit which is a copy of a United States Geological Service map from 1986 that shows a blue line emanating from the Big Wood River, and generally following the Broadford Road right-of-way. R., Vol. 1, p. 170. The ditch that runs alongside the Broadford Road is the man-made Rockwell Bypass ditch. No other ditch or stream channel is depicted lying to the west of the Rockwell Bypass. Portions of the Broadford Slough ditch below the Rockwell Bypass headgate are located to the west of the Rockwell Bypass channel.

In sum, there is no historical evidence that tended to indicate that the Broadford Slough is a natural stream. As indicated by Dr. Brockway in his Affidavit, it has been his experience that channels equipped with lockable and controllable headgates to control water diversions are considered by the State of Idaho to be canals. R., Vol. 1, p. 103 at ¶ 4. The evidence from longtime residents of the Bellevue area show that a wooden headgate existed on the river as early as the 1950's. Lacking any evidence that would allow BWR to meet its burden of proof, the district court reached the conclusion that the Broadford Slough ditch was not a natural channel even if it

1

once was. Even if the Broadford Slough had been proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been a natural channel at the dawn of civilization, the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in *Dayley, supra*, would support the Association's position. Certainly, there is no moving body of water or current in the Broadford Slough during the entire irrigation season, a finding which was required to constitute a natural water course in *Loosli v. Heseman*, 66 Idaho 469, 481, 162 P.2d 393 (1945). See also *Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd.*, 119 Idaho 299, 805 P.2d 1223 (1991). In *Burgess*, the Court found that the Salmon Falls dam had impeded the flow of the creek, but that 25 cfs of seepage continued to flow through the abutments of the dam into the original channel. As a result, the channel met the criteria of a natural water course because water continually flowed in the channel. Kevin Lakey's Affidavit clearly establishes that during the irrigation season, checkboards placed in the Broadford Slough allow no water right delivery. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 7. The Affidavit of Leroy Lewis attested to the fact that the Broadford Slough was dried up in the winter months to prevent flooding. R., Vol. 1, p. 108 at ¶ 5.

This case bears certain similarities to the Court's decision in *Independent Irrigation Co. Ltd. v. Baldwin*, 43 Idaho 371, 252 P. 489 (1926). In that case, Independent Irrigation Company filed suit against the water master for attempting to prevent the diversion and use of water by the Company. The Company claimed an entitlement to use of the water without interference by the water master, because they had constructed "a tight and permanent dam maintained by them, across the slough." The appellants had been using the water in the slough and the natural springs that arose in the slough. The Court stated: The evidence further shows that from the date of the construction of the dam by appellants Scott Slough ceased to be a tributary of Snake River.

43 Idaho at 376. Not unlike the case of *Independent Irrigation Co., supra*, the facts of the instant case show that a tight and permanent dike or levee was constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers, and has operated for more than fifty (50) years. The only water that came into the Broadford Slough ditch from that point is water that has been diverted from the Big Wood River through the ditch to the Broadford Slough headgate. The fact that water may rise into the slough downstream through springs does not change the characterization of the ditch. It is not a natural channel, and the Association is entitled to continue to operate, repair and maintain its ditches pursuant to the statutes governing lateral ditch water users' associations. More than 100 years ago, the California Supreme Court considered a party's claim that a levee placed across a slough did not change the character of the slough's channel from being a natural watercourse. The Court in *Lamb v. Reclamation District No. 108*, 73 Cal. 125, 14 P. 625 (1887), rejected that claim.

The Sacramento River is a large navigable stream, having its sources near the boundary line between the states of Oregon and California, and running for several hundred miles through the northern and central parts of the latter state to the bay of San Francisco. In times of high water it frequently overflows its banks. A great deal of the adjoining land is lower than the banks of the stream; and at times of overflow the surplus water runs down to and over such land, where it remains until it evaporates, or, later in the season when the river is at a lower stage, runs back into the stream. The water at some places pours over the entire bank in continuous sheets for considerable distances, but more commonly finds its way out through the lower parts, or depressions, of the banks, which of course have gradually been worn down deeper and wider by the action of the water. These short depressions by which the water gets through the banks into the lower lands beyond are called sloughs; and Wilkins Slough, mentioned in the complaint, is quite a large

depression of that character, and affords means of escape during overflows for a considerable quantity of water. The lands thus overflowed, and for the protection of which respondent claims the right to maintain said levee, are a part of that large body of swamp and overflowed land acquired by California from the United States by virtue of the act of Congress of September 28, 1850, generally known as the Arkansas act.

73 Cal. at 126. Continuing, the Court stated:

Counsel for appellant contends that Wilkins Slough is within the legal definition of a "watercourse," and argues for the application here of the doctrine that one land-owner on a watercourse cannot dam it so as to flood the land of his neighbor above. But in the first place, appellant is not a riparian owner upon Wilkins Slough. His land is two miles away, and divided from it by a large navigable river. He has no interest in whatever rights landowners on Wilkins Slough, if there were any, might have as between themselves. In the second place, we do not think that Wilkins Slough, as between appellant and respondent at least, is to be treated as a watercourse within the legal meaning of that word. It occasionally happens that a river, in its course from its source to its mouth, divides into two main, permanent channels, each carrying continuously a large part, if not a moiety, of its waters at all stages, and either uniting with the other at a lower point, or continuing to the sea, leaving a delta between the two. But there is nothing here resembling that condition. Wilkins Slough is not a channel or fork, continuously carrying a large part, or any part, of the waters of the Sacramento River. It carries no water at all except "in times of flood," and then the amount which it carries, when compared with the volume of water in the river, is insignificant. In fact, it has no original water of its own at all, but is simply a conduit by which occasionally some of the floodwater of the river escapes into the lower lands adjoining. This same office is performed by every other low place along the bank; and every other part of the levee could be removed as a nuisance if that part of it which is at Wilkins Slough can be so removed. Upon this point we cannot distinguish the case at bar from the case of S. & B. Turnpike Co. v. Green, 99 Ind. 205, where it was held that plaintiff could protect his land from overflow of the Big Blue River by erecting a levee on its bank at a place where there was "a depression washed out across the lands of plaintiff," and where,

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"when there was a rise in said river, the water passed out over said lands of plaintiff," although it caused a greater overflow on the premises of defendant, to its damage.

(Emphasis in original). 73 Cal. at 134-35.

Whether or not Idaho would embrace the California Court's logic in Lamb, it appears

that Idaho case law is supportive of the district court's finding in this case. BWR has cited

Loosli, supra, a case which relied on Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., Ltd., 16 Idaho

484, 101 P. 1059 (1909) in order to reach its decision. In Hutchinson, supra, this Court stated:

"Watson slough is now and at all times herein mentioned and from time immemorial has been a natural watercourse, diverting water from the Snake river, on the west side thereof, and two and one-half miles southwest of Blackfoot, in Bingham County Idaho, and flowing through the said described land of the plaintiff, and on in a general southwesterly direction, emptying its waters into the said Snake river, the said watercourse being about seven or eight miles in length."

There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the natural character of Watson slough, -- as to whether or not it had always carried a stream of water or whether it was dry during certain seasons of the year. It must be conceded, however, that much of the evidence sustains the contention that it is a natural watercourse and has from time immemorial carried a constant stream of water. The court found in favor of this contention. It being conceded by both parties that the court entertained the correct view of the law as to what constitutes a watercourse, it necessarily follows that the court, in arriving at his conclusions of fact, necessarily did so in view and understanding of the correct principle of law. The presumption is strongly in favor of the correctness of the court's finding of fact on that question. Under the well-established rule with reference to findings based on conflicting evidence, we must sustain the finding on this proposition.

(Emphasis added). 16 Idaho at 488-89. The Court is urged to recall the testimony of Kevin

Lakey that no water flows down the Broadford Slough during the irrigation season because it was all diverted into the Rockwell Bypass. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at \P 7. Additionally, Leroy Lewis attested to the fact that the Broadford Slough had been dried up in the winter months to prevent flooding in the Bellevue area. R., Vol. 1, p. 108 at \P 5.

The Court will recall the district court's finding in this case that if the Association did not undertake work in the channel of the Big Wood River to remove accumulated debris and silt during low flow periods, no water would ever get into the Broadford Slough. Only at a point below where the Rockwell Bypass rejoined the Broadford Slough channel was it considered to have "original water" of its own that resulted in the IDWR characterizing that portion of the Broadford Slough channel as a natural watercourse.

If anyone would have known how the Idaho Department of Water Resources had characterized the Broadford Slough as not being a natural stream, it would had to have been Terry Blau, the Stream Channel Protection Program Administrator. During his 35 years of employment with the IDWR, he was aware that the segment of the Broadford Slough beginning at the confluence of the Big Wood River was not regarded as a natural stream until a point below where the Rockwell Bypass rejoined the slough, and became a gaining reach. R., Vol. 1, p. 83 at ¶ 5. It was only after that point that the IDWR regarded the channel as a natural stream. *Id.* Were that not the case, it is apparent that any construction activities in the upper reach of the slough would have been regulated by the IDWR.

Mr. Blau, who submitted an Affidavit under oath, stated as follows:

During the time of my employment with the IDWR, and in my role as the Stream Channel Protection Specialist, the segment of the

Ditch beginning at the confluence of the Big Wood River was not regarded as a natural stream until a point below where the Rockwell By-pass rejoined the slough and became a gaining reach. At that point, the IDWR regarded the channel as a natural stream for purposes of regulation under the Stream Channel Alteration statutes.

R., Vol. 1, p. 83 at ¶ 5.

In BWR's opening Brief, as in the trial of this matter, BWR suggested that the Association does not have any legal right to charge for the maintenance and operation of the Broadford Slough ditch "over which the IDWR has exclusive responsibility." BWR's Opening Brief at p. 26. Kevin Lakey, the District 37 Watermaster, was careful to explain that the IDWR's responsibility for delivery of irrigation water did not include any responsibility beyond diverting water into the Broadford Slough. Tr., p. 190, LL. 1-16. He testified that the IDWR had no repair or maintenance responsibility for either the Broadford Slough or the Rockwell Bypass channels. Tr., p. 198, LL. 3-10. It is clear that there is nothing in law or practice that obligates the IDWR to maintain this or any other irrigation delivery system. Lakey testified that he was aware that the Association had conducted substantial work on the ditches and the headgates, and that the Association's management of the water rights delivery on the slough and bypass made administration simpler for the IDWR. R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 8-9. As the court observed, without such maintenance activities being performed on those ditches, surface water rights would be incapable of being diverted, conveyed or delivered. R., Vol. 2, p. 396 at ¶ 14. The court also specifically found that the administrative functions of Water District No. 37 ceased at the point where water is diverted out of the Big Wood River into the channel leading to the Broadford Slough headgate. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ¶ 18. Finally, the court found that neither

Water District No. 37 nor the IDWR does any maintenance or repair to the ditches of the Broadford Slough or the Rockwell Bypass. *Id.* Even if the Broadford Slough was once a natural channel, it is apparent that it is not today. Mr. Lakey responded to a question posed by Judge Elgee, and informed him that when the Broadford Slough headgate was closed, water would simply back up to the level of the river and stay in the river. Tr., p. 215, LL. 20-24.

E. More than three parties take their water from a common point of diversion.

BWR has asserted that the court failed to make a finding that three or more parties take their water from a common point of diversion. However, the court did find that all Association members' surface water is diverted at the same point in the Big Wood River into the ditch that leads to the Broadford Slough headgate. The court specifically found that all of the water diverted from the Big Wood River into the Broadford Slough ditch is ultimately diverted into the Rockwell Bypass. R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at ¶ 16. Because the membership roster of the Association clearly includes more than three parties, and because the court found that all waters diverted for the water right owners was necessarily diverted at the same point on the river into the Broadford Slough ditch, the Association contends that BWR's arguments in this regard are devoid of merit.

F. The Rockwell Bypass.

BWR contends that the Rockwell Decree mandates the saved water right holders to exclusively maintain the Rockwell Bypass. However, as the court specifically found,

There is nothing in the Rockwell Decree that provides that the saved water right owners have an exclusive obligation to maintain the Rockwell Bypass for the benefit of other users. R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at ¶ 16. As observed by the district court, there are many water users besides the saved water right owners whose water rights are transported via the Rockwell Bypass. There is nothing that mandated that the half-dozen or so saved water right owners had to get out with a pick and shovel to maintain the bypass to the exclusion of other downstream water users whose water rights were transported in the Rockwell Bypass channel. More importantly, the court acknowledged that there was nothing in the Rockwell Decree that mandated the saved water right owners to maintain the first half-mile of the Broadford Slough ditch between the Big Wood River and the Rockwell Bypass headgate. If that work wasn't legitimately performed by the Association, then no one, including the saved water right owners, would be able to have their water rights delivered. The court concluded that there was more maintenance required to deliver BWR's water then just the maintenance work to be performed on the Rockwell Bypass itself, and there was no *exclusive* obligation on the part of the Rockwell Bypass saved water right owners to maintain the Bypass when many other water users utilized the same delivery system, R., Vol. 2, p. 401 ¶ 2.

G. Affirming the district court's decision will not interfere or complicate the state's administration of water rights.

At page 33 of BWR's opening Brief, BWR asserts, *ipse dixit*, that affirming the district court's decision will complicate and interfere with the state's administration of water rights. It is interesting to note that the Association had conducted its maintenance activities for a decade before BWR made this assertion. It is even more interesting for this Court to note what Kevin Lakey stated in his Affidavit regarding the very issue now raised by BWR:

The Association's management of the delivery of water rights on the Slough and the Bypass have made the administration of those water rights much simpler for the IDWR to administer.

R., Vol. 1, p. 115 at ¶ 9.

H.

BWR was not a bona fide purchaser.

Although not raised as an issue on appeal, BWR has obliquely referred to its arguments to the district court that it was a bona fide purchaser ("BFP") without notice of the role of the Association. See BWR's Opening Brief at p. 6, fn. 4. Given the possibility that BWR may again refer to this argument in its Reply Brief, the Association feels compelled to address it here.

For someone who casually paid Five Million Dollars (\$5,000,000) for a piece of property sight unseen, it is indeed curious for BWR to have made the BFP allegation. The district court certainly did not buy into that argument, and it specifically found that BWR never researched or verified any issues pertaining to the property's water rights, or their means of conveyance or delivery, despite the express terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. R., Vol. 2, p. 394 at ¶ 10. The relevant inspection contingency and water right verification language is contained in the Wenner/BWR Purchase and Sale Agreement. R., Vol. 2, p. 227. Additionally, BWR's policy of title insurance contained an exception to insurance coverage which excludes:

> Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or by making inquiry of a person in possession thereof.

R., Vol. 2, p. 242 at ¶ 2.

The district court observed that there was nothing inconsistent with the Association's Bylaws and its ability to assess BWR for the delivery of its water under the relevant statutes regardless of BWR's claim that it was a bona fide purchaser. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ¶ 20. It is apparent that the district court's reference to BWR as a "free rider" was all too appropriate in this case.

The district court was careful to consider the Purchase and Sale Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 40) with regard to the verification of water right issues during BWR's inspection period prior to closing of the transaction. This Court is urged to recall that Marc Richards testified that he did nothing insofar as an inspection or analysis of issues related to water rights for the property. He acknowledged that he made absolutely no inquiry of anyone with regard to any of these issues. In *Imig v. McDonald*, 77 Idaho 314, 291 P.2d 852 (1955), the Idaho Supreme Court commented upon BFP status in the context of a property purchaser, and stated as follows:

It seems to us from the facts that the respondents failed to exercise due diligence and to avail themselves of information easily obtainable and to which their attention had been directed, and they cannot now claim to be bona fide purchasers. (Citations omitted).

77 Idaho at 319. The holding in that case applies equally to the facts of this case. After being charged with verifying issues regarding water rights on the property, Richards simply ignored the contract, and proceeded to purchase the property for \$5,000,000 without making so much as an inquiry of anyone regarding the water rights appurtenant to the property, or the manner in which they were delivered. If there ever was a situation where someone assumed the risk of a lack of inquiry or knowledge, this case presents a compelling example.

In Adams v. Anderson, 142 Idaho 208, 127 P.3d 111 (2005), this Court made a similar

observation:

A bona fide purchaser is one who, at the time of the purchase, paid valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of any outstanding adverse rights of another. (Citation omitted). Additionally, a person is not a bona fide purchaser if he purchased the property with sufficient knowledge to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry.

142 Idaho at 213. Given the language in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, it is certainly clear that BWR was charged with sufficient knowledge to put it on inquiry as to issues pertaining to water rights. The fact that Richards testified in both his deposition and during the trial of this matter that he elected not to do so deprives him of BFP status. Tr., p. 306, LL. 17-25; p. 307, LL. 1-4; p. 311, LL. 3-8 and LL. 23-25.

I. Robert "Archie" Bouttier possessed both actual and apparent authority to call for the delivery of BWR's water.

Mr. Bouttier was an original Association member who farmed the property that is now owned by BWR. He had resided in the area since the mid-1970's. Tr., p. 146, LL. 19-25. He had been familiar with the BWR property since the early seventies. Tr., p. 148, LL. 5-8. At the trial of this matter, he described in great detail the relationship that he had with Jann Wenner, the former owner of BWR's property. As a result of an arrangement with Wenner, Bouttier testified that he maintained and irrigated Wenner's property on an annual basis starting sometime in 1996 or 1997. Tr., pp. 148-150. Following Mr. Wenner's sale of the property to BWR, Mr. Bouttier described his initial meeting with Marc Richards, BWR's sole member. Although he offered to show Mr. Richards around the property, Bouttier explained that Richards wasn't interested in doing that. Tr., p. 154, LL. 12-15. After informing Richards what he had been

doing on the property, Bouttier testified, "And he [Richards] said, well, you can just keep on
doing what you did with Jann, it looks fine to me." Id. at LL. 17-19. Specifically with regard to
the water, the following colloquy occurred between BWR's attorney and Mr. Bouttier:
Q. Fair enough. And you never got to the subject of how the water is delivered to the property?
A. I asked him if he wanted to go up and I'll show him that stuff, and he didn't want to see it.
Tr., p. 155, LL. 3-7. Finally, Mr. Bouttier testified that between 2006 and 2011, he personally

called for the delivery of irrigation water from the Association. Tr., p. 156, LL. 10-14. Mr. Richards confirmed to Mr. Bouttier that he had purchased Jann Wenner's property sight unseen. Tr., p. 161, LL. 18-20. In the court's Findings of Fact, the court found that Bouttier had either express or apparent authority to call upon the Association for the conveyance and delivery of surface water rights appurtenant to BWR's property. R., Vol. 2, p. 394 at ¶ 11. It is abundantly clear that after having heard the testimony of both Mr. Bouttier and Mr. Richards, the court believed the testimony of Mr. Bouttier. See last sentence of Finding of Fact No. 8, R., Vol. 2, p. 394. The court found that BWR was a member of the Association, and that it received a benefit from the Association's activities. R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at ¶ 17. The court found that a benefit had been conferred on BWR by the Association which benefit was not an incidental benefit. Id. The court found that BWR was aware of that benefit by virtue of its knowledge that its property had been irrigated. Id. The court found that the Association had rendered such benefit with the expectation that it would be paid in accordance with the applicable statutes. Id. Finally, the court found that even if not pled, the parties implicitly tried the issues of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit in the trial of this matter consistent with with IRCP Rule 15(b). Id.

One final comment is warranted with respect to BWR's assertion that it knew little, if anything, regarding the irrigating, farming and grazing activities that took place on its property. This Court should view Mr. Richards' assertions in this regard with some degree of skepticism and incredulity. Mr. Richards was asked to explain how he could have obtained an agricultural tax exemption (Exhibit No. 536) which indicated that BWR's property was operated on a crop share basis. Richards acknowledged that, "Archie Bouttier was taking the hay and the alfalfa off the property, and had his horses there eating it." Tr., p. 321, LL. 6-7. When asked if Archie Bouttier was the one who was irrigating BWR's property, Mr. Richards responded, "I would assume so." Tr., p. 321, L. 22. Exhibit No. 537 admitted into evidence was a second Blaine County agricultural tax exemption form. In that document, Mr. Richards testified that he had checked the box to indicate that the property was "owner-operated." Tr., p. 324, LL. 16-25. As part of obtaining the agricultural tax exemption, Richards had advised Blaine County that he had planted 35 or more acres of oat hay during the previous year. When questioned about that supposed activity, he testified that although that is what he had written there, he really hadn't planted anything. Tr., p. 325, LL. 1-6. His representation to Blaine County was simply untrue. Despite having purchased a \$5,000,000 piece of property in a sight unseen condition, the testimony of Mr. Richards made it clear that he had little, if any, knowledge as to what actually took place on his property. Many of his answers at trial were simply "I don't know," or "I don't recall." See, e.g., Tr., p. 326-330.

It became very apparent, and the court specifically found, that the elements of both unjust enrichment and *quantum meruit* were clearly satisfied. BWR received a benefit from the Association with regard to the maintenance of the irrigation water delivery system, and the actual delivery of irrigation water to BWR's property. Contrary to BWR's arguments, there is no basis, statutory or otherwise, that would allow an Association member to opt out of membership in the Association, and then to later opt in. *See* Finding of Fact No. 19 at R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ¶ 19.

The district court found that the Association conferred a substantial benefit upon BWR's property and that the Association's assessments were proper and correctly calculated based upon the statutory provisions. *See* Finding of Fact Nos. 17, 20, 21, and 22. R., Vol. 2, pp. 397-399. The court found that neither the IDWR nor Water District No. 37 provided any product or service to BWR or to the other members of the Association beyond the diversion of water out of the Big Wood River. R., Vol. 2, p. 398 at ¶ 18. The court found that the administrative functions of Water District No. 37 cease at the point where water is diverted out of the Big Wood River into the channel leading to the Broadford Slough headgate. *Id.* Neither Water District No. 37 nor the IDWR do any maintenance or repair on the Broadford Slough or the Rockwell Bypass. *Id.*

It seems evident that BWR was more interested in being a "free rider" insofar as the Association was concerned, and despite having spent \$5,000,000 to purchase its property, Mr. Richards was not about to pay annual assessments for the delivery of the irrigation water, even though they amounted to less than \$1,300 per year. This Court should reject the arguments made by BWR, and should affirm the Findings and Conclusions of the district court.

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2	IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
3	The Association asserts that attorney fees are warranted in this case pursuant to Idaho
4	Code § 42-1307. That section reads:
5	42-1307. Action for assessment – Attorneys' fees. – In case any
6	assessment, as herein provided for is due and unpaid the association may sue to collect the same, in the name of its secretary-treasurer as
7	such, in any court of competent jurisdiction, and in addition to the amount due including all penalties and interest, and all costs incurred
8	in said action, may collect a reasonable attorneys' fee in such action
9	to be fixed by the court.
10	Just as the district court found that the Association was entitled to recover its costs and attorney
11	fees below, this Court should arrive at a similar conclusion on appeal.
12	The Association also contends that Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1) and (3) provide an additional
13	basis for an award of costs and attorney fees in this case. The amount sought to be recovered by
14	the Association was clearly less than \$25,000, and BWR acknowledged that it had received the
15 16	written invoices from the Association for payment of delinquent assessments. Tr., p. 28, LL. 2-18.
17	Idaho Code § 12-120(3) affords a prevailing party the right to recover fees on an open account for
18	services in a commercial transaction.
19	Finally, the Association believes that costs and fees should appropriately be awarded
20	under Idaho Code § 12-121, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. The Association contends that
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22	BWR's appeal, not unlike its case below, was brought and defended frivolously, unreasonably,
23	and without foundation.
24	Under any or all of the statutory provisions enumerated above, an award of costs and fees
25	to the Association would be appropriate.

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V. CONCLUSION

The Association was validly formed by three or more parties who take water from the same point where it is diverted out of the Big Wood River into the ditch leading to the Broadford Slough headgate. The Association agrees with the district court that the terms "ditch" and "canal" are synonymous with one another for purposes of Title 42 of the Idaho Code. All of the Association members' irrigation water is diverted from the Big Wood River at the same point, and is then conveyed via a ditch to the members' respective properties.

The Association was formed out of necessity in order to insure that necessary maintenance and repair work was done within the channels of the Broadford Slough and the Rockwell Bypass. Additionally, the district court recognized the necessity of undertaking work with mechanized equipment in the channel of the Big Wood River in order to allow water to be diverted into the ditch that led to the Broadford Slough headgate. Without undertaking that work, the court found that no water rights could be delivered during low flow periods because of the build-up of debris, silt and rock. Nothing in the Rockwell Decree obligated the saved water right owners to venture above the Rockwell Bypass headgate to do any work in the Big Wood River, or in the half-mile ditch leading from the river to the Broadford Slough headgate.

Marc Richards expressly authorized Robert "Archie" Bouttier to run BWR's property just as he had done in previous years for Jann Wenner. In doing so, Bouttier necessarily had to call upon the Association for the delivery of the irrigation water rights appurtenant to BWR's property. Mr. Richards' rationale as to why he should be a "free rider" was never clearly articulated as found by the district court.

Richards testified repeatedly that although Big Wood Ranch received surface water every year, Big Wood Ranch received no benefit. Nor does Richards believe that he receives any benefit by the efforts of the Association, or anyone else, to maintain the stream between the main channel of the Big Wood River and the Broadford Slough headgate.

R., Vol. 2, p. 397 at ¶ 17. The Association contends that Richards' position was always one of pure obstinacy, and that there never was any legal basis or foundation for BWR's claims made in the Complaint, or in its defense of the Association's Counterclaim.

The decision of the district court should be affirmed, and costs and attorney fees should be awarded to the Association. In 1927, the Idaho legislature provided a mechanism that allowed water users to unite to form an organization such as this Association. The legislature recognized the need for such cooperative efforts at that time, and the efforts of the Association in conducting those activities ninety years later should not be thwarted today.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <u></u>day of April, 2014.

ROBERTSON &, SLETTE, PLLC

BY:

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3	$\frac{\text{CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE}}{\text{M}}$ The undersigned certifies that on the <u>definition</u> day of April, 2014, he caused two (2) true and
4	The undersigned certifies that on theday of April, 2014, he caused two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the
5	following manner:
6	Patrick J. Miller [] Hand Deliver
7	Givens Pursley [1] U.S. Mail 601 W. Bannock St. [] Overnight Courier
8	Boise, ID 83701-2720 [] Facsimile Transmission - 208-388-1300 [] Email <u>pim@givenpursley.com</u>
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11	Gary D. Slette
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