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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

COPY

STATE OF IDAHO,)	
)	No. 43123
Plaintiff-Respondent,)	
)	Elmore Co. Case No.
vs.)	CR-2009-4937
)	
MICHAEL PATRICK MARTIN,)	
)	
Defendant-Appellant.)	

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

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District Judge

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PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT**

**ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT**

FILED - COPY

NOV 23 2015

Supreme Court _____ Court of Appeals _____
Entered on ATS by _____

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case

Michael Patrick Martin appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35(c) motion in which Martin alleged the Idaho Department of Correction miscalculated his parole eligibility date by failing to give him credit for time served on both of his consecutive sentences.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

On June 1, 2010, the district court entered Judgment upon jury verdicts finding Martin guilty of felony driving under the influence and felony leaving the scene of an accident. (#37890 R.¹, Vol. II, pp.469-472; R., pp.31-34.) The court imposed a unified 10-year sentence with six years fixed for the driving under the influence charge and a consecutive five-year sentence with one year fixed for leaving the scene of an accident "for a total unified sentence of seven (7) years fixed and eight (8) years indeterminate with credit for 481 days served against the fixed portion of each sentence[.]" (#37890 R., Vol. II, pp.470-471; R., pp.32-33.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (#37890 R., Vol. II, p.471; R., p.33.) Two weeks later, the court entered a "Sentence Clarification," stating:

The Department of Correction has asked for clarification of the Defendant's sentence imposed on June 1, 2010. The Defendant's sentence is a unified sentence of seven years fixed and eight years indeterminate. On Count I, the Defendant's sentence is for ten years, with six years fixed and four years indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the

¹ Pursuant to the Court's order, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts from Martin's prior appeal in Docket No. 37890 have been augmented to the record in this case. (**Amended** Order Augmenting Appeal, dated June 26, 2015 (emphasis original).)

fixed portion of the sentence. On Count II, the Defendant's sentence is for five years, with one year fixed and four years indeterminate, with credit for time served of 481 days against the fixed portion of the sentence. Thus on Count II, all the fixed time has been served and only indeterminate time remains to be served. The sentences are consecutive.

(R., p.24.)

At the end of the retained jurisdiction period, the court placed Martin on probation. (See R., p.3 (entry dated 11/10/2010).) Approximately 18 months later, the state filed a motion for probation violation. (See R., p.5 (entry dated 05/24/2012).) Martin admitted violating his probation and, on August 6, 2012, the district court revoked Martin's probation and ordered his sentence executed. (#37890, Order Revoking Probation and Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment, dated August 6, 2012 ("2012 Order") (augmentation).)

On September 9, 2013, almost one year after revoking Martin's probation, the court entered a corrected revocation order to add language clarifying that Martin's sentences are consecutive. (Compare R., pp.14-15 ("2013 Corrected Order") with 2012 Order.) Both orders stated Martin would receive credit for 718 days. (R., p.15; 2012 Order, p.2.) Four months later, on January 10, 2014, Martin filed a *pro se* motion asking the district court to "correct" its 2013 Corrected Order to indicate that the 718 days credit for time served should apply to both of his sentences, and to "reflect that the 'fixed' portion of Count II has already been served." (R., pp.17-18 ("2014 Motion").) Martin contended that the 2013 Corrected Order needed to be modified in order for the Department of Correction to grant him credit for time served on Count II. (R., p.18.) The district court denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it did not have "jurisdiction in [Martin's]

criminal case to grant the relief requested” and directing Martin to “file a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to I.C. § 19-4205.” (R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal this order. (See R., pp.6-7 (register of actions reflecting no notice of appeal filed after the court denied Martin’s motion on February 10, 2014).)

Eleven months later, on January 15, 2015, Martin filed a second motion for credit for time served pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c). (R., pp.51-52 (“2015 Motion”).) In his 2015 Motion, Martin requested an order correcting the credit for time served to reflect a parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, and to “acknowledge” he is entitled to credit for time served on both counts, as stated in the Sentence Clarification entered on June 16, 2010. (R., p.52.) Martin’s request was based on the state’s calculation of credit for time served and parole eligibility, which the state provided in response to Martin’s 2014 Motion. (R., pp.52, 55-57.) On February 27, 2015, the district court denied Martin’s motion, stating:

The Defendant has not presented any additional information that the court’s calculation was incorrect under either Idaho Code §§ 18-309 or 19-2603. The Defendant is asking in this motion that the District Court order the Idaho Department of Corrections to calculate his time differently.

The Court has no jurisdiction in this criminal case to grant the relief requested in this motion. Any writ of habeas corpus must be filed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4205. Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion for Correction of Miscalculated Sentence ICR 35 subsection (c) is hereby DISMISSED.

(R., pp.69-70.)

Martin filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s February 27, 2015 order denying his 2015 Motion. (R., pp.71-75.)

ISSUE

Martin states the issue on appeal as:

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Martin's ICR 35(c) motion for correction of his sentence to accurately reflect credit for time served?

(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief"), p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue as:

Is Martin's challenge to his 2015 Motion barred by the doctrine of res judicata? Alternatively, has Martin failed to show the district court erred in denying the relief he requested in his 2015 Motion?

ARGUMENT

Res Judicata Bars Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion; Alternatively, Martin Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion

A. Introduction

Martin asserts the district court erred in denying his 2015 Motion and claims the court's 2013 Corrected Order fails to properly give him credit for time served as evidenced by the Department of Correction's miscalculation of his parole eligibility date. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Martin further asserts the district court was required to remedy this alleged error pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c). (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Because Martin's 2015 Motion is an attempt to relitigate the same issue presented in relation to his 2014 Motion, this Court should find consideration of the 2015 Motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Alternatively, Martin has failed to show error in the denial of his 2015 Motion because he has failed to demonstrate that the district court's 2013 Corrected Order was erroneous or that the district court erred in concluding it did not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to direct the Department of Correction to recalculate Martin's parole eligibility date.

B. Standard Of Review

"Questions of jurisdiction are questions of law over which this Court has free review," State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.3d 979, 981 (2010) (citation omitted), as is the "question of whether an action is barred by res judicata," State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) (citation omitted). "The question of whether a sentencing court has properly

awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is [also] a question of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate courts.” State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts “defer to the trial court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.” State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).

C. Martin's 2015 Motion Challenging His Credit For Time Served Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata

“As a general matter, the doctrine of res judicata holds that in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim.” Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482 (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted). In Rhoades, the Idaho Supreme Court held that “the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration of subsequent Rule 35 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate issues already finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions.” Id. Martin's 2015 Motion, from which he now appeals, is barred by res judicata because it is an effort to relitigate the same Rule 35 claim he previously asserted in his 2014 Motion.

Martin filed his first motion for credit for time served on January 10, 2014.

(R., pp.17-18.) In his 2014 Motion, Martin asserted, in relevant part:

The Corrected Judgment entered on September 9th, 2013, does not reflect that the credit is to be taken from each of the two sentences.

The Corrected [J]udgment does not reflect that the "fixed" portion of Count II has already been served.

Because the wording of the Corrected Judgment entered on September 9th, 2013 does not reflect what was ordered by Judge Wetherell when he imposed the sentence upon the Petitioner, it has caused the Department of Corrections to not grant to the Petitioner the 718 days credit for time served against Count II.

(R., p.18.) Martin also complained: "The time calculation of the Department of Corrections still has me serving a five year period of time" on Count II. (R., p.19.)

The state filed a written response to Martin's 2014 Motion in which it set forth its belief that Martin was entitled to 728 days credit for time served, rather than the 718 days set forth in the court's 2013 Corrected Order, and submitted:

. . . the Defendant's sentence is 10 years, with 6 fixed and 4 indeterminate on count I, followed by 5 years, with 1 fixed and 4 indeterminate on count II. On Count I, Defendant should be granted credit for 481 days served pretrial, 172 days served on his rider and 75 days served on the probation violation for a total of 728 days. On Count II, Defendant is entitled to credit for 481 days served in pretrial incarceration. The State has no objection to the Court correcting the sentence in this matter to reflect the credit as set forth herein. Based on the State's calculations, Defendant's overall sentence, 15 years with 7 fixed (2557 days) and 8 years (2922 days) indeterminate, should be set off by 1209 total days of credit for time served. Therefore, as of the time of the Court's order revoking probation, Defendant had 1348 days to serve before he was parole eligible. His parole eligibility date would be approximately April 15, 2016.

(R., p.28.)²

The district court denied Martin's 2014 Motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction in Martin's "criminal case to grant the relief requested in [his] motion."

(R., p.50.) Martin did not appeal that decision.

On January 15, 2015, Martin filed his second motion for credit for time served, asking the court to "correct" its "time calculation" to reflect a parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016. (R., pp.51-52.) Thus, in his 2015 Motion, Martin sought to relitigate the "matter offered and received" in relation to his 2014 Motion. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. This is apparent given Martin's reliance on the state's response to his 2014 Motion as a basis for relief. (R., pp.51-52, 55-57.) While the language Martin used in his 2015 Motion focused on his parole eligibility date as calculated by the state in its 2014 written response, rather than the Department of Correction's alleged failure to give him credit for time served on Count II, the ultimate purpose of the motion was the same. The facts in Rhoades are instructive on why res judicata precludes consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion.

After a jury found Rhoades guilty of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the district court sentenced Rhoades to death "for the murder and kidnapping charges, and a fixed life term for the robbery charge," but stated that "in the event the death

² The April 15, 2016 parole eligibility date suggested by the state in response to Martin's 2014 Motion is incorrect because it gives Martin 481 days credit for time served on the fixed portion of Count II even though the fixed term for that count is only 365 days. (R., p.70.) It is also based on 10 additional days credit for time served post-judgment, which are not included in the district court's calculation of 718 days. (R., pp.69-70.)

sentences were commuted to life in prison or any other sentence, they would be enhanced by a fixed consecutive term of 15 years for the use of a firearm.” Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 862, 11 P.3d at 481. “Following the imposition of sentence, Rhoades filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence seeking a correction of the sentence ‘heretofore given by providing only one sentence for weapons enhancement per the entire transaction.’” Id. at 862-863, 11 P.3d at 481-482. The district court denied Rhoades’ Rule 35 motion and Rhoades appealed, but he only challenged his convictions, not the denial of his request for Rule 35 relief. Id. at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. Several years after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Rhoades’ convictions, sentences, and the denial of post-conviction relief, Rhoades filed a second Rule 35 motion “asking the court ‘to correct the illegal firearms enhancements imposed in [his] case.’” Id. The district court denied Rhoades’ motion and Rhoades appealed.

On appeal, in response to the state’s res judicata argument, Rhoades asserted the doctrine did not apply because, he claimed, the issue he sought to relitigate in his second Rule 35 motion was “not the same issue litigated earlier.” Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483. The Supreme Court rejected this argument as “without merit,” explaining:

In his first Rule 35 motion, Rhoades moved “to correct the sentence heretofore given by providing only one sentence for weapons enhancement per the entire transaction” Clearly, Rhoades was arguing he should have been given only one sentence enhancement for the entire course of events, rather than the three separate enhancements given by the trial judge. Similarly, in his current motion, Rhoades argues his sentence is illegal because he was given three separate sentence enhancements for conduct which constituted a single, indivisible course of conduct. While the two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they

nevertheless encompass the same issue; namely, whether the district judge erred in giving Rhoades a separate sentence enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted, rather than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of conduct. Thus, Rhoades is now seeking to relitigate the same issue already decided by the district judge and not appealed by Rhoades. Therefore, because consideration of the present motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we affirm the order of the district judge denying Rhoades' Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, albeit on different grounds than those used by the district judge.

Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (ellipses original).

As in Rhoades, consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it is an attempt to relitigate the same issue finally decided in his 2014 Motion.³

D. Even If Consideration Of Martin's 2015 Motion Is Not Barred By Res Judicata, He Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion

Even if this Court concludes consideration of Martin's 2015 Motion is not barred by res judicata, Martin has failed to show the district court erred in denying the motion. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c) authorizes a district court to correct its "computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603" at "any time." On appeal, Martin argues the "district

³ Also as in Rhoades, this Court may affirm based on res judicata even though the district court did not expressly deny Martin's 2015 Motion on this basis. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 864, 11 P.3d at 483 (affirming denial of Rule 35 motion based on res judicata even though district court denied motion on merits); see also State v. Dycus, 154 Idaho 456, 459, 299 P.3d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102, 685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984)) ("Where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal theory.")). The district court did, however, note that it previously considered a similar motion and that Martin had not "presented any additional information that the court's calculation was incorrect." (R., p.69.)

court's corrected order and sentence does not give him full credit for the prejudgment time served on both courts [sic]. The fact that IDOC does not believe he is parole eligible until 2017 is proof of the error in the court's order and sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) "The fact" that Martin believes the Department of Correction has miscalculated his parole eligibility date does not, however, mean the district court's 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous or that the district court erred in denying Martin's 2015 Motion. The court's 2013 Corrected Order is silent on whether the amount of credit authorized applies to one or both of Martin's sentences; the order only provides that Martin should be given 718 days⁴ credit for time served, "which includes time spent on the retained jurisdiction program." (R., p.15.) Although the order does not affirmatively state how the credit for time served should be allocated, Martin cites no legal authority

⁴ The state notes there is a 10-day difference between the 718 days awarded in the court's 2013 Corrected Order (R., p.15), which is also reflected in the Department of Correction's Time Calculation Report (Appendix A), and the 728 days the state relied on its response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which also formed the basis for its suggested parole eligibility date of April 15, 2016, that Martin claims is correct (R., p.57; Appellant's Brief, p.7). Martin, however, does not directly challenge the 10-day difference or offer any argument or authority explaining why the district court's date calculation is incorrect. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-7.) Martin also does not directly challenge, or offer any argument or authority, to support a claim that the Department of Correction's August parole eligibility date is incorrect as compared to his requested April parole eligibility date, which cannot be explained by the 10-day difference in credit for time served. (Id.) Rather, Martin's complaints on appeal center on his assertion that the 2013 Corrected Order is erroneous because it "does not give him full credit for the prejudgment time served on both courts [sic]." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Martin has, therefore, waived any such challenge to the district court's 718-day calculation or the August parole eligibility date. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to support his argument").

for the proposition that it is required to do so. Martin's claim that the district court's 2013 Corrected Order "was written so that he only received credit for prejudgment time served on one of the two counts" is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

Martin's complaints about the district court's 2013 Corrected Order also ignore the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation Report he attached to his 2015 Motion. (R., p.67 (Appendix A⁵)). As noted by the district court, that document "show[s] IDOC credits the defendant with 559 days for jail and 158 days for IDOC **on each offense**. This totals credit for time served for pretrial and probation violation credit for 718 days credited **on each offense toward the fixed time**." (R., p.69 (emphasis added); see Appendix A.) The record, therefore, contradicts Martin's claim that the district court's 2013 Corrected Order has prevented the Department of Correction from giving him credit for time served on both counts. In fact, it appears 718 days credit has been attributed to both counts even though Martin is not entitled to full credit on both.⁶ While the district court, in its Sentence Clarification, awarded Martin credit

⁵ Attached hereto as Appendix A is the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation Report that appears in the record at page 67.

⁶ The state acknowledges that, based on the Time Calculation Report (Appendix A), there appears to be a disparity between the number of days the Department of Correction has credited to Count II and the parole eligibility date it has calculated for Count II; however, that apparent disparity only reinforces the state's position, discussed infra, that Martin must pursue the relief he seeks by filing a habeas petition under I.C. § 19-4205, so that the disparity may be explored in an action to which the Department is a party.

for prejudgment time served on both counts,⁷ Martin is not legally entitled to credit on both counts for time served after judgment was entered.⁸ Indeed, that was not the state's position in its written response to Martin's 2014 Motion, which Martin adopted in support of his 2015 Motion. (R., p.57.) Nor does Martin appear to believe otherwise on appeal as indicated by his assertion that his "proper parole eligibility date" is "approximately April 15, 2016," "as set out in the State's response to his original motion." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Because the record shows that the Department of Correction appears to have given Martin more credit than he is due on Count II, and nothing in the district court's 2013 Corrected Order has prevented Martin from getting more credit than he is due, Martin's only viable argument is that the Department of Correction has

⁷ The district court's award of credit for prejudgment time served on both counts was not consistent with the law as set forth in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352, 630 P.3d 143, 144 (1981), in which the Court held a defendant could not receive prejudgment credit for time served for each separate crime. The Idaho Supreme Court recently overruled Hoch in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d 30 (2015), but concluded its "new interpretation of Idaho Code section 18-309's plain language only prospectively and to cases now on direct review." Nevertheless, the state is not seeking affirmative relief on the misapplication of credit for time served prejudgment.

⁸ "[P]eriods of post-judgment incarceration," including "time spent in the retained jurisdiction program," "must be credited to the sentence." State v. Albertson, 135 Idaho 723, 725, 23 P.3d 797, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Similarly, "if a defendant was arrested for probation violations and spent time in confinement awaiting the disposition of the alleged violations, that incarceration must be credited against the underlying sentence . . ." Id. (citing I.C. § 19-2603, other citations omitted). Unlike I.C. § 18-309, which authorizes prejudgment credit on "the offense," without limitation, Owens, 158 Idaho at ____, 343 P.3d at 33, I.C. § 19-2603 only allows for credit on the defendant's sentence. Martin's "sentence" is for an overall term of 15 years with seven fixed; he is not entitled to double credit for time served on that sentence post-judgment. Nothing in the decisional law of this state or the plain language of I.C. § 19-2603 provides otherwise and Martin does not appear to contend otherwise. (See Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

miscalculated his parole eligibility date. On this point, the district court correctly concluded it did not have jurisdiction in Martin's criminal case to "grant the relief requested." (R., p.70.)


Idaho Code Section 19-4205(2)(c) provides that a prisoner may file an application for writ of habeas corpus to address "[m]iscalculation of his sentence." It is clear that I.C. §19-4205 is the proper mechanism for suing the Department of Correction if Martin believes the Department has calculated his parole eligibility date incorrectly. See Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 139 P.3d 773 (2006).⁹ It is equally clear that I.C.R. 35(c), which only allows the court to determine the amount of credit for time served due to a defendant, is not the proper mechanism for requiring the Department of Correction to recalculate a parole eligibility date. See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 218 P.3d 1143 (2009) (district court jurisdiction under I.C.R. 35 limited by scope of relief authorized by the rule). As such, Martin has failed to show any error in the denial of his 2015 Motion.

⁹ Initiating the cause of action authorized by I.C. § 19-4205 is necessary for the district court to obtain jurisdiction over the Department of Correction and order it to perform whatever act the court deems appropriate. Indeed, in his 2014 Motion, the only case Martin cited was Fullmer, supra. (R., p.19 (citing Fullmer, 143 Idaho 171, 139 P.3d 773).) The district court twice instructed Martin to pursue relief under I.C. § 19-4205 (R., pp.50, 70), and it is unclear why Martin has refused to take this course of action.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Martin's request for relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c).

DATED this 23rd day of November, 2015.



JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of November, 2015, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

DEBORAH WHIPPLE
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P. O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701



JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

JML/dd

APPENDIX A

INMATE COPY

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
OFFICIAL TIME CALCULATION REPORT

COMMITMENT NAME: MARTIN, MICHAEL PATRICK IDOC NUMBER: 96254
★ LAST DATE CALCULATED: 11/02/2012 SEX: M STATUS: Termer PAGE: 1 OF 1

CASE NUMBERS CR09-4937 CR09-4937
SENTENCE NUMBER 5 6
COUNTY ELMORE ELMORE

CRIME DRIV INFLNCE ACCIDENT LV
COUNTS (IDENTICAL TERMS) 1 1
DATE OF CRIME 05.06.07 05.06.07

MINIMUM SENTENCE 6- 0- 0 1- 0- 0
MAXIMUM SENTENCE 10- 0- 0 5- 0- 0

DATE OF SENTENCE 08/06/2012 08/06/2012
SENTENCE EFFECTIVE DATE
CC/CS TO SENTENCE I CS 5
CONSECUTIVE BEGIN DATE 08/18/2016
INDETERMINATE BEGIN DATE 08/18/2017 08/18/2021

JURISDICTION BEGINS
JURISDICTION ENDS
JURISDICTION QUASHED

JAIL CREDITS 559 559
IDOC CREDITS 159 159

★ PAROLE ELIGIBLE 08/18/2016 08/18/2017
FULL TERM EXPIRATION 08/17/2021 08/17/2025

CC = Concurrent, CS = Consecutive, CL = Consecutive to All

REMARKS:
GENERAL 08.08.12AG*/08.08.12 J-AUDIT.BP

STATUS PERIODS:
START LENGTH TYPE

11/01/2012 398 Present at Facility
08/06/2012 87 SENTENCE DATE
11/03/2010 642 RELEASED FROM FACILITY
06/24/2010 132 Present at Facility
05/28/2010 27 SENTENCE DATE